The Tenth Schedule was enacted in 1985 to curb defections, but it is the Speaker’s discretion that decides whether it bites. In the light of Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025), make a case for an independent adjudicatory tribunal. Examine.
Subtopic: Polity · Anti-Defection & Parliamentary Democracy
How to structure your answer
Introduction: The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment 1985 and tightened by the 91st Amendment 2003, makes the Speaker the sole judge of disqualification under paragraph 6.
Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — grounds of voluntary giving up of membership and voting against the whip; the 2003 deletion of the 'split' defence; (ii) institutional flaw — the Speaker remains a partisan office, and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) allowed only post-decisional judicial review; the Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur (2020) suggested a three-month timeline and a permanent tribunal; (iii) contemporary stress — Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July 2025) reiterated that delay defeats the schedule.
Way forward / Conclusion: Hand adjudication to an Election Commission-led tribunal, write a constitutional deadline into paragraph 6, and confine the whip to confidence and money votes — the Dinesh Goswami and 170th Law Commission line.
Written within the word limit
220 words · target 250 words · 14 min
Introduction:
The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment 1985 and tightened by the 91st Amendment 2003, makes the Speaker the sole judge of disqualification under paragraph 6; Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July 2025) again exposed how Speaker-led delay defeats the schedule's purpose.
Constitutional design: Disqualification grounds include voluntary giving up of membership and voting against a party whip; the 91st Amendment deleted the one-third 'split' defence and capped the Council of Ministers at 15% of House strength, shifting incentives from intra-party dissent to wholesale crossover engineered through resignations and by-elections.
Institutional flaw: The Speaker remains a partisan office; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld paragraph 6 but allowed only post-decisional judicial review. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur (2020) prescribed a three-month decision norm and floated a permanent tribunal — a prescription anchored by the Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and the 170th Law Commission Report.
Contemporary stress: Padi Kaushik Reddy (2025) reiterated that prolonged Speaker inaction is justiciable, after Karnataka's 17-MLA disqualification (2019), Maharashtra Shiv Sena rulings (2024), the Manipur Congress defection of 2020 and Goa-Madhya Pradesh episodes, where Speakers acted as gatekeepers of the ruling majority.
Way forward / Conclusion:
Hand adjudication to an Election Commission of India-led tribunal, write a constitutional deadline into paragraph 6, and confine the whip to confidence and money votes — the durable corrective consistent with intra-party democracy and the federal trust of the Tenth Schedule.
What an examiner expects to see
- Tenth Schedule inserted by 52nd Constitutional Amendment 1985
- 91st Constitutional Amendment 2003 deleted the one-third 'split' defence and capped Council of Ministers at 15% of the House
- Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule — Speaker/Chairman as sole adjudicator
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld paragraph 6 but permitted post-decisional judicial review
- Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur (2020) prescribed a three-month decision norm
- Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July 2025) on Speaker's delay
- Dinesh Goswami Committee 1990 and 170th Law Commission Report on independent tribunal
Concrete cases, schemes and judgments
- Karnataka 17 MLAs disqualification case (2019)
- Maharashtra Shiv Sena Speaker's ruling (2024)
- Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025)
- Manipur Congress defection case 2020
- Goa, Madhya Pradesh defection episodes