Anantam IASPost · 13 April 2026

CENSORSHIP IN INDIA: A COMPLETEGUIDE

Study Notes · General Studies

From Mill to Section 69A — The Full Constitutional, Legal & Digital
Story

PART 1: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS — WHY DO WE EVEN DEBATE FREE SPEECH?

The Core Question

Before a single Indian law is discussed, we must ask: Why should speech be free at all? And conversely: Why should the State ever restrict it?

Philosophy gives us the competing answers that have shaped every censorship debate in history.

John Stuart Mill — The Marketplace of Ideas (1859)

John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859) is the foundational text of modern free speech theory. His argument rests on four pillars:

1. The Infallibility Problem:
No government, no court, no majority is infallible. The opinion you silence today might be true. Suppressing it means choosing error over truth.

2. The Dead Dogma Problem:
Even if the suppressed opinion is wrong, its collision with truth strengthens truth. Without challenge, truth becomes a “dead dogma” — repeated by rote, never truly understood.

“However true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”

3. The Partial Truth Problem:
Most real-world opinions are partly true and partly false. Silencing the minority view destroys the partial truth within it.

4. The Harm Principle:
The only legitimate justification for restricting anyone’s liberty — including speech — is to prevent harm to others.
Not offense. Not discomfort. Not dislike. Actual, tangible harm.

Mill’s framework is the intellectual ancestor of the First Amendment absolutism of the United States, where speech receives near-inviolable protection.

John Locke — Natural Rights and Consent

John Locke argued that individuals possess natural, inalienable rights — to life, liberty, and property — which precede the State.

The State derives its legitimacy from the consent of the governed.

This consent requires an informed citizenry capable of debating public affairs freely.

Censorship, in Locke’s framework, undermines the very basis of legitimate government because it corrupts the process through which consent is formed.

Immanuel Kant — Reason and the Public Use of Reason

Kant argued in What is Enlightenment? (1784) that human beings have a duty to use their reason publicly.

“Dare to know!” — Sapere aude

The suppression of public reason is, for Kant, a form of treating citizens as children, incapable of thinking for themselves.

The enlightened State must allow the free public exercise of reason.

Thomas Hobbes and the Counterargument — Order Before Liberty

But the philosophical tradition is not unanimous.

Thomas Hobbes argued in Leviathan that without a strong sovereign to impose order, life becomes:

“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Unlimited speech in a fragile, diverse, conflict-prone society can trigger exactly this chaos.

Hobbes provides the philosophical underpinning for State censorship in the name of public order and security — an argument that finds its echoes in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau — The General Will

Rousseau introduced the concept of the general will — the collective interest of the community as a whole — which may sometimes require individual rights, including speech, to be subordinated to the common good.

This communitarian tradition has shaped Indian constitutional thinking, which explicitly recognizes that individual rights must be balanced against social interests.

Walter Bagehot and the “Permitted Dissent” Theory

The British constitutional thinker Walter Bagehot argued that the stability of democracy rests not on the suppression of dissent but on the institutionalisation of it — giving dissent legitimate channels (Parliament, press, courts) so it does not erupt into revolution.

This is the philosophical basis for the Indian model: rights are guaranteed, but with structured, legally defined limits.

The Frankfurt School — Power and Censorship

Herbert Marcuse of the Frankfurt School offered a radical counterpoint:

In modern capitalist democracies, “free speech” is itself a tool of oppression.

The powerful dominate the marketplace of ideas through economic control of media.

True freedom of expression requires restraint on dominant speech and amplification of marginal voices.

This critical theory tradition informs debates about platform power, algorithmic bias, and the political economy of media.

PART 2: WHY INDIA DID NOT ADOPT ABSOLUTE FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The Constituent Assembly Debate — A Deliberate Choice

When India’s Constituent Assembly drafted the Constitution between 1946 and 1949, the members were acutely aware of John Stuart Mill and the liberal tradition.

They were also acutely aware of India’s specific realities:

The Constituent Assembly, under the stewardship of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Jawaharlal Nehru, made a conscious philosophical choice:

Freedom of speech would be guaranteed, but it would not be absolute.

The American model of near-absolute speech protection was explicitly considered and rejected.

Dr. Ambedkar explained the reasoning: India could not afford to transplant constitutional models designed for homogeneous, stable societies into a fragile, diverse democracy still finding its feet.

The “reasonable restrictions” model — guaranteeing rights while providing a defined catalogue of permissible limitations — was adopted as the Indian solution.

The American Model: Why India Rejected It

The US First Amendment reads:

“Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”

This is textually near-absolute.

The US Supreme Court has allowed restrictions only in extreme cases:

Later narrowed to:

India’s founders saw two problems with this model:

1. The US had fought its civil war. India had not yet resolved its communal question.

2. The US is a relatively homogeneous constitutional culture. India has 22 scheduled languages, hundreds of communities, and a history in which speech had been used as a weapon of group violence.

