“Superior Maritime strength proved to be England’s most powerful weapon in the struggle for colonial supremacy, particularly in the Carnatic Wars.”

The statement is substantially correct, but it is not the whole explanation.

Where sea power decided matters. The Carnatic Wars, fought between 1746 and 1763, were contests over supply. In the First War the French captured Madras in 1746 only because La Bourdonnais held local naval superiority, and returned it at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. Thereafter the balance reversed permanently. Boscawen's and later Pocock's squadrons kept the Coromandel coast open to Britain and closed to France, so English reinforcements arrived while French ones did not. Lally's siege of Madras failed in 1759 when a British fleet relieved the town, and Pondicherry fell in 1761 after a naval blockade. Wandiwash in 1760 was won on land, but Coote's army was the one that had been resupplied.

The qualification. Naval supremacy explains the margin, not the whole result. Plassey in 1757 gave the Company the revenues of Bengal, which financed the Carnatic campaigns; the French Compagnie remained dependent on a state that prioritised Europe. French command was divided between Dupleix, Godeheu and Lally, and Dupleix's recall in 1754 cost France its ablest strategist.

Conclusion. Sea power was the most powerful single weapon, because it converted European wars into Indian outcomes — but it worked in combination with Bengal's money and French administrative failure.