In 1978 Parliament amended Article 74 to make Cabinet advice binding on the President. It left Article 163 alone. Fifty years of Centre-state confrontation have run through that gap, because the Governor’s discretion, unlike the President’s, was never defined and has never been narrowed.
The role of the Governor is therefore a study in constitutional ambiguity that political incentive has steadily widened.
The Constitutional Paradox
Article 153 provides that every state shall have a Governor. Article 155 gives appointment to the President, effectively the Union government. Article 156 provides that the Governor holds office during the President’s pleasure.
Set those three together and the paradox appears. The President cannot be removed without impeachment. The Governor can be removed at any time, without a stated reason. A functionary meant to serve as a constitutional check inside a state depends entirely on the pleasure of the Union.
The incentive that follows is obvious, and it is structural rather than personal. A Governor who displeases the Centre can be removed. That creates pressure to act as the Centre’s agent rather than as the Constitution’s sentinel.
Ambedkar’s design intent, visible in the Constituent Assembly debates, was the opposite: an agent of the Centre for emergencies and a constitutional sentinel, not an alternative power centre or a political adversary of the elected government.
The Discretion Problem
Article 163 provides that the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except where required by the Constitution to act in his discretion.
That exception is the whole problem. It has never been statutorily defined. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) held that the Governor must act on Cabinet advice in virtually all cases, but a judgment cannot enumerate every situation in advance, and the residual space has been progressively expanded in practice: withholding assent to bills, sitting on bills indefinitely, controlling vice-chancellor appointments, making partisan public statements.
The contrast with Article 74 is the sharpest available argument for reform. Parliament fixed the equivalent ambiguity at the Union level in 1978 and left it untouched at the state level.
Appointment: The Politicisation Cycle
Article 155 requires no consultation with the Chief Minister. The convention of consultation recommended by the Sarkaria Commission (1988) has been honoured mostly in the breach. The mass replacement of Governors following changes of government at the Centre, in 2004 and again in 2014, is the clearest illustration of the office’s partisan cycle.
Sarkaria’s five criteria: eminent in public life, from outside the state, not a recent active politician, unconnected to local politics, and appointed after mandatory consultation with the Chief Minister. None has statutory force.
NCRWC (2002) recommended a committee of the Prime Minister, Lok Sabha Speaker, Home Minister and state Chief Minister for appointments, institutionalising the process and giving the Chief Minister a constitutionally significant voice. No government has implemented it.
Both Sarkaria and Punchhi specifically recommended against appointing serving or recently retired civil servants and defence chiefs. The practice has moved in the opposite direction.
Removal: From Pleasure to Limits
Article 156 provides no removal procedure, no stated grounds and no Parliamentary role.
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) held that no Governor can be removed solely because of ideological mismatch or loss of Central confidence, and that the pleasure doctrine cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The Court preserved the doctrine in form while limiting it in substance: removal without stated reasons remains valid, but is politically reviewable.
The Punchhi Commission (2010) went further, recommending that the impeachment procedure under Article 61 apply mutatis mutandis to Governors, requiring a Parliamentary majority, an inquiry and stated grounds. That would convert the office from a Central instrument into an independent constitutional one.
Why Reform Has Not Happened
This is the question worth answering, because the recommendations have been consistent and bipartisan for nearly forty years.
The reason is that every party benefits from the current arrangement while in power at the Centre and objects to it while in opposition in the states. Reform requires a governing party to surrender an instrument it currently holds, in exchange for protection it will only need later. That is a hard trade for any government, and it explains why Sarkaria, NCRWC and Punchhi have all reached similar conclusions to no effect.
Punchhi’s own formulation remains the best statement of the standard: exercise of the discretionary power must be dictated by reason, activated by good faith, tempered by caution.
The Way Forward
- Define Article 163 discretion by statute, enumerating the narrow situations in which independent judgment applies.
- Prescribe timelines for assent, since indefinite delay is the most common current abuse and the easiest to fix.
- Institutionalise appointment through the NCRWC committee model, giving the Chief Minister a formal voice.
- Give security of tenure through the Punchhi impeachment-equivalent procedure, which removes the incentive to please the Centre.
- Separate the Chancellor’s role from the Governor’s office, which would remove an entire category of recurring conflict in university appointments.
The office is not failing because the wrong people occupy it. It is failing because the design gives a Central appointee undefined powers and no security, and then expects independence.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the constitutional position of the Governor?