The Indian Model: Rights with Structured Limits

India chose what constitutional scholars call the “limitation clause” model — also used in Germany, South Africa, and Canada.

Rights are guaranteed, but the Constitution itself specifies the grounds on which they can be limited, and the limitation must be “reasonable.”

This is not a weakness of the Indian Constitution.

It reflects a sophisticated philosophical position:

Rights exist in tension with each other and with social order; the task of constitutional design is to manage that tension through law, not to pretend it does not exist.

PART 3: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK — ARTICLE 19(1)(a) AND 19(2)

Article 19(1)(a): The Guarantee

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India reads:

“All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.”

This is a positive guarantee — the State must respect it.

It is not a mere aspiration.

As a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, it is judicially enforceable.

Any citizen whose right is violated can approach:

The Right Covers:

Article 19(2): The Permissible Restrictions

Article 19(2) allows the State to impose “reasonable restrictions” on the exercise of Article 19(1)(a) rights in the interests of:

  1. The sovereignty and integrity of India
  2. The security of the State
  3. Friendly relations with foreign States
  4. Public order
  5. Decency or morality
  6. Contempt of Court
  7. Defamation
  8. Incitement to an offence

Three Critical Features of This List

First: It Is Exhaustive

The State cannot restrict speech on grounds outside this list.

If a restriction is not justifiable under one of these eight heads, it is unconstitutional.

Period.

This is what the Supreme Court found with Section 66A of the IT Act — it created offences (causing “annoyance” or “inconvenience”) that did not fall under any of these eight heads.

Second: Restriction Must Be “Reasonable”

Not merely some restriction — a reasonable one.

The word “reasonable” implies:

Third: Restriction Must Be “In the Interests Of”

The restriction must be imposed:

“in the interests of”

the listed values — not merely in furtherance of State convenience or political preference.

Who Can Invoke Article 19(1)(a)?

Only citizens of India.

Non-citizens cannot claim this right.

However:

are available to all persons, including foreigners.

Some speech-related protections thus extend indirectly to non-citizens.

PART 4: EVOLUTION THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

The Original Constitution (1950) — The Romesh Thapar Crisis

When the Constitution came into force on January 26, 1950, Article 19(2) in its original form allowed restrictions only on grounds of:

Note what was absent:

“Sovereignty and integrity of India” and “friendly relations with foreign States” were not yet in the list.

The First Constitutional Test

Almost immediately, the new constitutional framework was tested.

In Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court struck down a Madras government order banning the entry and circulation of Cross Roads, a communist weekly edited by Romesh Thapar.

The reason:

The ban was imposed in the name of “public order,” but the Constitution required that such a restriction be in the interest of the “security of the State” — a higher threshold.

The Madras law was broader and therefore unconstitutional.

Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (1950)

Similarly, in Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (1950), the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Punjab Public Safety Act that allowed pre-censorship of the Organiser newspaper (the RSS mouthpiece).

The Court held:

There was no constitutional sanction for prior restraint in the original Article 19(2).

Government Alarm and Nehru’s Response

The government was alarmed.

If the courts could strike down laws preventing inflammatory communist speech and communal publications, how could India maintain public order?

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru moved swiftly.

The First Constitutional Amendment (1951) — Nehru’s Action

The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was the first amendment to the Indian Constitution.

Pushed through by the Nehru government, it:

1. Added New Grounds in Article 19(2)

2. Lowered the Threshold

Changed the wording from restrictions that undermine public order to restrictions that relate to public order — a significantly lower threshold.

3. Inserted “Reasonable Restrictions”

Added:

“reasonable restrictions in the interests of”

This inserted the word “reasonable,” signalling that restrictions must be proportionate.

4. Added the Ninth Schedule

Placed certain laws beyond judicial review.

(Though this was later limited by the Supreme Court in the I.R. Coelho judgment, 2007.)

The Nehru Paradox

Nehru is celebrated as one of the great defenders of press freedom in India’s history.

He personally opposed press censorship and wrote passionately about freedom of expression.

Yet he was also the architect of the First Amendment, which expanded the grounds for restriction.

His explanation:

The original Constitution was worded too broadly in favour of absolute freedom, and the courts were using it to protect speech that could destabilise a fragile new democracy.

He saw the First Amendment not as an attack on free speech but as a correction to make the constitutional framework workable.

This paradox is fundamental to understanding India’s ambivalent relationship with free expression.

The Sixteenth Amendment (1963)

The Sixteenth Amendment added:

“Sovereignty and integrity of India”

more explicitly into Article 19(2), reflecting concerns about secessionist movements in Nagaland and other border regions.

The Forty-Second Amendment (1976) — The Emergency Era

Passed during Indira Gandhi’s Emergency (1975–1977), the 42nd Amendment was the most sweeping attack on fundamental rights in India’s constitutional history.

