Anantam IASPost · 25 July 2026

Principal Organs of the State Government

Study Notes · Indian Polity · PSIR Optional

The state government mirrors the Union in form and differs in one decisive respect: the Governor is appointed by and removable at the pleasure of the centre, which makes the head o…

The state government mirrors the Union in form and differs in one decisive respect: the Governor is appointed by and removable at the pleasure of the centre, which makes the head of state a channel of central influence rather than a purely ceremonial office.

This is chapter 25 of the PSIR Optional Notes, from the part on Indian Government and Politics in the Paper I syllabus. The complete book is a free download.

UPSC syllabus

Principal Organs of the State Government: Envisaged role and actual working of the Executive, Legislature and High Courts.

In one page

  • The Governor is appointed by the President under Article 155, holds office during pleasure, and is in practice a central appointee. This single fact generates most of the controversy in centre–state relations.
  • Article 163 gives the Governor functions to be exercised in his discretion, unlike the President, and the Governor’s own judgement on what falls within discretion is final.
  • The real discretionary areas: appointing a Chief Minister in a hung assembly, dismissing a ministry that has lost confidence, recommending President’s Rule under Article 356, reserving a bill for the President under Article 200, and reporting on the state.
  • S.R. Bommai (1994) made Article 356 proclamations justiciable and held that a majority must be tested on the floor of the house, not in the Governor’s judgement.
  • The Chief Minister and council of ministers are collectively responsible to the legislative assembly, exactly as at the Union.
  • Six states have a Legislative Council, created or abolished under Article 169 by Parliament on a resolution of the assembly. Its powers are markedly weaker than the Rajya Sabha’s.
  • High Courts under Article 226 have a writ jurisdiction wider than the Supreme Court’s under Article 32, since it extends to legal rights and not only fundamental rights.
  • The live controversy is delay: Governors withholding assent indefinitely, which State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary (2023) and the Tamil Nadu litigation of 2025 have addressed.

The Governor

Appointment and tenure

Appointed by the President by warrant under Article 155 and holding office during the President’s pleasure under Article 156, with a normal term of five years. The office is not elective and there is no impeachment procedure; removal is by withdrawal of pleasure, which in practice means by the Union government.

Two conventions recommended by the Sarkaria Commission (1988) and reiterated by the Punchhi Commission (2010) are worth naming because they are honoured irregularly: the Governor should be an eminent person from outside the state, detached from local politics and not a recent active politician of the ruling party at the centre; and the Chief Minister should be consulted before appointment.

Discretion, and where it bites

The textual difference from the President is decisive. Article 163(1) says the council of ministers shall aid and advise except in so far as the Governor is required to exercise functions in his discretion, and 163(2) makes the Governor’s own decision on that question final and not open to question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion.

The 2025 controversy over Governors sitting on bills is the live instance. In State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor (2023) the Supreme Court held that the Governor cannot effectively veto legislation by inaction, since “as soon as possible” in the first proviso to Article 200 carries constitutional force. The Tamil Nadu litigation carried this further by prescribing timelines. The underlying constitutional stake is whether an unelected central appointee can nullify the legislative output of an elected assembly.

The state legislature

Assembly and Council

The Legislative Assembly has between 60 and 500 members, directly elected, with a normal term of five years. It alone can pass a no-confidence motion and it alone controls money bills.

The Legislative Council, where it exists, is limited by Article 171 to one-third of the assembly’s strength and not fewer than 40. Its composition is distinctive: one-third elected by local bodies, one-twelfth by graduates of three years’ standing, one-twelfth by teachers of three years’ standing in institutions not below secondary level, one-third by members of the assembly from outside its own membership, and the rest nominated by the Governor for literature, science, art, cooperative movement and social service.

The 2024 question on the relevance of the Legislative Council needs both sides. For: it provides a revising chamber, brings in expertise and eminent persons who cannot win elections, represents local bodies and educational interests, and slows hasty legislation. Against: it has no real power, since it can only delay a bill by up to three months on first passage and one month on second, and cannot amend or reject a money bill beyond fourteen days; it cannot bring down a government; it is expensive; and it has been used as a route to accommodate defeated politicians. Article 169 lets Parliament create or abolish one on an assembly resolution passed by a special majority, and states have repeatedly done both, which is itself evidence of how contingent the institution is.

Working

State legislatures sit for markedly fewer days than Parliament, pass a large share of bills without committee reference, and in several states have almost no functioning committee system. The result is that the executive’s dominance over the legislature is more complete at state level than at the Union, which matters because states legislate on the subjects, agriculture, land, police, health, education, that most directly affect citizens.

