Decline of American Hegemony — Causes, Continuities & UPSC Notes (UPSC International Relations)

The post-Cold War "unipolar moment" is over. The United States remains the single most powerful state in the international system, but the gap between US power and the rest has narrowed sharply. For UPSC GS-II, the decline-of-American-hegemony debate is the framing question behind almost every IR topic — multipolarity, BRICS+, WTO reform, UNSC reform, Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, and the Indo-Pacific.

What hegemony means

A hegemon is not merely the strongest state. It is the state that sets the rules — in trade (dollar, WTO), security (alliances, intervention), finance (IMF, World Bank), technology (standards, chips), and ideas (liberal democracy, human rights). After 1991, the US enjoyed two decades of unrivalled rule-setting power — what Charles Krauthammer called the "unipolar moment".

By the 2010s, that moment had passed. The 2008 financial crisis, the Iraq quagmire, the rise of China, and Russian revisionism all eroded US pre-eminence.

External reasons for relative decline

Rise of China

• Second-largest economy in nominal terms, largest by PPP; manufacturing share of world output ~30%.
• Dominant in global supply chains — rare earths, solar, EVs, batteries.
• Aggressive military build-up: world's largest navy by hulls, hypersonic weapons, third carrier Fujian.
• Parallel institutions — AIIB, BRI, NDB, SCO, RCEP — that don't need US or Western consent.

Russian revisionism

• Crimea (2014), full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022), alliance-building with Iran, North Korea, Belarus.
• Demonstrated limits of Western coercion: sanctions slowed but did not break Russia's war economy.

China-Russia-Iran axis

Deepening coordination among three states that do not accept the US-led order. In 2024-25 this included arms transfers to Russia, joint naval drills in the Gulf of Oman, and coordinated positions at the UN.

Rise of middle powers

• India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, UAE, South Korea — each pursuing strategic autonomy rather than alignment.
• BRICS+ 2024 expansion signalled a crystallising Global South caucus.

Loss of moral authority

• Iraq (2003), Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, UNFCCC withdrawal (2017), UNESCO pullouts, unconditional support to Israel during Gaza (2023-25), exceptionalism on ICJ and ICC rulings.
• The charge of "rules-based order for thee, not for me" has become common among non-Western elites.

Under-delivery on global public goods

• Climate finance short of the US$100 billion pledge.
• Vaccine nationalism during COVID-19.
• Weaponisation of the dollar via secondary sanctions is pushing BRICS and Gulf states to experiment with alternatives.

Internal reasons

Polarisation

• Bitter domestic divisions over trade, immigration, China, Ukraine, climate.
• Foreign policy continuity — a hallmark of post-WWII America — is no longer guaranteed from one administration to the next.

Trumpism and the return of "America First"

• Trump's first term (2017-21) saw TPP withdrawal, NATO 2% row, WHO exit.
• Trump 2.0 (Jan 2025 onward) has reimposed tariffs, pressured NATO allies to spend 3%+ of GDP, pushed for Ukraine ceasefire talks on terms favourable to Russia, and floated annexation rhetoric around Greenland, Panama and Canada.
• These moves have unsettled allies and accelerated hedging, including in Europe, Japan, South Korea and India.

Economic shifts

• US share of global GDP is ~24% today vs ~40% at its post-war peak.
• Industrial base hollowed out; CHIPS Act and IRA are attempts at re-shoring.
• Ballooning federal debt above US$35 trillion by 2025.

War fatigue

• 20 years in Afghanistan, 8 in Iraq, Syria intervention, aid-heavy support to Ukraine — all have produced political fatigue and calls to pivot resources home.

Why American hegemony still matters

Despite the decline, the US remains the indispensable power.