It:

Though many of these provisions were reversed by the 44th Amendment (1978) after Emergency ended, the 42nd Amendment stands as a permanent reminder of how constitutional amendments can be weaponized against the very rights they nominally protect.

PART 5: DOCTRINES DEVELOPED BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court of India has, over seven decades, developed a rich body of doctrine governing freedom of expression.

These are the key tests and principles:

The Reasonable Restriction Test (Chintaman Rao, 1950)

The Supreme Court held that a “reasonable restriction” must not be arbitrary or excessive beyond what is required in the public interest.

Legislation that:

“arbitrarily or excessively invades the right”

cannot be reasonable.

The Court must examine:

The Direct and Proximate Nexus Test (Ramji Lal Modi, 1957)

The restriction must have a direct and proximate connection to the listed constitutional ground:

Examples:

A distant, remote, or speculative connection is insufficient.

This prevents the State from using broad, vague laws that sweep up protected speech in the name of preventing disorder.

The Overbreadth Doctrine

A law that is worded so broadly that it restricts both protected and unprotected speech is constitutionally invalid because of its overbreadth.

The Court applied this doctrine definitively in:

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

to strike down Section 66A, which was so broadly worded it could criminalise wholly innocent speech.

The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

A law that uses terms so vague that:

violates both:

Examples of vague unconstitutional terms in Section 66A:

These were held fatally vague.

The Proportionality Test (Post-Puttaswamy)

Following:

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

the Supreme Court adopted a four-part proportionality test for restrictions on fundamental rights:

1. Legitimate Aim

The restriction must pursue a legitimate State aim.

2. Rational Connection

It must be rationally connected to that aim.

3. Least Restrictive Means

It must be the least restrictive means available to achieve that aim.

4. Balancing Requirement

It must be proportionate — the benefit to the public must outweigh the harm to the right.

This test was applied in:

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020)

to internet shutdowns, fundamentally changing how courts evaluate government-imposed restrictions on digital communication.

The Public Order Spectrum

In:

Superintendent, Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia (1960)

the Supreme Court distinguished between:

Law and Order

Trivial disturbances affecting a few individuals.

Public Order

Disturbances affecting the community at large.

Security of State

Acts threatening the existence of the State itself.

Speech can only be restricted in the name of:

Public order — not mere law and order.

And only an imminent and proximate threat to public order justifies restriction, not a distant or speculative one.

PART 6: PRIOR RESTRAINT vs. POST-FACTO RESTRICTION

The Distinction

There are fundamentally two ways a State can restrict speech:

Prior restraint (pre-censorship)

The State prevents speech before it reaches its audience.

Examples:

These are all prior restraints.

Post-facto restriction (subsequent punishment)

The speech occurs freely, and the State punishes the speaker afterward if the speech was illegal.

Examples:

These are post-facto restrictions.

Why Prior Restraint is More Dangerous

Prior restraint is constitutionally suspect for several reasons:

1. The Speech Never Reaches the Audience

With subsequent punishment, at least the public hears the idea before the speaker is punished.

Prior restraint eliminates the information entirely.

2. The Decision-Maker Has Unilateral Power

Pre-censorship is typically exercised by executive officials, not courts, with limited procedural safeguards.

3. The Chilling Effect Is Absolute

Prior restraint doesn’t just chill speech — it freezes it.

The Foundational Principle

The seminal US case on this is:

Near v. Minnesota (1931)

“The chief purpose of [the free press] guarantee is to prevent prior restraints upon publication.”

India’s Supreme Court has broadly adopted this position.

India’s Position: Brij Bhushan and Beyond

In:

Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi (1950)

the Supreme Court struck down a requirement that the Organiser newspaper submit proofs of political matter to the Chief Commissioner before publication.

The Court held:

This was an impermissible prior restraint.

The original Article 19(2) did not permit it.

After the First Amendment

After the First Constitutional Amendment broadened Article 19(2), prior restraints became permissible in principle.

However:

They remain subject to heightened scrutiny.

The Court has consistently held that:

The burden on the government to justify prior restraint is heavier than the burden for subsequent punishment.

The Film Censorship Paradox

India operates one of the world’s most institutionalized systems of prior restraint:

The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC)

Films cannot be publicly exhibited without a CBFC certificate.

The Board can:

Constitutional Validity of Film Censorship

This system was upheld in:

K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970)

The Supreme Court held film censorship constitutionally valid because:

1. Motion Pictures Are Uniquely Impactful

Films affect audiences more powerfully than printed text.

2. Films Reach Mass Audiences

They influence audiences who may not have the critical faculties to filter content.

This reasoning — that some media are more powerful and therefore warrant stricter control — remains controversial.

But it has remained the law for over five decades.

It explains why India routinely censors films in ways it would not censor books or newspapers.

Section 69A and Prior Restraint Online

Website blocking under Section 69A is a form of prior restraint.

The government can order a website or social media post blocked before any court has determined the content is unlawful.

