The Trust Deficit in India-Bangladesh Ties

Why in News?

Once described as a model of neighbourhood diplomacy, India-Bangladesh relations are passing through a phase of political distrust. The change of regime in Bangladesh after the 2024 political upheaval, the interim rule under Muhammad Yunus, and the return of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman have not yet produced the expected reset in ties.

The relationship is strained not because channels of communication have collapsed, but because both sides perceive the other as withholding meaningful political and material reassurance.

During the Sheikh Hasina period, India-Bangladesh ties saw significant progress in connectivity, security cooperation, power trade, border management and economic engagement. Bangladesh acted against several anti-India insurgent networks operating from its territory, while India expanded lines of credit, power supply, transit and market access.

However, the 2024 political upheaval in Bangladesh altered this comfort zone. The interim government under Muhammad Yunus adopted a more critical tone towards India, while India was cautious in dealing with the post-Hasina political order. The BNP’s return to power under Tarique Rahman raised hopes of a pragmatic reset, but the first few months have shown that structural mistrust remains deep.

Why has the Trust Deficit Persisted?

1. India’s cautious approach towards the BNP government:

• India has engaged the new Bangladesh government diplomatically, including through high-level visits and participation in the swearing-in ceremony. 
• From Dhaka’s perspective, diplomatic outreach has not been matched by policy concessions. Bangladesh expected India to reverse some measures taken during the interim government’s tenure, especially in trade, transit and visas.

2. Trade and transit restrictions: 

• India withdrew the transhipment facility that had allowed Bangladeshi exports to third countries through Indian land routes. India also imposed port restrictions on some Bangladeshi imports, including readymade garments and processed food items. These decisions are seen in Bangladesh as punitive and as a signal that India is not yet ready to normalise economic relations.
• For India, however, such measures have been justified in terms of logistics, reciprocity, domestic industry concerns and border management.

3. Visa restrictions and people-to-people disruption:

• The India-Bangladesh relationship has historically been sustained by dense people-to-people links. Medical travel, student movement, family visits, trade travel and tourism have all created social stakes in stability. Hence, visa restrictions add to the trust deficit. 

4. Illegal migration and domestic politics in India: 

• The issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh is politically sensitive in Indian States such as West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. 
• Bangladesh, however, sees aggressive rhetoric on illegal immigration as a diplomatic irritant and an insult to its national dignity.
• Bangladesh has alleged attempts to force people into its territory, while India has maintained that repatriation must be dealt with through existing bilateral mechanisms. This shows how a border-management issue can quickly become a larger diplomatic flashpoint.

5. Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India:

• The continued presence of the former Prime Minister in India remains a sensitive issue. The interim government had taken a hardline position on this matter. The BNP has tried to soften the tone by indicating that Hasina’s presence need not permanently hold the relationship hostage.

6. The Ganga Water Treaty and water insecurity: 

• The 1996 Ganga Water Sharing Treaty is due for renewal in December 2026. This is one of the most important issues in bilateral relations because Bangladesh is a lower riparian country and depends heavily on predictable dry-season flows of the Ganga/Padma system.
• Any delay in renewal may affect irrigation, agriculture, navigation, fisheries, salinity management and public opinion in Bangladesh. Projects such as the Ganges-Kobadak irrigation system in western Bangladesh are linked to the reliability of Ganga/Padma water flows.

7. China factor in Bangladesh’s foreign policy

• Bangladesh’s affiliation towards China is partly structural and partly tactical. China is a major investor in infrastructure, defence supplies and connectivity projects.
• For India, this raises strategic concerns because Bangladesh sits at the heart of the Bay of Bengal and India’s eastern neighbourhood. A stronger Chinese presence in Bangladesh could affect India’s maritime security, connectivity ambitions and Northeast strategy.

Why Bangladesh Matters to India?

• Security of the Northeast: Bangladesh is crucial for India’s internal security because of its proximity to Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya and Mizoram. Past cooperation helped India reduce insurgent sanctuaries and improve border security. Any deterioration in ties can affect security in the Northeast.
• Connectivity and Act East Policy: Bangladesh provides India with the most practical land and river connectivity route to the Northeast and Southeast Asia. Projects involving road, rail, inland waterways and ports are central to India’s Act East Policy and BIMSTEC vision.
• Trade and regional integration: Bangladesh is one of India’s most important neighbours in terms of trade, market access and supply chains. Disruption in trade and transit affects not only bilateral commerce but also India’s regional integration with Nepal, Bhutan and the Bay of Bengal region.
• Maritime security in the Bay of Bengal: Bangladesh is a key Bay of Bengal littoral state. Its strategic alignment affects India’s maritime interests, blue economy, energy security and response to China’s growing Indian Ocean presence.
• Climate and river cooperation: India and Bangladesh share several transboundary rivers. Floods, cyclones, riverbank erosion, salinity intrusion and water scarcity require cooperative river-basin management rather than narrow seasonal bargaining.

India’s Concerns: 

• The possible revival of anti-India Islamist or extremist networks.
• The political rise of Jamaat-e-Islami and other groups with historically anti-India positions.
• Safety of religious minorities in Bangladesh.
• Illegal migration and border crime.
• Smuggling, trafficking and fake currency networks.
• Growing Chinese strategic influence.
• Uncertainty about the BNP’s long-term position towards India.
• Domestic pressure from the Indian border States.

Way Forward: 

• Restore people-centric diplomacy: India should prioritise full restoration of medical, student, business and family visas. This would generate goodwill among ordinary Bangladeshis and reduce anti-India narratives.
• Review trade and transit restrictions: India can consider a phased restoration of transhipment and land-port facilities, subject to safeguards. A technical mechanism can address logistics and reciprocity issues without politicising trade.
• Fast-track Ganga Treaty negotiations: The Ganga Water Treaty renewal should be treated as a strategic confidence-building measure. The future agreement should include climate variability, dry-season stress, data sharing, sediment management and basin-level ecological concerns.
• Institutionalise border-management mechanisms: India and Bangladesh should use BSF-BGB and Home Ministry-level mechanisms to handle migration and repatriation disputes. Public accusations should be avoided unless diplomatic mechanisms fail.
• Engage all democratic actors in Bangladesh: India should avoid being seen as aligned with only one political party. A stable long-term policy requires engagement with the BNP, civil society, youth groups, business associations and regional actors.

A stable, sovereign and economically resilient Bangladesh is not a concession by India; it is a strategic necessity for India’s own neighbourhood policy.