High Courts

There are 25 High Courts, some with jurisdiction over more than one state or union territory. Judges are appointed by the President under Article 217 after consultation which, since the Second and Third Judges cases, means the collegium process; judges hold office to the age of 62, against 65 in the Supreme Court.

The jurisdiction that matters most is Article 226. It is wider than Article 32 in two ways: it extends to enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose, meaning ordinary legal rights; and it extends to any person or authority within the court’s territorial jurisdiction, including in some circumstances private bodies performing public functions. Chandra Kumar (1997) held that this power of judicial review is itself part of the basic structure and cannot be excluded, which is why tribunal decisions remain reviewable by High Courts.

Article 227 gives superintendence over all courts and tribunals in the territory, a supervisory power the Supreme Court does not possess in the same form.

The working problems are chronic and quantifiable: vacancies persistently around a quarter to a third of sanctioned strength, pendency in the tens of millions across the system, and delays in collegium recommendations and government clearances that neither side accepts responsibility for.

UnionState
HeadPresident, indirectly elected by an electoral collegeGovernor, appointed by the President, holds office during pleasure
DiscretionArticle 74; advice binding, reconsideration onceArticle 163; express discretionary functions, and his own decision on scope is final
Second chamberRajya Sabha, permanent, with Articles 249 and 312 powersLegislative Council in six states only; may be created or abolished under Article 169
Delay power over billsPresidential assent, no time limit; pocket vetoArticle 200: assent, withhold, return, or reserve for the President
CourtSupreme Court, Article 32 confined to fundamental rightsHigh Court, Article 226 wider; plus superintendence under Article 227
Union and state organs compared. The Governor’s row is the entire difference, and every federal controversy in Chapter 28 traces back to it.

Where answers lose marks

  • Treating the Governor as the President’s exact counterpart. Article 163 gives express discretion and makes the Governor the judge of its scope; Article 74 does neither.
  • Saying Article 32 is wider than Article 226. It is the other way round: Article 226 covers legal rights as well as fundamental rights.
  • Writing on Article 356 without Bommai (1994): justiciability, the floor test, and no dissolution before parliamentary approval.
  • Presenting the Legislative Council as a state Rajya Sabha. Its delaying power is a few months and it cannot bring down a government.
  • Omitting the assent-delay controversy. It is the live constitutional question and the 2023 Punjab judgment is the authority.

Asked before

  • Relevance of the Legislative Council. (2024, Paper I, 10 marks)

Answer skeleton

Relevance of the Legislative Council. (10 marks, 150 words)

Frame. Article 169 lets Parliament create or abolish a Council on the assembly’s resolution, and states have done both repeatedly. That contingency is the answer’s frame: the institution survives on argument, not on entrenchment.

The case for. A revising chamber that checks hasty legislation; a route for expertise and eminence through the graduates’, teachers’ and nominated seats; representation of local bodies, which no other body provides; and a forum continuing when the assembly is dissolved.

The case against. Delay of three months on first passage and one on second is the whole of its power; it cannot reject a money bill or unseat a government; it is a recurring expense; and it has been used to accommodate politicians defeated at the polls, which inverts its purpose.

Evidence. Only six states retain one. Andhra Pradesh abolished its Council in 1985 and revived it in 2007, which shows the decision follows political convenience rather than institutional reasoning.

Conclude. Relevant in principle as a revising and representative chamber, marginal in practice because it was given the form of a second chamber without the powers of one. Reform would mean strengthening its revising role, not abolishing it.

Last-mile revision

  • Governor: Articles 155–156, appointment and pleasure; Sarkaria (1988) and Punchhi (2010) conventions on outsider, detached, consultation with the Chief Minister.
  • Article 163: express discretion, and the Governor is the final judge of its scope.
  • Discretionary areas: CM appointment in a hung house, dismissal, Article 356 report, Article 200 reservation, Article 201.
  • Bommai (1994): justiciability, floor test, no dissolution before parliamentary approval. State of Punjab (2023) on assent by inaction.
  • Assembly 60–500; Council under Article 171, one-third of assembly and not fewer than 40; composition one-third local bodies, one-twelfth graduates, one-twelfth teachers, one-third by MLAs, rest nominated. Creation and abolition under Article 169.
  • High Courts: 25; Article 217 appointment, retirement at 62; Article 226 wider than 32; Article 227 superintendence; Chandra Kumar (1997) on review as basic structure.

Read the rest. This chapter is one of 58 in the complete PSIR Optional Notes, covering Paper I and Paper II in full — free to download.