Shreya Singhal and Section 69A

In:

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

the Supreme Court upheld Section 69A precisely because it includes procedural safeguards:

Criticism of Section 69A

Critics note that these safeguards operate in secret:

Thus, while formally constitutional, Section 69A remains one of the most contested censorship powers in India.

PART 7: JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF RIGHTS — THE SC’S INTERPRETIVE GENEROSITY

The Supreme Court of India has, through a long line of cases, interpreted Article 19(1)(a) expansively, reading into it rights that its text does not explicitly mention.

Press Freedom (1950 onwards)

Though the Constitution has no separate press freedom clause (unlike the US First Amendment’s “freedom of the press”), the Supreme Court from the earliest days held that freedom of the press is implicit in Article 19(1)(a).

Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1958)

The Court struck down provisions of the Working Journalists Act that unduly burdened newspaper establishments.

It recognized:

Economic burdens on the press are indirect restrictions on speech.

Bennett Coleman v. Union of India (1972)

The Court struck down the Newsprint Control Order that limited the number of pages a newspaper could publish.

The Court held:

The right to free speech includes the right to circulate.

Restrictions on the medium are restrictions on the message.

Right to Information as Part of Free Speech (1975)

In:

State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975)

the Supreme Court held that:

The right to know — the right to receive information — is part of Article 19(1)(a).

Citizens cannot exercise meaningful freedom of speech without access to information.

This constitutional foundation later gave impetus to the:

Right to Information Act, 2005

Right to Silence (1986)

In:

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986)

the Court held that the right of a Jehovah’s Witness child not to sing the national anthem is protected under Article 19(1)(a).

Freedom of expression includes:

The freedom not to express.

Commercial Speech (1995)

In:

Tata Press v. MTNL (1995)

the Court held that commercial speech — advertising — is also protected under Article 19(1)(a).

The right to advertise is part of free expression, though subject to restrictions against misleading advertising.

Broadcast Freedom (1995)

In:

Cricket Association of Bengal v. Union of India (1995)

the Court struck down the government’s monopoly over broadcasting.

It held:

The airwaves belong to the public and cannot be monopolized by the State.

This was a revolutionary judgment that opened India to private television.

Right to Access the Internet (2020)

In:

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020)

the Supreme Court recognized that:

The right to access the internet is an integral part of:

The internet is not a luxury.

It is the medium through which modern free expression occurs.

Constitutional Significance of This Expansion

Through these judgments, the Supreme Court transformed Article 19(1)(a) from a narrow textual right into a living constitutional ecosystem.

What began as merely:

“Freedom of speech and expression”

now includes:

This judicial expansion is one of the defining features of Indian constitutional free speech jurisprudence.

PART 8: THE CHILLING EFFECT DOCTRINE

What Is the Chilling Effect?

The “chilling effect” is the indirect, secondary suppression of speech that results from legal restrictions — not because the restriction directly prohibits specific speech, but because it creates uncertainty and fear that leads speakers to self-censor even when their speech is legal.

A law that is vaguely worded, or carries harsh penalties, or is enforced selectively against disfavoured speakers creates a chilling effect on all speech — not just the speech it targets.

Speakers who are unsure whether their expression will trigger legal consequences choose silence over risk.

The Classic Example: Section 66A

Section 66A of the IT Act was the textbook case of a chilling effect in India.

The provision criminalised online speech that was:

These terms were so vague that no speaker could know with certainty whether their post, tweet, or WhatsApp message would be deemed criminal.

Result: Even Legal Speech Was Chilled

People stopped sharing:

for fear of arrest.

In:

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

the Supreme Court explicitly recognised the chilling effect:

The vagueness of Section 66A “leads to uncertainty and unpredictability” that “has a chilling effect on the right of free speech and expression.”

Chilling Effect Through Selective Enforcement

A law can be facially neutral but create a chilling effect through selective enforcement.

This occurs when:

The law is applied only against critics of the government, while supporters escape prosecution for equivalent speech.

This signals to all speakers that:

The law is a political weapon rather than a neutral rule.

As a result, those critical of power self-censor to avoid being targeted.

Chilling Effect Through Cost

Even if a speaker is ultimately vindicated in court, the cost of litigation itself creates a chilling effect.

These costs include:

When the government files a case against a journalist, the message to all journalists is:

Criticise us and face this ordeal, even if you win eventually.

Lawfare as Censorship

This is often called:

Lawfare

Using legal processes as a weapon without intent to secure conviction.

Lawfare is a sophisticated form of censorship because punishment lies in the process itself.

Chilling Effect and the Secret Censorship Problem

Blocking orders under Section 69A are confidential.

The affected party is not told:

This opacity creates a severe chilling effect.

Speakers cannot calibrate their speech to legal requirements when they do not know what those requirements are.

Internet Freedom Foundation Critique

The Internet Freedom Foundation has described this as:

“Secret and inaccessible censorship”

that undermines the very safeguards the Supreme Court relied upon when it upheld Section 69A in Shreya Singhal.

