How far has the Indian federal framework been successful in accommodating regional and cultural diversities? Highlight the role of asymmetric federalism and suggest measures to make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective.

Introduction

India is a holding-together federation: power was devolved by a strong centre rather than surrendered by pre-existing states. The Constitution does not use the word "federal" and Article 1 calls India a Union of States. That design deliberately traded symmetry for survival, and by the comparative record it has worked — several post-colonial states of similar diversity did not hold.

Where accommodation has succeeded

• Linguistic reorganisation. The States Reorganisation Act, 1956 turned language from a secessionist grievance into a basis of administration. Article 3 lets Parliament redraw boundaries without state consent, which made later adjustments possible without constitutional crisis.
• Language policy. The Eighth Schedule recognises without ranking; Article 345 lets states choose their official language; Article 350A provides mother-tongue primary instruction; the Official Languages Act, 1963 made the retention of English open-ended, defusing the anti-Hindi agitations.
• Electoral federalism. Regional parties have governed states and joined national coalitions, converting identity into bargaining rather than exit.

Asymmetric federalism as the device

• Article 371 series. 371A for Nagaland protects Naga customary law, land and resources; 371G does the same for Mizoram; 371F covered Sikkim; 371-I, 371-J and others provide regional development boards and reservations.
• Sixth Schedule autonomous district councils in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram give legislative and judicial powers over land, forests and customary law.
• Fifth Schedule Scheduled Areas with Tribes Advisory Councils and the Governor's power to modify law.
• The principle is that equal treatment of unequal situations is not equality — asymmetry is the instrument of substantive federal equity, discussed in our note on types of federalism.

Where it has failed

• Article 356 was used repeatedly for partisan ends until S. R. Bommai (1994) made it justiciable.
• Fiscal centralisation has grown: cesses and surcharges lie outside the divisible pool, and GST compressed state taxation autonomy while the Council's voting design gives the Union an effective veto.
• The Governor's office has become a recurrent flashpoint over assent and university appointments.
• Article 370's abrogation and the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir showed asymmetry can be withdrawn unilaterally.
• Central agencies and centrally sponsored schemes narrow the effective policy space of states.

Dispute resolution and its weaknesses

• Article 131 gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in Centre-state disputes, but it is slow and adversarial.
• Article 263 Inter-State Council was constituted only in 1990 on the Sarkaria Commission's recommendation and meets rarely; its Standing Committee is the more active body.
• Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 tribunals have taken decades; the 2019 amendment proposing a single permanent tribunal with a dispute resolution committee remains the pending fix.
• Zonal Councils are advisory and underused. The tribunal system generally suffers from vacancy and appeal-layering.

Measures

• Make the Inter-State Council meet on a statutory calendar with a published agenda and a permanent secretariat.
• Operationalise the single permanent water disputes tribunal with a hard adjudication deadline.
• Cap cesses and surcharges as a share of gross tax revenue so the divisible pool is protected.
• Codify time limits for gubernatorial assent, as the Punchhi Commission recommended.
• Institutionalise pre-legislative consultation with states on Concurrent List subjects.

Conclusion

The framework has accommodated diversity better than it has managed disagreement. Asymmetry is its most successful instrument and fiscal centralisation its most corrosive trend. The gap is not in constitutional design but in the institutions meant to resolve conflict, which exist and do not function. See our note on federalism in India.