Judicial Legislation is antithetical to the doctrine of separation of powers as envisaged in the Indian Constitution. In this context justify the filing of large number of public interest petitions praying for issuing guidelines to executive authorities.

The Indian Constitution adopts a functional, not rigid, separation of powers: in Ram Jawaya Kapur v State of Punjab (1955) the Supreme Court held that functions are sufficiently demarcated even without a strict doctrine, and Kesavananda Bharati (1973) made separation of powers part of the basic structure. "Judicial legislation" — courts laying down binding rules of general application — therefore appears to trespass on the legislature's domain.

Why it appears antithetical

• Law-making carries democratic accountability that unelected judges lack; Article 50 itself directs separation of the judiciary from the executive.
• Articles 121-122 and 211-212 embody mutual restraint among the organs of state.
• Guidelines are framed without legislative debate, stakeholder consultation or fiscal assessment — the overreach criticism of the 2016 highway liquor-ban order illustrates the danger.

Why PILs seeking guidelines are nevertheless justified

• Article 32 — the "heart and soul of the Constitution" in Ambedkar's words — makes enforcement of fundamental rights the Court's duty, and Article 226 extends it; where rights fail for want of rules, the court cannot plead helplessness.
• Guidelines fill a legislative vacuum only until the legislature acts: Vishaka (1997) governed workplace sexual harassment until the POSH Act, 2013 replaced it.
• They discipline executive apathy: Vineet Narain (1998) insulated the CBI, and D.K. Basu laid down arrest safeguards; continuing mandamus keeps compliance under judicial review.
• PIL's relaxed locus standi (S.P. Gupta, 1981) lets public-spirited citizens espouse the rights of the voiceless, making guideline petitions an instrument of access to justice.
• Articles 141 and 142 supply express authority for declared law and complete justice; such directions are interstitial and yield to subsequent legislation.

PILs praying for guidelines are thus a constitutional safety valve against governance failure, not usurpation — provided courts observe restraint on policy and fiscal questions, and legislatures promptly convert workable guidelines into statute.