GS Paper 2 10 marks · 150w 9 min Medium
“The USA is facing an existential threat in the form of a China, that is much more challenging than the erstwhile Soviet Union.” Explain.
Subtopic: International Relations · US–China strategic rivalry
How to structure your answer
Introduction (Thucydides Trap framing) → economic scale and interdependence vs Soviet autarky → technological competition (5G, semiconductors, AI) → military and institutional reach (navy, BRI, AIIB) → alliance dilemma for US partners → Conclusion (a systemic, not merely military, contest)
Detailed model answer
216 words · target 150 words · 9 min
Introduction
Graham Allison's 'Thucydides Trap' frames US–China rivalry as a ruling power confronting a rising one. American strategists increasingly regard China as a more formidable challenger than the Soviet Union ever was.
Why China is more challenging than the USSR
- Economic weight: the Soviet economy never exceeded roughly 40 per cent of America's; China's is about two-thirds at market exchange rates, larger in PPP terms, and accounts for close to 30 per cent of global manufacturing.
- Interdependence: bilateral goods trade of nearly 600 billion dollars binds American firms, farmers and consumers to China — containment now imposes costs on the container, unlike the largely autarkic USSR.
- Technology: China leads or competes at the frontier in 5G (Huawei), electric vehicles, solar, batteries and AI, prompting US export controls and the CHIPS and Science Act — a race the USSR never seriously ran outside the military sphere.
- Military and institutional reach: the world's largest navy by hull count, hypersonics, plus the BRI, AIIB and RCEP — China reshapes the existing order from within rather than leading a separate bloc.
- Alliance dilemma: most US partners, from the EU to ASEAN, count China as a top trading partner, making Cold War-style bloc discipline impossible.
The contest is therefore systemic — economic, technological and normative, not merely military — demanding sustained competition combined with selective engagement rather than simple containment.
What an examiner expects to see
- Set the frame with Allison's Thucydides Trap: an established power versus a rising power, but with features the US–Soviet rivalry lacked.
- Economic scale: Soviet GDP never crossed ~40% of the US; China's is ~two-thirds at market rates, larger in PPP, and ~30% of world manufacturing output.
- Interdependence is the decisive difference: ~$600 bn goods trade means decoupling hurts the US too — the USSR was economically walled off.
- Technology contest at the civilian frontier: Huawei/5G, EVs, batteries, solar, AI; US counters with export controls and the CHIPS and Science Act (2022).
- China works within and reshapes the existing order (BRI, AIIB, RCEP, UN agencies) instead of running a parallel bloc like the USSR.
- Alliance dilemma: US partners trade heavily with China, so bloc discipline of the Cold War type is unavailable to Washington.
Concrete cases, schemes and judgments
- Graham Allison, Destined for War — the Thucydides Trap thesis
- US export controls on advanced semiconductors to China (2022 onwards) and the CHIPS and Science Act
- PLA Navy as the world's largest by number of hulls
- Belt and Road Initiative and AIIB membership spanning US allies
- US–China goods trade of nearly $600 billion despite rivalry
Terminology to weave into the answer
Thucydides Trapstrategic competitiondecoupling and de-riskingtechno-nationalismBelt and Road Initiativesemiconductor export controls