“Development and welfare schemes for the vulnerable, by its nature, are discriminatory in approach.” Do you agree? Give reasons for your answer.
Subtopic: Social Justice · welfare of vulnerable sections
How to structure your answer
Written within the word limit
280 words · target 250 words · 14 min
Introduction
Welfare schemes for vulnerable groups necessarily differentiate — they select beneficiaries by caste, gender, income or disability. In that limited, technical sense they are “discriminatory in approach”. But differentiation aimed at equalising life-chances is protective discrimination, which the Constitution not only permits but mandates.
Why the differentiation is constitutional, not invidious
- Article 14 permits reasonable classification founded on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the objective; Articles 15(3), 15(4), 16(4) and 46 expressly authorise special provisions for women, children, backward classes, SCs and STs.
- Substantive equality: in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas the Supreme Court held affirmative measures to be a facet of equality itself, not an exception to it — treating unequals equally only perpetuates inequality.
- Targeting reflects fiscal realism: NFSA covers 75% of the rural and 50% of the urban population; PM-JAY selects households through SECC deprivation criteria; Stand-Up India channels credit to SC/ST and women entrepreneurs. Scarce resources reach those whom markets and social structures exclude.
Where the criticism has force
- Targeting errors: outdated data and Aadhaar-linkage failures exclude genuinely poor households, making differentiation arbitrary in practice.
- Labelled benefits can stigmatise recipients and breed paternalism.
- Competitive backwardness: tying benefits to group identity incentivises new demands for inclusion — the Maratha, Jat and Patidar agitations — politicising vulnerability.
- Perpetual targeting without exit criteria risks entrenching categories rather than dissolving disadvantage.
Conclusion
I agree only partially: such schemes are discriminatory in method but egalitarian in purpose — echoing Rawls's difference principle, under which departures from identical treatment are justified when they benefit the least advantaged. The corrective is not to abandon targeting but to refine it: updated data, transparent criteria, periodic review and graduation pathways, so that positive discrimination remains a bridge to equality rather than a permanent category.
What an examiner expects to see
- Reframe the statement: targeting is classification, and Article 14 permits reasonable classification with intelligible differentia and rational nexus — differentiation is not per se discrimination.
- Articles 15(3), 15(4), 16(4) and 46 constitutionally mandate special provisions for women, children, backward classes, SCs and STs — protective discrimination is a design feature.
- State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas: affirmative action is a facet of equality (substantive equality), not an exception to it.
- Targeting is fiscally rational — NFSA's 75/50 coverage, PM-JAY's SECC deprivation criteria — concentrating scarce resources on the excluded.
- Legitimate criticisms: exclusion errors from stale data, stigma of labelled benefits, competitive backwardness (Maratha/Jat/Patidar demands), and absence of exit or graduation criteria.
- Universal versus targeted debate: universal basic services eliminate targeting errors but dilute redistribution; a calibrated mix is defensible.
- Conclusion stance: partially agree — discriminatory in approach, egalitarian in purpose; refine targeting rather than abandon it.
Concrete cases, schemes and judgments
- State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) — substantive equality doctrine
- Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) — validity and limits of protective discrimination
- National Food Security Act, 2013 — legal entitlement for 75% rural and 50% urban population
- PM-JAY (Ayushman Bharat) beneficiary selection through SECC 2011 deprivation criteria
- Stand-Up India loans for SC/ST and women entrepreneurs
- Maratha, Jat and Patidar reservation agitations as competitive backwardness