Federalism: Centre–State Relations
India is federal in structure and unitary in bias, and the balance between them has been set less by the text than by the party system. Where one party dominated the centre and the…
India is federal in structure and unitary in bias, and the balance between them has been set less by the text than by the party system. Where one party dominated the centre and the states, the Constitution behaved unitarily; where it did not, the same text behaved federally.
This is chapter 28 of the PSIR Optional Notes, from the part on Indian Government and Politics in the Paper I syllabus. The complete book is a free download.
UPSC syllabus
Federalism: Constitutional provisions; changing nature of centre-state relations; integrationist tendencies and regional aspirations; inter-state disputes.
In one page
- Article 1 calls India a Union of States, not a federation. Ambedkar’s explanation: the Union is not the result of an agreement and no state has a right to secede.
- Federal features: written constitution, division of powers in three Lists, bicameralism, an independent judiciary, and a rigid amendment procedure for federal provisions.
- Unitary features: a strong centre with residuary powers, single citizenship, a single integrated judiciary, All India Services, an appointed Governor, Article 356, and Parliament’s power to alter state boundaries without state consent under Article 3.
- Quasi-federal is Wheare’s description; cooperative federalism is Granville Austin’s; the working reality has been described as bargaining federalism by later writers.
- Legislative relations: Seventh Schedule with Union (98 entries), State (59) and Concurrent (52) Lists after amendments; Union supremacy on the Concurrent List under Article 254; and five circumstances in which Parliament may legislate on State List subjects.
- Administrative relations rest on Article 256 and 257 directions, and financial relations on Articles 268 to 293 and the Finance Commission.
- S.R. Bommai (1994) is the turning point: federalism is a basic feature, Article 356 proclamations are justiciable, and majority is tested on the floor.
- The current frictions are fiscal, cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool, GST compensation, centrally sponsored schemes, and institutional, the Governor’s office and central agencies.
The constitutional design
Federal and unitary features
| Federal features | Unitary features | |
|---|---|---|
| Written and supreme constitution; division of powers in the Seventh Schedule; bicameral Parliament with a chamber representing states; independent judiciary with power to umpire; provisions affecting federal structure amendable only with ratification by half the states | Strong centre with the larger List and residuary powers (Article 248); single citizenship; single integrated judiciary; All India Services (Article 312); Governor appointed by the centre; Emergency provisions and Article 356; Article 3 permitting alteration of state areas, boundaries and names without state consent; Union control over the State Election Commissioner’s removal and over state legislation reserved under Article 200 |
Article 3 deserves emphasis because it is the sharpest departure from classical federalism: a state’s views must be sought but need not be accepted, and Parliament may by simple majority create, merge, divide or rename states. The bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh in 2014 and the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 both proceeded despite state-level objection.
Legislative relations
Articles 245 to 255. Parliament legislates for the whole or any part of India, a state legislature for its territory. The Seventh Schedule divides subjects into the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List. Under Article 254, in case of repugnancy on a Concurrent subject the central law prevails, unless the state law was reserved for and received the President’s assent, and even then Parliament may override it later.
Parliament may legislate on a State List subject in five situations, and the list should be reproducible: on a Rajya Sabha resolution in the national interest by two-thirds of members present and voting (Article 249); during a national emergency (250); when two or more states request it (252); to implement international treaties and agreements (253); and during President’s Rule in a state (356).
Residuary powers rest with the Union under Article 248 and Entry 97 of the Union List, which is the Canadian rather than the American model.
Administrative and financial relations
Administrative: Articles 256 and 257 require states to ensure compliance with laws of Parliament and empower the Union to give directions, with failure to comply constituting a ground for action under Article 365. All India Services under Article 312 serve both levels while remaining under central control for appointment and discipline, which Ambedkar defended as a unifying device and which states periodically resist.
Financial: taxes are assigned, levied and distributed under Articles 268 to 281, with the Finance Commission recommending devolution every five years, and Article 275 grants-in-aid. Article 293 constrains state borrowing where a state is indebted to the Union, which in practice means always.
GST, introduced by the 101st Amendment in 2016, is the most significant change to fiscal federalism since 1950. It pooled the taxing powers of both levels in the GST Council, where the centre holds one-third of the weighted votes and all states together two-thirds, with decisions requiring three-quarters, so the centre holds an effective veto and no group of states can pass a measure without it. Mohit Minerals (2022) held that the Council’s recommendations are persuasive rather than binding and that both Parliament and state legislatures have simultaneous power to legislate on GST, which restored some state autonomy in principle.
