Legislative Councils occupy an uncomfortable constitutional space that is they are too weak to check, too costly to justify, too political to reform. Do you agree?

Legislative Councils were conceived as revising chambers in State legislatures, but their constitutional design has produced an uneasy institution: neither coequal like the Rajya Sabha, nor completely useless like a ceremonial body. The statement is substantially valid, though not without qualifications.

Too weak to check

• Under Article 169, Parliament may create or abolish a Legislative Council by ordinary law, but only after the State Assembly passes a resolution by special majority.
• The constitutional position of Vidhan Parishads under Articles 168–171 is structurally subordinate to the Assembly in ways that Rajya Sabha is not subordinate to Lok Sabha.
• “On ordinary Bills, it can delay legislation for a maximum of about four months; on Money Bills, only fourteen days.”. On money bills, the delay is fourteen days.
• There is no joint sitting mechanism, no equal legislative power, and no absolute veto.

Too costly to justify

• The fiscal charge has empirical support: the Uttar Pradesh Vidhan Parishad, with 100 members, costs an estimated ₹150–200 crore annually while sitting fewer days than the Assembly and passing a fraction of its legislation.
• Maharashtra's Council has been documented sitting fewer than 20 days in several recent years. Salaries, pensions, chamber infrastructure, and secretariat costs for an institution with limited constitutional leverage constitute a legitimate public expenditure concern.
• “The fiscal criticism is relevant because Councils require salaries, pensions, infrastructure and secretariat expenditure despite having limited legislative power and fewer sittings.” Too political to reform
• LCs are often used to accommodate defeated politicians, party loyalists or leaders who are not members of the Assembly. 12.5

Ex/; Uddhav Thackeray’s election to the Maharashtra Legislative

• Council in 2020 allowed him to continue as Chief Minister within the six-month constitutional requirement.
• Composition:
  • One-third members are elected by MLAs, making the Council an
  • Graduate and teacher constituencies were originally meant to extension of Assembly party strength. bring educated voices into legislatures, but today they often represent narrow and outdated electorates.

Governor-nominated seats, meant for persons with special

• knowledge in literature, science, art, cooperative movement and social service, are also vulnerable to party-political use.
• Political oscillation of the states: Parties support Councils when they are useful for accommodating leaders or slowing rivals but oppose them when they obstruct a majority government.
  • Ex: Andhra Pradesh’s repeated abolition-restoration politics and
  • Tamil Nadu’s abolition of its Council in 1986.

Why they may still be justified

• They act as a revising chamber, slowing hasty legislation.
• They provide representation to local bodies, graduates, teachers and nominated experts under Article 171.
• They provide continuity because one-third members retire every two years.
• They can improve deliberation on education, local governance, urban policy and the cooperative sector.
• In large States like Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka, a second chamber can reduce Assembly majoritarianism.

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2008) identified the only reform that addresses all three charges simultaneously: reconstituting Vidhan Parishads as Councils of Local Governments, primarily composed of representatives of Panchayati Raj institutions and Urban Local Bodies.