Why the Doctrine Matters Constitutionally

The chilling effect doctrine shifts constitutional focus from:

What speech is directly banned

to

What speech people are too afraid to make.

That makes it one of the most powerful modern tools in protecting democratic dissent.

PART 9: THE INTERNET AS SPEECH — DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

From Printing Press to Digital Network

Every major communications technology has disrupted the existing legal framework for speech regulation:

Why the Internet is Constitutionally Different

The internet possesses characteristics that distinguish it from all prior media:

1. Decentralization

No single owner, no single chokepoint, no single regulator.

2. Democratization

Any individual can now reach a global audience at near-zero marginal cost.

3. Speed

Information travels at the speed of light; by the time a court order is obtained, the information has spread globally.

4. Persistence

Digital content can survive indefinitely; deletion from one platform does not ensure destruction.

5. Anonymity

Speakers can disguise their identity, complicating enforcement.

6. Cross-Border Nature

Content hosted in one jurisdiction is accessible in all others.

These characteristics make traditional models of speech regulation — designed for print and broadcast — deeply inadequate for the internet age.

India’s Digital Explosion

India has undergone one of the most dramatic digital transformations in human history.

From a few million internet users in 2000, India has grown to:

Over 800 million internet users by 2024

making it the second largest internet population in the world.

The Jio Revolution

The arrival of Reliance Jio in 2016 and the collapse of data prices to among the lowest in the world turbocharged this transition.

Social Media Became the New Public Sphere

Platforms such as:

became the primary public sphere for hundreds of millions of Indians who had never had access to traditional media discourse.

Politics, religion, business, culture, and community life all moved online.

The Constitutional Challenge

This created an enormous regulatory challenge:

How should a constitutional framework designed in 1950 — before transistor radio was widespread in India — govern a reality in which a farmer in Bihar and a professor in Bangalore can both speak to millions instantaneously?

The Misinformation Crisis

The same democratization of speech that empowered ordinary citizens also empowered those who spread:

India has experienced several incidents where viral WhatsApp messages triggered:

The Central Constitutional Tension of the Digital Age

The tension between:

The democratizing power of the internet

and

Its potential for catastrophic harm

is the central challenge of 21st-century free speech law.

Why This Part Matters

The internet has not merely expanded speech.

It has transformed:

This transformation forces constitutional law to evolve beyond analog assumptions.

PART 10: THE IT ACT AND INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY

The Information Technology Act, 2000

The Information Technology Act, 2000 was India’s first comprehensive legislation governing cyberspace.

Drafted before the smartphone era, it has been amended significantly, but its core architecture remains.

The Act’s key provisions relevant to censorship are:

Section 66A (Now Struck Down)

Introduced by the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008, Section 66A criminalised:

The maximum punishment was:

Three years imprisonment

Why Section 66A Was Constitutionally Defective

The Section was fatally flawed because its terms:

(a) Were Undefined

Examples:

(b) Did Not Correspond to Article 19(2)

These phrases did not fit within any of the eight constitutionally permitted grounds of restriction.

(c) Gave Police Unlimited Discretion

Police could arrest anyone for online speech they disliked.

Supreme Court Verdict

Section 66A was struck down in its entirety in:

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

Section 69A — The Blocking Power

Section 69A empowers the Central Government to direct:

to block access to information through any computer resource if it is:

“necessary or expedient”

in the interest of:

  1. Sovereignty and integrity of India
  2. Defence of India
  3. Security of the State
  4. Friendly relations with foreign States
  5. Public order
  6. Prevention of incitement to commission of any cognizable offence

Blocking Rules Framework

Blocking is done under:

Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009

These require:

Supreme Court Position on Section 69A

The Supreme Court upheld Section 69A in:

Shreya Singhal

because of these procedural safeguards.

Core Criticism: Secrecy

However, blocking orders are confidential.

Ordinarily:

This secrecy is the central critique of the Section 69A regime.

Section 79 — Safe Harbour for Intermediaries

Section 79 grants immunity (“safe harbour”) to intermediaries such as:

for user-generated content, provided they:

When Safe Harbour Is Lost

An intermediary loses protection if it:

1. Has Actual Knowledge

that content is being used to commit a crime

2. Fails to Remove It Expeditiously

after receiving knowledge

Shreya Singhal Reading Down of Section 79

The Supreme Court held:

“Actual knowledge” must come only from:

Not from private complaints.

This prevented intermediaries from becoming private censors.

The IT Rules, 2021 — New Platform Governance Regime

The:

Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021

created a new framework for:

Requirements for Significant Social Media Intermediaries

(Platforms with over 5 million users)

They must:

Encryption Controversy

Traceability effectively requires breaking:

End-to-end encryption

This has triggered major constitutional privacy concerns.

