Indian Constitution has conferred the amending power on the ordinary legislative institutions with a few procedural hurdles. In view of this statement, examine the procedural and substantive limitations on the amending power of the Parliament to change the Constitution.

Article 368 vests Parliament — an ordinary legislative institution acting in constituent capacity — with power to amend the Constitution 'by way of addition, variation or repeal'. The framers deliberately avoided rigid devices such as referendums or conventions, retaining only limited procedural hurdles.

Procedural limitations

• Initiation only by a Bill in either House of Parliament; state legislatures cannot initiate amendments.
• Special majority in each House separately — a majority of total membership and two-thirds of those present and voting; no joint sitting is available to resolve deadlock.
• Ratification by at least half the state legislatures for federal provisions — election of the President, Union-State legislative relations, the Supreme Court and High Courts, the Seventh Schedule, representation of states, and Article 368 itself.
• Presidential assent is obligatory (24th Amendment, 1971); some provisions (Articles 4, 169) are alterable by simple majority outside Article 368, underscoring overall flexibility.

Substantive limitations: the basic structure

• Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1965) upheld an unlimited amending power; Golak Nath (1967) barred abridgement of Fundamental Rights; the 24th Amendment reasserted parliamentary power.
• Kesavananda Bharati (1973) settled the balance: Parliament may amend any provision but cannot damage or destroy the 'basic structure' — constitutional supremacy, rule of law, judicial review, secularism, federalism, free and fair elections, and the limited amending power itself.
• In application: Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) struck down clause (4) of Article 329A; Minerva Mills (1980) invalidated clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 inserted by the 42nd Amendment; I.R. Coelho (2007) opened post-April 1973 Ninth Schedule laws to review.

India's amending power is thus procedurally flexible but substantively bounded: the Constitution can grow with changing needs, yet its identity stays beyond the reach of transient majorities.