GS Paper 2 10 marks · 200w 14 min Medium
The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law which was legislated but with a different intention?
Subtopic: Constitution & Polity · anti-defection law and Parliament
How to structure your answer
Introduction (Tenth Schedule via 52nd Amendment, 1985) → How the whip regime silences individual MPs → Kihoto Hollohan and the 91st Amendment tightening party control → Partial attribution: fewer sittings, disruptions, weak committees, centralised parties → Reforms: restrict the whip, independent tribunal → Conclusion
Detailed model answer
237 words · target 200 words · 14 min
Introduction
The Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment, 1985) was designed to curb the 'Aaya Ram Gaya Ram' politics of legislative horse-trading. An unintended consequence has been the shrinking of the individual MP's deliberative role.
How the law has diminished the MP's role
- Disqualification for defying the party whip applies to every vote, not merely confidence or money matters, reducing MPs to delegates of the party leadership.
- With outcomes predetermined by party arithmetic, floor debate loses consequence; MPs have little incentive for policy specialisation or genuine persuasion.
- Kihoto Hollohan (1992) upheld the law while narrowing the space for dissent, and the 91st Amendment (2003) closed the one-third 'split' route, further tightening party control.
- With weak intra-party democracy, the whip effectively transfers the MP's judgment to the party high command.
But the decline cannot be wholly attributed to it
- Falling sittings (the Lok Sabha now meets roughly 55–60 days a year), frequent disruptions and guillotined budget discussions curtail debate independently of the Tenth Schedule.
- Declining committee scrutiny — the share of Bills referred to committees has fallen sharply across recent Lok Sabhas (PRS data) — weakens the MP's policy role.
- Centralised candidate selection and money-and-muscle politics erode legislator autonomy regardless of the law.
Conclusion
Reform should restrict the whip to confidence and money motions (NCRWC; Law Commission's 170th Report) and vest disqualification in an independent tribunal, as the Supreme Court suggested in Keisham Meghachandra (2020) — restoring the MP as a deliberative representative rather than a headcount.
What an examiner expects to see
- The Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) targeted defections, but its whip provision covers every vote, converting MPs into party delegates.
- Kihoto Hollohan (1992) upheld the law's validity; the 91st Amendment (2003) removed the one-third split defence, tightening party control further.
- Predetermined outcomes drain floor debate of consequence and remove the incentive for policy specialisation.
- 'How far' demands balance: fewer sitting days, disruptions, weak committee scrutiny and centralised candidate selection also erode the MP's role.
- Reform one: restrict the whip to confidence and money motions (NCRWC; Law Commission 170th Report; Dinesh Goswami Committee).
- Reform two: shift disqualification from the Speaker to an independent tribunal (SC suggestion in Keisham Meghachandra, 2020).
Concrete cases, schemes and judgments
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — constitutionality upheld, judicial review preserved
- 91st Constitutional Amendment (2003) — merger by two-thirds alone recognised
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020) — independent tribunal suggested
- PRS Legislative Research data on the falling share of Bills referred to committees
Terminology to weave into the answer
Tenth Scheduleparty whipdeliberative democracylegislative scrutinyindependent adjudicatory tribunalintra-party democracy