The changing nature of centre–state relations
Four phases
- 1950–67, Congress dominance. One party at both levels meant disputes were settled inside the party rather than between governments. Federalism was real in form and rarely exercised.
- 1967–89, confrontation. Non-Congress governments in states after 1967 produced systematic friction. Article 356 was used repeatedly against opposition governments; the dismissal of nine state governments in 1977 and again in 1980 is the standard illustration. Rajamannar Committee (1969) in Tamil Nadu, the West Bengal memorandum (1977) and the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973) date from this phase.
- 1989–2014, coalition federalism. Regional parties in national coalitions gave states leverage they had never had. Article 356’s use collapsed after Bommai (1994), and the Inter-State Council was finally constituted in 1990.
- 2014 onward. A single-party majority at the centre alongside genuinely federal fiscal instruments. The frictions have moved from dismissal of governments to fiscal distribution, the Governor’s office, central investigative agencies, and the design of centrally sponsored schemes.
The commissions
Administrative Reforms Commission (Setalvad, 1969) recommended an Inter-State Council and restraint on Article 356. Rajamannar Committee (1969), appointed by Tamil Nadu, recommended abolition of Articles 356, 357 and 365, transfer of subjects from the Concurrent to the State List and constitution of an Inter-State Council. Sarkaria Commission (1988) rejected radical restructuring but recommended that Article 356 be used only as a last resort with a warning first, that the Governor be an outsider appointed after consulting the Chief Minister, that the Inter-State Council be constituted, and that residuary matters other than taxation move to the Concurrent List. Punchhi Commission (2010) added the recommendation of localised emergency in a district or part of a state rather than the whole, a fixed procedure for the Governor’s discretion, and a time limit for the Governor’s decision on bills.
Bommai and what it settled
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) is the single most important federalism case.
- Federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution.
- A proclamation under Article 356 is justiciable; the Court may examine whether the material on which satisfaction was based has a rational nexus with the action.
- The majority of a ministry must be tested on the floor of the house, not determined by the Governor’s subjective assessment.
- The assembly may not be dissolved until both houses of Parliament have approved the proclamation; until then it may only be suspended.
- If a proclamation is struck down, the Court may restore the dismissed government.
- Secularism is a basic feature, and a state government acting against it may be dismissed, which was the ground for upholding the dismissals following the events of December 1992.
Integrationist tendencies and regional aspirations
The syllabus pairs these deliberately. Integrationist instruments include the linguistic reorganisation of states from 1956, which paradoxically strengthened the union by conceding language; All India Services; a single judiciary and single citizenship; national institutions and a national market completed by GST; and the emergency provisions.
Regional aspirations have taken four forms, and each has been handled differently. Demands for statehood (Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttarakhand in 2000, Telangana in 2014) have generally been conceded. Demands for autonomy within a state have been met by constitutional asymmetry: the Sixth Schedule autonomous councils in the North-East, Article 371 special provisions for eleven states, and formerly Article 370. Demands for cultural and linguistic protection have been met through the Eighth Schedule and state language policy. Demands for secession have been met with force followed by negotiated accommodation, in Mizoram most successfully after the 1986 accord.
The reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, discussed in Chapter 33, is the significant recent test: the abrogation of Article 370 and the downgrading of a state to two union territories was upheld in In Re: Article 370 (2023), with the Court recording the Solicitor General’s statement that statehood would be restored.
Inter-state disputes fall into three classes: river water disputes under Article 262 and the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956, where the exclusion of Supreme Court jurisdiction has not prevented protracted litigation, as in Cauvery and Krishna; boundary disputes, such as Maharashtra–Karnataka over Belagavi and Assam–Mizoram; and disputes over shared institutions and resources. The Inter-State Council under Article 263, recommended repeatedly and finally constituted in 1990, meets rarely, which is itself the criticism.
Debate: Does the working of Indian federalism confirm its centralising tendencies?