Fact Check Unit (FCU) Controversy

The Rules also created a Fact Check Unit empowered to identify and require removal of:

“False or misleading” content about the Central Government

The Bombay High Court struck this down in 2023 as unconstitutional:

The government cannot be judge of what is false about itself.

IT Rules Amendment 2026 — Latest Escalation

The IT Amendment Rules, 2026 introduced major changes:

New Takedown Timelines

These are among the shortest timelines in the world.

Compliance Warnings

Platforms must issue compliance warnings to users every 3 months.

Expanded Ministry Blocking Powers

Government is exploring direct blocking powers for multiple ministries:

instead of routing only through MeitY.

Sahyog Portal — Centralised Takedown Infrastructure

The Ministry of Home Affairs’ I4C created:

Sahyog Portal

(Operational from October 2024)

It allows law enforcement agencies nationwide to send takedown requests directly to platforms under Section 79(3)(b).

Scale of Takedown Orders

According to X:

The platform was receiving:

Over 160 takedown orders per day

from Indian authorities through Sahyog.

Criticism of Sahyog

Critics argue:

This industrialized takedown infrastructure makes meaningful legal review impossible and creates systematic over-compliance.

Platforms remove content defensively to avoid losing safe harbour.

The Section 79–69A Combined System

Together, these create interlocking censorship mechanisms:

Section 69A:

Blocks entire URLs/accounts

Section 79(3)(b):

Demands removal of specific content

Resulting Pressure on Platforms

Platforms face pressure from two directions:

  1. Formal blocking orders
  2. Informal compliance requests

Both operate with limited transparency.

Constitutional Significance

The IT Act framework has become India’s central architecture of digital censorship.

Its key constitutional dilemma is this:

Can a democracy regulate harmful online speech without creating a permanent infrastructure for opaque executive censorship?

PART 11: PLATFORM vs. STATE CENSORSHIP

Two Kinds of Censors

The traditional free speech framework focuses on State censorship — governments restricting speech.

But in the digital age, private platforms exercise enormous power over speech.

State Censorship Operates Through Law:

Platform Censorship Operates Through Private Contracts:

The Constitutional Problem with Private Censorship

Fundamental rights under Part III of the Indian Constitution protect citizens against State action — not against private action.

If Meta removes your Facebook post, you cannot file a writ petition claiming violation of Article 19(1)(a), because Meta is a private company.

The Constitution does not bind private parties.

However, This Distinction Becomes Blurred When:

The X Corp v. Union of India Controversy

X Corp challenged the government’s Sahyog portal and related takedown demands in court, arguing they violated the procedural safeguards of Section 79 and Section 69A and constituted an attempt to suppress political speech.

A High Court ruling upheld the Sahyog portal as an “instrument of public good” — X Corp had limited success in its challenge.

This case raised a profound question:

When a global platform and a democratic government clash over the limits of censorship, whose values prevail?

The Compliance Trap

Platforms face an asymmetric risk:

The rational choice is compliance — which is exactly what the Indian government relies on.

PART 12: LANDMARK CASES IN DETAIL

Case 1: Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

Citation: AIR 2015 SC 1523
Bench: Justice J. Chelameswar and Justice R.F. Nariman

Background

In November 2012, two young women in Mumbai — Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan — were arrested under Section 66A for posting on Facebook expressing disagreement with a political shutdown (bandh) following the death of Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray.

The arrest triggered massive public outrage.

Law student Shreya Singhal filed a public interest litigation before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of Section 66A.

Issues Decided

  1. Whether Section 66A violates Article 19(1)(a)?
  2. Whether Section 66A is saved by Article 19(2)?
  3. Whether Section 69A (website blocking) is constitutional?
  4. Whether Section 79 (intermediary liability) is constitutional?

Key Holdings

On Section 66A:

On Section 69A:

On Section 79:

Significance

The Zombie Afterlife

The most extraordinary aspect of the Shreya Singhal saga is what happened after the judgment:

Section 66A was declared void ab initio in March 2015.

The Zombie Afterlife

The most extraordinary aspect of the Shreya Singhal saga is what happened after the judgment.

Section 66A was declared void ab initio in March 2015.

Yet police across India continued to file FIRs under it.

The Internet Freedom Foundation and Civic Data Lab’s Zombie Tracker found that nearly twice as many cases were filed in the six years after the judgment (1,307 cases) than in the six years it was on the statute books (681 cases).

The Supreme Court had to issue further directions in 2019 and 2021 ordering compliance — demonstrating the enormous gap between constitutional law and ground-level enforcement.

Case 2: Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020)

Citation: (2020) 3 SCC 637
Bench: Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice R. Subhash Reddy, Justice B.R. Gavai

Background

On August 5, 2019, the Indian government revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370, bifurcating the state into two Union Territories.

In the preceding days and continuing afterward, the government imposed:

Anuradha Bhasin, the Executive Editor of Kashmir Times, filed a petition before the Supreme Court arguing that the communication shutdown had made it impossible for her to publish her newspaper’s Srinagar edition, violating both her freedom of press (Article 19(1)(a)) and her freedom of trade (Article 19(1)(g)).

