The Supreme Court of India is overburdened because it functions simultaneously as a constitutional court and a regular court of appeal. Examine the case for structural reform.

“In trying to do what it is not trained or designed to do, the Supreme Court compromises what it alone can do” Pratab Bhanu Mehta The Supreme Court of India was imagined as the guardian of the Constitution, but with time it has transitioned into a final court of almost every dispute. This dual role constitutional court under Articles 32, 131, 136 and 143, and routine appellate court through Special Leave Petitions has created an institutional identity crisis.

From Constitutional Court to Regular Appellate Court

• Constitutional matters displaced: PRS Legislative Research data shows that over 60% of the SC's workload consists of SLPs, and that too mostly civil and criminal appeals, not constitutional questions.
  • A court meant to clarify constitutional principles is forced to manage endless individual grievances. The Electoral Bonds case, the CAA challenge, and the Article 370 abrogation — each involving fundamental rights, federal structure, and democratic accountability — took years to reach Constitution Bench hearings.
• Geographic injustice: The SC admits less than 1% of SLPs filed from remote states (PRS data) meaning litigants from Tamil Nadu, Kerala, the Northeast, and tribal belts must travel to Delhi and retain Delhi counsel for a petition that will statistically be dismissed at admission.
• High Courts diminished: Article 136 has turned High Courts into intermediate courts rather than final constitutional courts within their territories. This weakens federal judicial architecture.

Also, overburdening reduces the quality of constitutional adjudication. Complex issues need larger benches, sustained hearings and reasoned judgments, not hurried disposal between admission lists. This explains the case for a National Court of Appeal or regional benches.

Models proposed (NCA and the cassation court approach)

• The Law Commission's 229th Report recommended separating the SC's constitutional and appellate roles:
  • a Constitution Bench in Delhi focused exclusively on constitutional interpretation, federal disputes, election law, and institutional accountability
  • Regional Cassation Benches in Chennai/Hyderabad, Mumbai, and Kolkata to hear routine civil and criminal appeals.
  • Case study: France's Court of Cassation reviews only questions of law (not facts); the US Supreme Court grants certiorari to only 80 of 7,000+ annual petitions; IMP: In V. Vasanthakumar v. UoI (2016), the SC itself referred the NCA question to a Constitution Bench acknowledging the legitimacy of the structural concern even if the reference has not produced a ruling.
  • Concerns expressed by SC: Multiple appellate courts risk producing conflicting jurisprudence, fragmenting SC authority, and creating a new layer of litigation between regional courts and the SC. The symbolic unity of a single apex court in a diverse federation is not a trivial consideration. However, these risks argue for careful design of the NCA, not for rejecting structural reform altogether.

India can follow a phased approach:

• Immediate (no constitutional amendment required): Art. 130 circuit benches outside Delhi (CJI's approval + Presidential notification); stricter SLP admission filters distinguishing "substantial question of law" from routine appeals LC 229th Report recommendation.
• Medium term: Permanent subject-wise Constitution Benches (taxation, federal disputes, criminal law) to ensure constitutional questions are heard promptly rather than waiting for bench composition alignment.
• Long term: National Court of Appeal by statute if constitutional consensus emerges to hear all routine appeals with SC jurisdiction restricted to constitutional questions, analogous to the German Federal Constitutional Court model.

Unless the appellate flood is separated from the constitutional function, the SC will remain what Ambedkar did not design it to be: accessible in theory to every litigant, but increasingly unavailable to the Constitution itself.