Article 153 provides that every state shall have a Governor, appointed by the President under Article 155, who holds office during the President’s pleasure under Article 156. In practice this means a Central appointee who can be removed at any time without a stated reason, unlike the President who can only be removed through impeachment.
What is the paradox at the heart of the office?
The Governor is a federal functionary without federal security of tenure. The office is meant to be a constitutional check within a state, yet its continuance depends entirely on the pleasure of the Union government, which creates an incentive to act as the Centre’s agent rather than as the Constitution’s sentinel.
What does Article 163 say about discretion?
The Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except where required to exercise functions in his discretion under the Constitution. Unlike Article 74, which was amended in 1978 to make Cabinet advice binding on the President, Article 163’s discretion exception has never been statutorily defined, leaving an ambiguous space that Governors have progressively expanded.
What did Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab hold?
The 1974 judgment held that the Governor must act on Cabinet advice in virtually all cases, confining discretion to a narrow set of situations. The practical difficulty is that the judgment did not, and could not, enumerate that set exhaustively.
What was Ambedkar’s design intent for the office?
Constituent Assembly debates show Ambedkar envisaged the Governor as an agent of the Centre for emergencies and as a constitutional sentinel, not as an alternative power centre or a political adversary of the elected state government.
What did the Sarkaria Commission recommend on appointments?
Five criteria: the Governor should be eminent in public life, from outside the state, not a recent active politician, unconnected to local politics, and appointed only after mandatory consultation with the Chief Minister. None of the five has been given statutory force.
What did the NCRWC recommend?
The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended in 2002 that Governors be appointed by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Lok Sabha Speaker, the Home Minister and the state Chief Minister, institutionalising the process and giving the Chief Minister a constitutionally significant voice. It has not been implemented.
What did B.P. Singhal v. Union of India decide?
The 2010 judgment held that a Governor cannot be removed solely because of ideological mismatch or because the Central government has lost confidence in them, and that the pleasure doctrine under Article 156 cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The Court preserved the doctrine in form while limiting it in substance.
Practice Questions
Prelims MCQs
- Under which Article does the Governor hold office during the pleasure of the President?
(a) Article 153
(b) Article 155
(c) Article 156
(d) Article 163
Answer: (c) Article 156 establishes the pleasure doctrine; Article 155 covers appointment and Article 153 provides for the office. - Article 163 differs from Article 74 in that
(a) It makes ministerial advice binding
(b) Its discretion exception has never been statutorily defined
(c) It applies only during emergencies
(d) It requires Parliamentary approval
Answer: (b) Article 74 was amended in 1978 to make Cabinet advice binding on the President; Article 163's discretion exception remains undefined. - Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) held that the Governor
(a) Has unlimited discretion
(b) Must act on Cabinet advice in virtually all cases
(c) Can dismiss a Chief Minister at will
(d) Is answerable to the state legislature
Answer: (b) The judgment confined the Governor's discretion to a narrow set of situations. - The Sarkaria Commission recommended that a Governor should be
(a) A serving civil servant
(b) From within the state concerned
(c) Not a recent active politician and from outside the state
(d) Nominated by the state legislature
Answer: (c) Sarkaria's criteria included eminence in public life, being from outside the state, not being a recent active politician, and mandatory consultation with the Chief Minister. - B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) established that
(a) Governors cannot be removed at all
(b) Removal solely for ideological mismatch is impermissible
(c) Parliament must approve every removal
(d) Governors serve a fixed six-year term
Answer: (b) The Court held the pleasure doctrine cannot be exercised arbitrarily, though it preserved the doctrine in form.
Mains Questions
- The Governor is a federal functionary without federal security of tenure. Examine how this paradox shapes Centre-state relations. (250 words)
- Article 163's undefined discretion has become the principal source of constitutional conflict in Indian federalism. Critically evaluate. (250 words)
- Successive commissions have made near-identical recommendations on the Governor's office without implementation. Discuss why. (250 words)
- Evaluate the Punchhi Commission's proposal to apply an impeachment-equivalent removal procedure to Governors. (150 words)
- Discuss judicial limits on the pleasure doctrine under Article 156. (150 words)
Tell Google you want more of this.
Add Anantam IAS as a preferred sourceOne tap, and this site shows up more often in your own Top Stories, AI Overviews and AI Mode. Remove it any time.