Former Congress leader Ghulam Nabi Azad filed a separate petition challenging the shutdown’s impact on ordinary citizens.

The J&K internet shutdown lasted:

552 consecutive days

—the longest recorded internet shutdown in any democracy in world history.

Key Holdings

1. Internet as Fundamental Right

“Freedom of speech and expression through the medium of internet is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a), and any restriction thereon must be in conformity with Article 19(2).”

The right to access the internet is also a facet of Article 19(1)(g) (right to practise any profession or trade).

2. Indefinite Shutdowns Are Illegal

An indefinite suspension of internet services is not permissible.

Any shutdown order must be temporary in nature, not indefinite.

3. Proportionality Required

Restrictions must satisfy the proportionality doctrine from Puttaswamy:

4. Section 144 Cannot Be Misused

Section 144 CrPC is designed for specific, targeted emergencies.

It cannot be used to impose blanket, territory-wide restrictions equivalent to an undeclared Emergency.

5. Transparency Requirement

Orders imposing restrictions, including internet shutdowns, must be made public so that they can be challenged in courts.

Secret orders cannot deprive citizens of access to justice.

6. Judicial Review

All restrictions on internet services are subject to judicial review.

The government cannot use national security as a magic wand to immunise orders from scrutiny.

Limitation of the Judgment

Despite these progressive principles, the Court did not immediately restore internet services in J&K.

It directed a Review Committee to examine the orders — a direction that resulted in only marginal and gradual restoration.

Limitation of the Judgment

Despite these progressive principles, the Court did not immediately restore internet services in Jammu and Kashmir. It directed a Review Committee to examine the orders — a direction that resulted in only marginal and gradual restoration.

Significance

The Enforcement Problem

Despite Anuradha Bhasin, India remains the world leader in internet shutdowns.

In practice, governments continue imposing shutdowns frequently, especially in:

This illustrates the same paradox seen in Shreya Singhal:

Strong constitutional doctrine, weak administrative compliance.

The Deeper Constitutional Legacy

If Shreya Singhal defined internet free speech,

Anuradha Bhasin defined:

The constitutional limits of internet censorship.

Together, these two cases form the twin pillars of India’s digital speech jurisprudence.

Transition to the Next Constitutional Phase

With these landmark judgments, the legal architecture of censorship in India entered a new phase:

The battleground shifted from old statutes like Section 66A to newer forms of censorship:

This is where the modern censorship debate now moves next.

PART 13: RECENT CONTROVERSIES AND EVENTS

The Farmers’ Protest Crackdown (2020–2021)

During the farmers’ protests against the three farm laws, the government used Section 69A to block over 250 Twitter accounts of journalists, activists, and organisations covering the protests.

The Rihanna tweet controversy — when Rihanna and other international celebrities expressed support for the farmers — triggered an unprecedented diplomatic response, with the Indian government calling their expression:

“unwarranted.”

X India employees were summoned by Delhi Police.

The episode illustrated how the Section 69A regime could be deployed against political dissent under the cover of “public order.”

The BBC Documentary Controversy (2023)

When the BBC released a documentary series examining the 2002 Gujarat riots and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s role, the government used Section 69A to block it within days of its release in India.

Universities that screened it faced police visits.

The documentary was available globally but blocked in India — an illustration of both the limits and the mechanics of geographically targeted censorship.

The Manipur Blackout (2023)

Following the eruption of ethnic violence between the Meitei and Kuki communities in Manipur in May 2023, the state government imposed an internet shutdown that lasted from May to December 2023 — the longest internet restriction worldwide in 2023.

India had imposed:

771 internet blackouts between 2016 and 2023

—the highest of any country in the world, accounting for over 60% of all global internet shutdowns during this period.

The Manipur shutdown cost an estimated:

Rs. 2,091 crore ($255.2 million)

in economic losses in the first half of 2023 alone, according to Top10VPN data.

The 2026 Censorship Surge

In March 2026, a wave of account-level blocking orders under Section 69A targeted:

MediaNama documented over 40 instances of content takedown in March 2026 alone.

Accounts critical of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Chief Election Commissioner, and India’s foreign policy decisions were withheld in India on:

The Internet Freedom Foundation described this as:

“secret and inaccessible censorship”

that defeats the safeguards the Supreme Court relied upon when it upheld Section 69A.

The US 2026 National Trade Estimate Report explicitly flagged India’s takedown protocols as politically motivated — a rare instance of international trade policy intersecting with domestic free speech concerns.

The Wikipedia Threat (2024)

In July 2024, the Delhi High Court threatened to block Wikipedia in India after the Wikimedia Foundation declined to reveal the identities of editors who had edited an article about ANI (Asian News International).

