Discuss the causes and consequences of inter-State water disputes in India.
Subtopic: Paper I · Causes and consequences of inter-State water disputes in India
How to structure your answer
Set the constitutional frame first, because the design itself is a cause; then causes, live disputes, consequences, reform.
Written within the word limit
285 words · target 250 words · 15 min
The constitutional frame. Water is Entry 17 of the State List, subject to Entry 56 of the Union List on inter-State rivers. Article 262 lets Parliament provide for adjudication and, uniquely, bar the Supreme Court's jurisdiction — which it did through the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956. The River Boards Act of the same year has remained a dead letter.
Causes.
- Design. Ad hoc tribunals are constituted afresh for each dispute, with no time limit for years, no standing data agency, and awards that acquire finality only on notification.
- Scarcity and demand. Irrigation expansion, urban and industrial demand, groundwater depletion and increasingly erratic monsoons have made every basin over-allocated relative to firm availability.
- Federal politics. Water is a mobilising issue in State elections, so no chief minister can be seen to concede; regional parties raise the cost of compromise.
- Absent shared facts. Disputes over the flow data itself make bargaining impossible.
Live disputes. Cauvery between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, where the tribunal reported in 2007, the Supreme Court modified the allocation in 2018 and a management authority was created; the Ravi-Beas and the Sutlej-Yamuna Link between Punjab and Haryana; Krishna between Karnataka, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh; Mahadayi between Goa, Karnataka and Maharashtra; Mahanadi between Odisha and Chhattisgarh; Mullaperiyar between Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
Consequences. Irrigation projects stall for decades; farmers face uncertainty at sowing; disputes spill into violence, as in Bengaluru in 2016; awards are resisted or legislated against, as with Punjab's 2004 termination law struck down in 2016; and federal comity and inter-State trust erode.
Reform direction. A single permanent tribunal with benches, a Disputes Resolution Committee for mandatory negotiation first, an independent data agency, and basin-level management authorities — the substance of the amendment Bill introduced in 2019, which has not yet become law.
What an examiner expects to see
- Design. Ad hoc tribunals are constituted afresh for each dispute, with no time limit for years, no standing data agency, and awards that acquire finality only on notification.
- Scarcity and demand. Irrigation expansion, urban and industrial demand, groundwater depletion and increasingly erratic monsoons have made every basin over-allocated relative to firm availability.
- Federal politics. Water is a mobilising issue in State elections, so no chief minister can be seen to concede; regional parties raise the cost of compromise.
- Absent shared facts. Disputes over the flow data itself make bargaining impossible.