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GS 2 · Practice archive

GS Paper 2 practice questions for UPSC Mains 2026.

Polity, Constitution, Governance, Social Justice and International Relations.

20 Qs / 250 marks426 questionsModel outlines included

GS Paper 2 · Tips & tricks

GS-2 — anchor every claim to an article, a judgment or a body

  1. Quote the Article number first.Article 200, Article 356, Article 14 — naming the constitutional provision in the first line of the body signals competence.
  2. Pair a judgment with the principle it laid down.S.R. Bommai (federalism), Kesavananda Bharati (basic structure), Vishaka (workplace harassment) — use them as shorthand, not lectures.
  3. Use the institution's real name.Not "election body" — Election Commission of India. Not "human rights body" — National Human Rights Commission. Not "the audit body" — CAG.
  4. For Governance, cite a real scheme + a real number.PM-KISAN beneficiaries, Aadhaar coverage %, MGNREGA person-days, DBT savings — concrete metrics anchor your point.
  5. IR answers need three verbs: convergence, divergence, balance.Every bilateral relationship has all three. Show all three in the same answer.
Q.115 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

The Tenth Schedule was enacted in 1985 to curb defections, but it is the Speaker’s discretion that decides whether it bites. In the light of Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025), make a case for an independent adjudicatory tribunal. Examine.

Subtopic: Polity · Anti-Defection & Parliamentary Democracy

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Introduction: The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment 1985 and tightened by the 91st Amendment 2003, makes the Speaker the sole judge of disqualification under paragraph 6.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — grounds of voluntary giving up of membership and voting against the whip; the 2003 deletion of the 'split' defence; (ii) institutional flaw — the Speaker remains a partisan office, and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) allowed only post-decisional judicial review; the Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur (2020) suggested a three-month timeline and a permanent tribunal; (iii) contemporary stress — Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July 2025) reiterated that delay defeats the schedule.

Way forward / Conclusion: Hand adjudication to an Election Commission-led tribunal, write a constitutional deadline into paragraph 6, and confine the whip to confidence and money votes — the Dinesh Goswami and 170th Law Commission line.

Key points
  • Tenth Schedule inserted by 52nd Constitutional Amendment 1985
  • 91st Constitutional Amendment 2003 deleted the one-third 'split' defence and capped Council of Ministers at 15% of the House
  • Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule — Speaker/Chairman as sole adjudicator
  • Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld paragraph 6 but permitted post-decisional judicial review
  • Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur (2020) prescribed a three-month decision norm
  • Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July 2025) on Speaker's delay
  • Dinesh Goswami Committee 1990 and 170th Law Commission Report on independent tribunal

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Q.210 marks · 150w 9 min Medium

The 73rd and 74th Amendments promised a three-tier federation, but local governments remain financially and functionally hollow. Comment.

Subtopic: Polity · Local Government & Federalism

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Introduction: The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments 1992 added Parts IX and IXA and the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules, listing 29 panchayat and 18 municipal subjects.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design left functions, funds and functionaries as 'may' devolutions under Articles 243G and 243W; (ii) State Finance Commissions under Article 243-I are constituted with delay and ignored; the 15th Finance Commission flagged uneven local-body grant utilisation; (iii) parallel bodies and elected mayors with no executive control hollow the third tier.

Way forward / Conclusion: Activity mapping for all 29 and 18 subjects, predictable SFC awards, and a constitutional bar on parallel bodies are the reforms that match the 1992 promise.

Key points
  • 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments 1992 — Parts IX and IXA
  • Articles 243G and 243W on devolution of functions — enabling, not obligatory
  • Eleventh Schedule (29 subjects) and Twelfth Schedule (18 subjects)
  • Article 243-I and 243Y — State Finance Commissions
  • 15th Finance Commission earmarked Rs 4.36 lakh crore for local bodies (2021–2026)
  • Article 243K — State Election Commission for panchayat elections
  • Panchayat Advancement Index (Ministry of Panchayati Raj, 2024) measures devolution gaps

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Q.315 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

Simultaneous elections, as proposed by the High-Level Committee on One Nation One Election, would alter the federal balance of the Constitution. Critically analyse.