PART 14: MISINFORMATION AND AI — THE NEW FRONTIER

The Misinformation Emergency

India faces a catastrophic misinformation crisis:

The fundamental challenge: distinguishing harmful misinformation from legitimate but contested speech.

Governments that are given the power to declare speech “false” inevitably use it to suppress inconvenient truths.

The Fact-Check Unit Controversy

The IT Rules (Amendment), 2023 created a Fact Check Unit (FCU) under the Press Information Bureau with power to identify “false or misleading” information about the Central Government and require its removal from social media platforms.

The constitutional problem is stark:

The government cannot be the judge of what is “false” about itself.

This is precisely the conflict of interest that free speech protections are designed to prevent.

The Bombay High Court struck down this provision in 2023, holding that the FCU violated Article 19(1)(a) and could not be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).

Deepfakes and the AI Censorship Problem

Artificial Intelligence creates a new category of speech-related problems:

  1. Synthetic speech can be generated at scale with minimal cost.
  2. Deepfake videos blur the distinction between truth and fabrication.
  3. Detection technology lags behind generation technology.
  4. False AI-generated speech can go viral before verification is possible.

This creates a dilemma unprecedented in constitutional history:

How can the law regulate false synthetic speech without granting the State sweeping powers to police truth itself?

PART 15: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

United States — The Absolutist Model

The US protects speech more aggressively than almost any democracy.

Even hate speech is generally protected unless it constitutes:

The First Amendment reflects deep distrust of government power to regulate speech.

Germany — Militant Democracy

Germany adopts the opposite model.

Because Nazi propaganda destroyed the Weimar Republic, Germany allows far stronger speech restrictions, including bans on:

Its constitutional philosophy is:

Democracy may defend itself against speech that seeks to destroy democracy.

South Africa — Transformative Constitutionalism

South Africa’s Constitution explicitly protects freedom of expression but also explicitly prohibits:

“advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”

The framework acknowledges apartheid’s legacy and permits stronger hate-speech regulation than the US model.

Lessons for India

India’s constitutional model is closest to the South African and German models — structured rights with explicitly permitted limitations.

The key differences from Germany are:

PART 16: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENSORSHIP

Who Controls the Media?

Understanding censorship requires understanding who owns the means of communication.

In India:

Regulatory Capture

The regulatory ecosystem — including MIB, MeitY, TRAI, and CBFC — is structurally tied to government control.

This creates systemic pressure toward over-regulation in politically sensitive areas.

Advertising as a Tool of Control

Governments are among the largest advertisers in India’s media economy.

Allocation of government advertising becomes a reward-punishment mechanism:

This is indirect censorship through economic pressure.

Economic Dependency of Digital Journalism

Independent outlets such as:

face severe financial pressure.

The legal cost of challenging censorship orders can itself become a censorship mechanism.

PART 17: THE ETHICAL DIMENSION

The Harm–Expression Paradox

At the core of censorship lies a real ethical dilemma:

Free expression and protection from harm are both genuine values.

Speech such as:

can cause measurable real-world harm.

Yet censorship power is exercised by powerful institutions — governments, courts, corporations — that may abuse it.

The Epistemic Argument for Free Speech

Democratic self-government requires citizens to:

A government that controls information controls democratic accountability.

The Dignity Argument for Restrictions

There is also a dignity-based argument:

Speech that degrades human beings and targets them for violence causes harm beyond “mere offense.”

Victims’ dignity is itself constitutionally valuable.

Who Bears the Burden of Proof?

India’s constitutional framework places the burden in principle on the State:

Restrictions must be shown to be:

In practice, citizens often bear the burden of costly legal challenge.

PART 18: THE WAY FORWARD — A BALANCED REFORMIST AGENDA

Principle 1: Transparency Before Everything

Section 69A blocking orders must be:

Principle 2: Judicial Oversight of Pre-Censorship

Prior restraints should require judicial authorization before taking effect, except in genuine emergencies.

Principle 3: Proportionality Must Be Operational

Authorities must document:

Internet shutdowns should be prohibited except under Article 352 Emergency conditions.

Principle 4: Legislative Reform of the IT Act

Needed reforms:

Principle 5: Platform Accountability Without Platform Censorship

Require:

Principle 6: Strengthening Press Freedom Structurally

India needs:

Principle 7: AI and Deepfake Regulation — Evidence-Based Approach

Targeted regulation should focus on:

Not broad over-censorship.

Principle 8: Engage Civil Society

Support:

CONCLUSION: THE PERMANENT TENSION

Freedom of expression is not a problem to be solved.

It is a tension to be managed — between:

India’s Article 19(1)(a) + 19(2) framework is a sophisticated attempt to manage this tension.

Its record is mixed:

The Supreme Court has produced landmark free speech judgments, while administrative censorship has intensified through opaque mechanisms.

The central challenge for India’s democracy is this:

To ensure that constitutional free speech is not hollowed out by a censorship infrastructure operating in the shadows of transparency and accountability.