India has recognised that West Asia is not a single contest, but a tangle of rivalries, bargains and anxieties. Comment.
Subtopic: Paper II · West Asia as a tangle of rivalries rather than a single contest
How to structure your answer
Show the multiple overlapping cleavages, then how India's policy of separate compartments follows from them.
Detailed model answer
296 words · target 200 words · 12 min
The statement is accurate, and the evidence is that the region's fault lines cut across one another rather than aligning into two camps.
The overlapping cleavages.
- Israel and the Arab states, where the Abraham Accords of 2020 normalised relations with the UAE and Bahrain, while Gaza has since made further normalisation politically costly.
- Saudi Arabia and Iran, a rivalry with sectarian, strategic and oil dimensions, which the Beijing-brokered restoration of ties in 2023 softened without resolving.
- Within the Gulf, the blockade of Qatar from 2017 to 2021 showed that the Gulf Cooperation Council is not a bloc.
- Turkey and the Arab states, over the Muslim Brotherhood, Libya and eastern Mediterranean gas.
- Proxy theatres in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, where the same actors appear in different combinations.
- External powers, with American commitment perceived as declining, Chinese economic penetration deepening and Russia present through Syria and OPEC+ coordination.
How Indian policy reflects the recognition. India has built separate, insulated relationships rather than choosing a camp:
- With Israel — defence technology and counter-terrorism.
- With the Gulf Arab states — some nine million Indian workers, the largest remittance source, energy imports, and the strategic partnership with the UAE that produced the comprehensive economic partnership agreement of 2022 and I2U2.
- With Saudi Arabia — energy, investment and the Strategic Partnership Council.
- With Iran — Chabahar port and access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, maintained despite sanctions pressure.
- With Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority — historical ties and development assistance, alongside consistent support for a two-state solution.
Assessment. India's approach works because the region itself is not organised into two sides; de-hyphenation is possible only because the tangle allows it. The risk is that a wider war would force alignment, and Indian interests — energy security, the safety of the diaspora and the shipping lanes — would then be exposed simultaneously.
What an examiner expects to see
- Israel and the Arab states, where the Abraham Accords of 2020 normalised relations with the UAE and Bahrain, while Gaza has since made further normalisation politically costly.
- Saudi Arabia and Iran, a rivalry with sectarian, strategic and oil dimensions, which the Beijing-brokered restoration of ties in 2023 softened without resolving.
- Within the Gulf, the blockade of Qatar from 2017 to 2021 showed that the Gulf Cooperation Council is not a bloc.
- Turkey and the Arab states, over the Muslim Brotherhood, Libya and eastern Mediterranean gas.
- Proxy theatres in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, where the same actors appear in different combinations.
- External powers, with American commitment perceived as declining, Chinese economic penetration deepening and Russia present through Syria and OPEC+ coordination.
- With Israel — defence technology and counter-terrorism.