Direct Benefit Transfer and Aadhaar-linked welfare have reorganised India’s social-sector spending, but exclusion errors persist. Discuss.
Subtopic: Social Justice · Welfare Delivery & E-Governance
How to structure your answer
Introduction: DBT has been the spine of welfare since 2013, anchored in the JAM trinity — Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile — and underwritten by the Aadhaar Act 2016 read with Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017).
Body: Three dimensions — (i) governance gains — Economic Survey reports cumulative DBT savings of over Rs 3.48 lakh crore since 2013, with leakages in PAHAL LPG, PDS and PM-KISAN measurably reduced; (ii) exclusion errors — PDS denials in Jharkhand (Santoshi Kumari, 2017) and Aadhaar authentication failures flagged by CAG audits; Aadhaar Act Section 7 conditionality survived Puttaswamy but Section 57 was struck down; (iii) institutional gap — grievance redress under the Aadhaar Act and the absence of an enforceable social-security entitlement.
Way forward / Conclusion: Independent grievance tribunals, biometric exception protocols, and convergence on the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011 updated by SECC 2.0 — with statutory backing for proactive disclosure of DBT data — will protect the welfare floor that JAM enables.
Written within the word limit
218 words · target 250 words · 14 min
Introduction:
Direct Benefit Transfer, launched on 1 January 2013, is anchored in the JAM trinity — Jan Dhan Yojana (2014), Aadhaar and Mobile — and underwritten by the Aadhaar Act 2016 read with K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), which recognised privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21.
Governance gains: The Economic Survey reports cumulative DBT savings of over Rs 3.48 lakh crore since 2013, with PAHAL LPG, PDS, MGNREGA wages and PM-KISAN (Rs 6,000 annual transfer) showing measurably reduced leakages; over 56 schemes onboarded DBT by 2024, and DigiLocker plus e-KYC stack the welfare rails.
Exclusion errors: PDS denials such as Santoshi Kumari's starvation death in Jharkhand (2017) and Aadhaar authentication failures flagged by the CAG (Report No. 24 of 2021) reveal a fragile last mile; Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act conditionality survived Puttaswamy, but Section 57 (private-party use) was struck down in Puttaswamy II (2018) as disproportionate.
Institutional gap: Grievance redress under the Aadhaar Act is weak, biometric exception protocols are inconsistent, the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011 is outdated for targeting, and DBT data lacks proactive disclosure under RTI Section 4.
Way forward / Conclusion:
Independent grievance tribunals, mandated biometric-exception protocols and convergence on a refreshed SECC 2.0 — with statutory backing for proactive disclosure of DBT data and an enforceable last-mile entitlement under Section 4 of the RTI Act 2005 — will protect the welfare floor that JAM enables and operationalise the right to social security under Article 41.
What an examiner expects to see
- DBT launched 1 January 2013; over 56 schemes onboarded by 2024
- JAM trinity — PMJDY (2014), Aadhaar Act 2016, mobile penetration
- Aadhaar Act 2016 Section 7 (welfare conditionality) and Section 57 struck down in Puttaswamy II (2018)
- Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) recognised privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21
- Economic Survey reports cumulative DBT savings of approximately Rs 3.48 lakh crore
- CAG Audit Report on Aadhaar (Report No. 24 of 2021)
- PM-KISAN, PAHAL LPG, MGNREGA wage payments via DBT
Concrete cases, schemes and judgments
- PAHAL LPG subsidy (largest DBT scheme by transactions)
- PM-KISAN annual Rs 6,000 transfer
- Santoshi Kumari starvation case, Jharkhand (2017)
- Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017 and 2018)
- DigiLocker and e-KYC stack