Exercise of CAG’s powers in relation to the accounts of the Union and the States is derived from Article 149 of the Indian Constitution. Discuss whether audit of the Government’s policy implementation could amount to overstepping its own (CAG) jurisdiction.

Introduction

The Comptroller and Auditor-General, described by Ambedkar as among the most important officers of the Constitution, derives duties and powers from Article 149, concretised by the CAG (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971. The debate is whether auditing policy implementation crosses into policy-making terrain.

Audit of implementation is within jurisdiction

• The 1971 Act and CAG's Regulations on Audit authorise not just legality audit but propriety and performance audit — testing economy, efficiency and effectiveness of spending.
• Parliament cannot enforce financial accountability without knowing whether policies achieved intended outcomes; CAG reports feed the Public Accounts Committee.
• The Supreme Court in Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers v Union of India (2014) upheld an expansive CAG mandate, including audit of private revenue-share under telecom licences.

The overstepping concern

• Critics argue the 2G spectrum report's presumptive loss figure of Rs 1.76 lakh crore and the coal-block estimates ventured into hypothetical policy counterfactuals.
• Auditing with hindsight may breed bureaucratic risk-aversion and policy paralysis.
• CAG's own regulations bar questioning the merits of a policy choice made by the competent authority.

Conclusion

The correct line is functional: examining whether a policy was implemented economically and achieved its objectives is legitimate audit; substituting the auditor's preferred policy for the government's is not. Safeguards such as entry and exit conferences with departments already discipline audit findings. A CAG that audits outcomes rigorously while respecting policy space strengthens, not usurps, executive accountability.