Kashmir as India’s Gateway to Eurasian Opportunity

Why in news?

PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti argues reviving Kashmir’s historic trade routes can harness its youth dividend.

UPSC Relevance

Prelims: Himalayan passes and border trade points, Shah-i-Hamadan and Kashmiri crafts, INSTC, Chabahar, Ashgabat Agreement, demographic dividend.

Mains GS-II: India and its neighbourhood (Pakistan, China); India–Central Asia relations; regional connectivity groupings.

Mains GS-III: Security challenges in border areas; infrastructure; employment and inclusive growth.

Demographic dividend and the aspiration gap

• A demographic dividend is the growth boost that comes when the working-age share of the population is high and the dependent share is low. India’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell to 2.0 in NFHS-5 (2019–21), just below replacement level (2.1), so the window is open but closing.
• The Economic Survey 2018–19 projected India’s working-age share to peak around 2041. China’s population has been falling since 2022, which is the contrast the author draws.
• The dividend is not automatic. It depends on skills, jobs and health — which is why the gap between rising education and stagnant employment is the core of the author’s concern.
• Kashmiri youth also shares these aspirations but is burdened by historic conflicts and lack of economic integration.

Kashmir’s historic crossroads

• Two historic routes mattered most: the Leh–Karakoram Pass–Yarkand route linking Ladakh to Xinjiang (Kashgar, Yarkand) and Central Asia, and the Jhelum Valley Road linking Srinagar to Muzaffarabad and Rawalpindi that led to exchange of goods, people, culture, faith, language and what not.
• Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani was a 14th-century Sufi of the Kubrawiya order from Hamadan (Persia). He is traditionally credited with bringing artisans who introduced or refined shawl weaving, carpet making and papier-mâché. The Khanqah-e-Moula in Srinagar is associated with him.
• These links weakened with the Partition of 1947 and the 1947–48 war, which turned Kashmir from a crossroads into a frontier divided by the Line of Control (LoC).

Why indirect access to Central Asia?

• India’s land route from J&K to Central Asia runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963, and China holds Aksai Chin.
• The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, and India objects to it as a violation of its sovereignty. So the very geography is today controlled by the two neighbours India has disputes with.
• This is why India reaches Central Asia by sea and via Iran instead: Chabahar Port (10-year operating agreement for the Shahid Beheshti terminal, May 2024), the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC, agreement of 2000 with Iran and Russia), and the Ashgabat Agreement (India joined in 2018). 
• Diplomatic anchors and connectivity initiatives include the Connect Central Asia Policy (2012), SCO membership (2017) and the India–Central Asia Summit (first held in January 2022).

India has tried this before: cross-LoC confidence-building measures

• The Srinagar–Muzaffarabad bus (Karwan-e-Aman) began in April 2005, and cross-LoC trade began in October 2008 through Salamabad (Uri) and Chakan-da-Bagh (Poonch). It was barter trade in a fixed list of items, with no customs duty.
• India suspended cross-LoC trade in April 2019, citing misuse for weapons, narcotics and fake currency, in the post Pulwama scenario. The bus also stopped in 2019 after Pakistan downgraded ties following the changes to Article 370. The “pilot corridor” idea the author proposes has thus already been tested — and its failure points are known.

The China track

• India–China border trade resumed on 1 August 2026 through Nathu La (Sikkim) and Shipki La (Himachal Pradesh), after six years; Lipulekh (Uttarakhand) had reopened in June. This followed an agreement during Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi in August 2025.
• Analysts see this reopening as mainly symbolic, since border trade volumes have always been small and tightly restricted. 
• It shows that trans-Himalayan trade is possible when relations thaw — but none of the reopened points is in Ladakh.