Yes. The design is centralising: residuary powers with the Union, a longer Union List, Article 3 permitting states to be redrawn without consent, an appointed Governor, All India Services, and Article 356. The practice matched it for four decades, with Article 356 invoked well over a hundred times, overwhelmingly against opposition governments. Fiscally, states raise about a third of revenues and spend about two-thirds, and the growth of cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool has shrunk what they are entitled to share. No. The same text has produced markedly different behaviour as the party system changed. Article 356’s use collapsed after Bommai (1994), and the coalition decades gave states more leverage than the drafters imagined. Linguistic reorganisation, asymmetric federalism under Article 371 and the Sixth Schedule, and the GST Council’s voting design, in which the centre cannot act without a substantial number of states, are all genuine federal accommodations. The examiner’s line. The determining variable is the party system, not the text. Say so, and support it: identical provisions produced unitary behaviour in 1950–67 and 1977–80, and federal behaviour in 1989–2014. The accurate formulation is that India has a centralised federal structure whose actual operation is set politically, with the judiciary since 1994 supplying a floor below which centralisation cannot go. The current frictions have shifted from constitutional dismissal to fiscal design, which is a sign that the Bommai floor is holding.
Where answers lose marks
- Calling India a federation without qualification. Article 1 says Union of States, and Ambedkar explained why: no agreement, no right to secede.
- Giving the five circumstances for Parliament legislating on State List subjects incompletely. Articles 249, 250, 252, 253 and 356 are all needed.
- Writing on federalism without Bommai (1994). Justiciability, the floor test and the no-dissolution rule are the core.
- Treating GST as straightforwardly centralising. The Council’s voting design gives the centre a veto but requires state agreement too, and Mohit Minerals (2022) held recommendations persuasive rather than binding.
- Omitting fiscal federalism. Cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool, and centrally sponsored schemes with matching requirements, are the live grievances.
- Ignoring asymmetric federalism. Article 371 provisions and the Sixth Schedule are federal accommodations that a purely centralising account cannot explain.
Asked before
- Does the actual working of Indian federalism conform to the centralizing tendencies in Indian polity? Give reasons for your answer. (2023, Paper I, 20 marks)
- The recent developments in Indian Politics has not eroded the true spirit of federalism in India. Critically examine this statement with the help of appropriate examples. (2025, Paper I, 15 marks)
Answer skeleton
The recent developments in Indian Politics has not eroded the true spirit of federalism in India. Critically examine. (15 marks, 250 words)
Frame. The statement is a claim to be tested, not accepted. Define the spirit of Indian federalism first: not equality of the two levels, but a guaranteed sphere for the states within a centralised design, with a judicial floor since Bommai (1994).
Evidence for the statement. Article 356 is now rarely used and is justiciable; the GST Council requires state concurrence; the Fifteenth Finance Commission continued a high devolution share; asymmetric arrangements under Article 371 and the Sixth Schedule remain; and states legislate and litigate against central law with success, as in the farm laws episode.
Evidence against. Cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool shrink the states’ entitlement; centrally sponsored schemes with matching requirements pre-commit state budgets; Governors withholding assent, addressed in State of Punjab (2023); central agencies operating in states with general consent withdrawn by several; and the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 without a functioning state legislature.
The analytical point. The pressure has shifted from constitutional to fiscal and administrative instruments, which is what happens when the constitutional route is closed by judicial doctrine.
Conclude. The statement is defensible on the constitutional core and doubtful on fiscal practice. The spirit is intact where it is judicially protected and eroded where it depends on convention, which is an argument for extending justiciability to assent timelines and to the divisible pool.
Last-mile revision
- Article 1 Union of States; Wheare’s quasi-federal; Austin’s cooperative federalism.
- Federal: written constitution, three Lists, bicameralism, judicial umpire, rigid amendment with state ratification. Unitary: residuary with the Union (248, Entry 97), single citizenship, integrated judiciary, All India Services (312), appointed Governor, Article 356, Article 3.
- Parliament on State List: Articles 249, 250, 252, 253, 356. Article 254 repugnancy.
- Administrative: 256, 257, 365. Financial: 268–281, 275, 293. GST by the 101st Amendment 2016; Council voting one-third centre, two-thirds states, three-quarters to pass; Mohit Minerals (2022).
- Phases: 1950–67 dominance, 1967–89 confrontation, 1989–2014 coalition, 2014 onward fiscal and institutional friction.
- Commissions: ARC 1969, Rajamannar 1969, Sarkaria 1988, Punchhi 2010. Inter-State Council under Article 263, constituted 1990.
- Bommai (1994): federalism basic feature, justiciability, floor test, no dissolution before approval, restoration, secularism as ground.
- Regional aspirations: statehood 2000 and 2014; asymmetry under Article 371 and the Sixth Schedule; Article 262 and the 1956 Act for river disputes.
Read the rest. This chapter is one of 58 in the complete PSIR Optional Notes, covering Paper I and Paper II in full — free to download.