The Governor under the Constitution has no functions which he can discharge by himself: no functions at all. While he has no functions, he has certain duties to perform. How far do you agree?

The Governor is not designed as a rival executive to the elected Council of Ministers, but as a constitutional sentinel placed at the intersection of State autonomy and Union oversight. This explains Ambedkar’s distinction: the Governor has few independent “functions” in routine administration, but certain constitutional “duties” in moments of uncertainty, breakdown or interinstitutional conflict.

Functions (discharged entirely on CoM advice (no personal discretion) Executive functions: Day-to-day administration, appointment of ministers (Art. 164), summoning and proroguing the Assembly (Art. 174), ordinance promulgation (Art. 213) — all on Cabinet advice; Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) — SC held Governor must act on Cabinet advice in virtually all cases; individual judgment is constitutionally irrelevant in routine matters.

Legislative functions: Addressing the Assembly (Art. 176) — a duty to read the Cabinet's policy statement, not deliver personal views; TN Governor R.N. Ravi (2022–23) refused to read Cabinet-approved addresses and delivered personal political commentary — converting a constitutional duty into political intervention; SC (State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor, April 2025) held that the Governor acted "without bona fides." Financial functions: Recommending Money Bills, laying Annual Financial Statements — purely formal; no independent gubernatorial financial judgment exists or is constitutionally permissible. where genuine discretion exists (Duties)

• Appointment of Chief Minister (Art. 164) — government formation discretion When no party commands a clear majority, the Governor must decide whom to invite — genuine, consequential judgment that no Cabinet advice can guide because no Cabinet yet exists; Sarkaria Commission (1988) prescribed a priority sequence (pre-poll alliance → single largest party → post-poll alliance) but this is convention, not constitutional mandate.

SR Bommai v. UoI (1994) — floor test in the Assembly, not Governor's satisfaction, is the only legitimate majority test; dismissal of CM who enjoys majority is unconstitutional — judicial correction of gubernatorial discretion's most dangerous exercise.

• Reservation of bills (Arts. 200–201) — assent, return, or Presidential reservation Art. 200 gives the Governor four options — assent, withhold, return, or reserve for Presidential consideration — with no constitutional time limit; this lacuna enabled TN Governor R.N. Ravi to withhold assent to 10 bills for up to 4 years; SC (April 2025) held "withhold" means temporary deferral, not permanent denial; prescribed mandatory timelines — 1 month for assent/return, 3 months for Presidential reservation.
• Presidential Reference (In Re: Assent, November 2025) — Constitution Bench codified these timelines into constitutionally authoritative framework; converting passive discretion into bounded duty — the most significant judicial restructuring of gubernatorial power since SR Bommai.

Reservation for Presidential consideration (Art. 201) gives the Governor a genuine duty towards Centre — forwarding state legislation that may conflict with Central law or policy; Kerala Online Gaming Bill (2023), TN NEET exemption bill — reservation as a constitutional channel between state and Centre, not a political veto.

• Report under Art. 356 — the most consequential gubernatorial act Governor's report recommending President's Rule is an unreviewable initiating act — no Cabinet advises the Governor to recommend dismissal of the very Cabinet whose dismissal is being recommended; this is genuine discretion by structural necessity; Sarkaria Commission — report must be a "speaking document" with corroborating evidence, not based on newspaper reports; Art. 356 is the last resort, not the first response.

SR Bommai (1994) — proclamation is judicially reviewable for mala fides; floor test mandatory before dismissal; Rameshwar Prasad v. UoI (2006) — Bihar dissolution struck down; Manipur (2025) — President's Rule imposed following Governor's report during ethnic violence — same structural vulnerability identified in SR Bommai has not been eliminated by judicial correction, only bounded.

• Discretion as Chancellor — university governance As ex-officio Chancellor, the Governor retains VC appointment powers not governed by Cabinet advice — Kerala Governor-CM deadlock over KTU and Digital University appointments (2024–25) required SC intervention (Justice Dhulia committee); institutional discretion embedded in statutory roles extending beyond Art. 163's framework — a zone of genuine gubernatorial authority that state legislation can modify but not fully eliminate.

Therefore, the Governor’s office is neither purely ceremonial nor freely discretionary. Its routine functions belong to the Council of Ministers; its exceptional duties belong to the Constitution. The Governor must remain a constitutional shock absorber, not a federal flashpoint.