The connectivity debate: engagement versus caution

The case for opening up

• Interdependence raises the cost of conflict: the “commercial peace” idea (from Kant to Keohane and Nye’s “complex interdependence”) holds that states and people who trade have more to lose from war. The author’s claim that regulated connectivity gives “incentives for stability” rests on this.
• It builds a local stake in peace: during cross-LoC trade (2008–2019), traders, truckers and labourers on both sides earned from the route. That created a constituency that wanted calm on the LoC.
• It answers the youth problem: Kashmir’s economy is landlocked and depends heavily on one highway (NH-44), which closes in bad weather. Apples, dry fruits, saffron and handicrafts would gain from new markets, and corridors create jobs along their length — the core of the author’s argument.
• It de-securitises Kashmiri youth: the Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan) explains how issues and groups get “securitised” — treated only as threats. The author’s complaint that young Kashmiris are seen as liabilities is a call to reverse this and treat them as economic actors.
• It fits India’s strategic interest: China is present in the region through CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative. Stronger Indian economic links northward would help India compete for influence in Central Asia instead of leaving the space to China.
• Global evidence: the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) turned France and Germany from enemies into partners through shared trade; the open Irish border after the Good Friday Agreement (1998) became part of the peace itself;; India–Bangladesh border haats (since 2011) show small, regulated trade can work in sensitive border areas; and the 2026 reopening of Nathu La and Shipki La shows trade can resume even after a crisis like Galwan. 

The case for caution

• Cross-border terror: Pakistan-based groups have used the LoC for infiltration for decades. India’s 2019 suspension of cross-LoC trade cited its misuse for weapons, narcotics, fake currency and funding of militancy.
• Engagement has been betrayed before: the Lahore bus diplomacy of February 1999 was followed by the Kargil intrusion within months; the Agra Summit (2001) failed; and the Pahalgam attack (April 2025) came during a period of relative calm, after which India suspended the Kartarpur Corridor and placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance.
• Sovereignty concerns: reopening routes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan could be read as accepting Pakistan’s control there. India already objects to CPEC on this ground.
• Interdependence can be used as a weapon: Farrell and Newman’s idea of “weaponised interdependence” (2019) shows that the side controlling a link can use it to coerce. Pakistan suspended bilateral trade in August 2019, and China has used trade restrictions against several countries. Connectivity creates dependence as well as peace.
• Weak economics of mountain routes: passes like the Karakoram (about 5,500 m) are open only part of the year. India–China border trade through Nathu La has always been small, and analysts called the 2026 reopening mainly symbolic. Big gains may not follow from small corridors.
• Weak design of past experiments: cross-LoC trade was barter-based, without banking channels, proper scanners or reliable pricing. This encouraged under-invoicing and hawala, so critics say the model itself invited misuse.

What will decide the outcome?

• State of bilateral ties: with Pakistan, the end of cross-border terror is India’s stated precondition; with China, the post-2024 thaw has created some room, as the 2026 border trade shows.
• Verifiability: modern tools — full-body truck scanners, digital manifests, banking-based payments, integrated check posts — can reduce misuse. Their absence was the main flaw of 2008–2019.
• Sequencing: internal connectivity comes first (USBRL rail link, Sonamarg and Zojila tunnels), then third-country routes that avoid disputed land (Chabahar, INSTC), and only then pilot land corridors.
• Local ownership: corridors succeed when local traders, youth and elected representatives benefit and have a say. Otherwise they are seen as projects imposed from above.

Where the balance may lie?

• Both sides agree on the goal — jobs and stability for J&K’s youth — but differ on the order of steps. The engagement view says trade can help create security; the caution view says security must come before trade.
• A middle path is what the author herself suggests: phased, pilot-based and security-verified corridors, starting where conditions are best. Today that points more to the China track via Ladakh and to Central Asia via Chabahar and INSTC than to a Pakistan track, given the 2025 events.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s call to leave the beaten paths, urging that Kashmir be seen through enterprise and integration, not only conflict, must guide any future efforts in this direction. 

Practice MCQ 

Q1. Consider the following statements about Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani:

1. He was a 14th-century Sufi saint associated with the Kubrawiya order.

2. He is traditionally credited with bringing Persian and Central Asian artisans to Kashmir, linked to crafts such as shawl weaving and papier-mâché.

3. The Khanqah-e-Moula in Srinagar is associated with him.

How many of the above statements are correct?

(a) Only one   (b) Only two   (c) All three   (d) None

Answer: (c). All three statements are correct.

Q2. Consider the following pairs of India–China border trade points and states:

1. Shipki La — Himachal Pradesh

2. Lipulekh — Uttarakhand

3. Nathu La — Arunachal Pradesh

How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?

(a) Only one   (b) Only two   (c) All three   (d) None

Answer: (b). Nathu La is in Sikkim. All three points resumed trade in 2026.

Mains Practice Question

Q. “Connectivity can be both a bridge of integration and a channel of vulnerability.” Examine the prospects and limits of reviving Jammu and Kashmir’s historic trade routes as part of India’s outreach to Central Asia. (250 words, 15 marks)

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