• Military primacy: Defence spending (~US$900 billion) exceeds the next 10 nations combined. 11 active aircraft carriers; global basing footprint; unrivalled strategic airlift.
• Dollar primacy: ~58% of global FX reserves, ~88% of FX transactions; SWIFT gatekeeping.
• Technology: Apple, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Nvidia, OpenAI — the AI frontier runs on US capital, chips (Nvidia, AMD), and cloud (AWS, Azure, GCP).
• Alliance system: NATO (32 members after Finland and Sweden joined), Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Quad, AUKUS. No rival — not even China — has a comparable network of willing allies.
• Knowledge and talent: Top universities, R&D ecosystem, global magnet for STEM talent.

Signals of continued US power (2023-26)

• Finland and Sweden joined NATO — ending decades of neutrality.
• Japan doubled defence spending; Japan-South Korea rapprochement under US shepherding.
• AUKUS transfer of nuclear submarine technology to Australia.
• Philippines-US EDCA expansion (new bases facing Taiwan and South China Sea).
• Abraham Accords, IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), I2U2.
• Ability to deploy two carrier groups to the eastern Mediterranean within weeks of the October 2023 Hamas attacks.

Is this a new Cold War?

The emerging order is not a bipolar Cold War 2.0. It is multipolarity with US primacy — a system where the US remains first among unequals, China is a near-peer economic and military rival, and several middle powers (India, EU, Japan, Russia, Gulf states) exercise meaningful agency.

Key differences from 1947-89:

• Economic interdependence (US-China trade ~US$600 billion/year) constrains decoupling.
• No ideological bloc war — China does not export communism; Russia does not export a universal model.
• Middle powers refuse to choose — India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, UAE all keep both lanes open.

Latest developments (2024-26)

• G20 Rio (Nov 2024): Global South themes — hunger, taxation of ultra-rich, energy transition. US was a constrained actor; Brazil and India drove the agenda.
• Russia-Ukraine war: Stalemate on the ground; Trump 2.0 negotiating posture has openly pressured Kyiv, raising European anxieties.
• Israel-Hamas war and Jan 2025 ceasefire: US diplomacy remained decisive but unable to prevent mass civilian harm in Gaza, damaging US standing in the Arab world.
• Red Sea / Houthi crisis (2024-26): US-UK strikes failed to restore freedom of navigation; traffic rerouted via Cape of Good Hope.
• BRICS+ expansion (Jan 2024) and Kazan Summit (Oct 2024): Local-currency settlement, BRICS Pay experiments, de-dollarisation talk (though modest in practice).
• AI Summit Paris (Feb 2025): US did not sign the joint declaration; India and France co-chaired — an early signal that AI governance will not be US-led by default.
• Quad Summit (Sept 2024, Wilmington) reiterated Indo-Pacific primacy.
• India-Maldives reset (Oct 2024) showed regional states successfully hedging between China, India and the US.

Implications for India

• Strategic autonomy remains viable — India can simultaneously be in Quad and BRICS, buy S-400s from Russia and Rafales from France, and host both Putin and Biden/Trump.
• Economic decoupling opportunity — "China Plus One" benefits India's manufacturing push (PLI, semiconductors).
• Regional burden-sharing — Trump 2.0 will expect India to do more on Indo-Pacific security.
• Rules-of-the-road diplomacy — India can shape AI governance, digital public infrastructure, and climate finance norms.

UPSC Relevance

GS-II: "Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests." Essay: "The world is no longer unipolar, but it is not yet multipolar."

Probable questions

• "The unipolar moment is over but American primacy is not." Examine. (15 marks)
• How does the relative decline of the US shape India's foreign policy choices? (10 marks)
• Discuss the role of middle powers in a post-hegemonic order. (15 marks)

Prelims trigger words — Unipolar moment, Pax Americana, hegemonic stability theory, multipolarity, NATO, AUKUS, BRICS+, IPEF, IMEC, Abraham Accords.

The debate is less about whether the US is declining and more about what it is declining into. Relative decline with absolute power intact, combined with the rise of assertive middle powers, defines the world order of 2024-26 — and sets the stage for every UPSC question on international relations.

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