Subtopic: Governance · Electoral Reforms

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Introduction: The High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections (Ram Nath Kovind, 2024) and the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill 2024 propose synchronised Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections, with a single voters' list and shortened residual terms.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) federalism — truncating an Assembly's life to align it with the Lok Sabha rewrites Article 172 and weakens the doctrine of separate state mandates; (ii) feasibility — mid-term collapse, Article 356 episodes, and the requirement of state ratification under Article 368(2) proviso; (iii) trade-offs — cost savings (Law Commission's 170th and 255th reports) versus the concentration of national-issue voting that dwarfs state-level accountability.

Way forward / Conclusion: Sequential reform — fixed-term Lok Sabha first, decoupled local elections later — is more compatible with the basic-structure protection of federalism than a single-stroke amendment.

Key points
  • High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections (Ram Nath Kovind) report submitted 14 March 2024
  • Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill 2024 introduced in Lok Sabha 17 December 2024
  • Article 83 (Lok Sabha term) and Article 172 (Assembly term) require amendment
  • Proposed Article 82A for the appointed date and the unexpired term concept
  • Article 368(2) proviso ratification by half the State Legislatures
  • 170th Law Commission Report 1999 and 255th Law Commission Report 2015 on electoral reforms
  • S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) on federalism as basic structure

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Q.410 marks · 150w 9 min Medium

The Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 2010 has reshaped the space for NGOs in India and strained the right to associate under Article 19(1)(c). Comment.

Subtopic: Governance · NGO Regulation & Civic Space

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Introduction: The FCRA 2010 replaced the 1976 Act and was tightened by the 2020 amendment to channel all foreign funds through a designated SBI Parliament Street branch.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory tightening — Section 7 ban on sub-grants, mandatory Aadhaar of office bearers, and tightened renewal under Sections 11 and 16; (ii) impact — FCRA registrations fell from over 22,400 in 2017 to under 16,000 by 2024 according to MHA disclosures; (iii) constitutional test — Noel Harper v. Union of India (2022) upheld the amendments under Article 19(1)(c) and Article 14, while Indian Social Action Forum v. Union of India (2020) preserved political-activity restrictions.

Way forward / Conclusion: A reasoned renewal process with appellate review and a narrower definition of 'political activity' would reconcile the security purpose with constitutional freedoms.

Key points
  • Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 2010 and FCRA (Amendment) Act 2020
  • Section 7 — bar on transfer of foreign contribution to other organisations
  • Designated SBI New Delhi Main Branch for all FCRA inflows
  • Article 19(1)(c) right to form associations — reasonable restriction under 19(4)
  • Noel Harper v. Union of India (2022) upheld 2020 amendments
  • Indian Social Action Forum v. Union of India (2020) on 'political' activity
  • FCRA registrations declined from approximately 22,400 in 2017 to under 16,000 in 2024 (MHA annual data)

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Q.515 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

Pendency of cases in Indian courts has become a structural denial of justice. With reference to the institutional reforms needed at the High Court and subordinate-judiciary level, examine.

Subtopic: Polity · Judiciary & Access to Justice

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Introduction: The National Judicial Data Grid reports over 5.2 crore pending cases as of 2025, with the subordinate judiciary carrying about 4.5 crore and High Courts about 62 lakh.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional and statutory base — Article 224A on ad hoc retired judges activated by the Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) verdict, and All India Judicial Service under Article 312; (ii) institutional — vacancy ratios in High Courts (about 30%), CrPC/BNSS undertrial backlog under Article 21 (Hussainara Khatoon, 1979), and inadequate use of plea bargaining and Lok Adalats under NALSA; (iii) reforms recommended by the Law Commission's 230th and 245th Reports and the Malimath Committee.

Way forward / Conclusion: A time-bound AIJS, fast-tracked filling of High Court vacancies through a reformed collegium under the Memorandum of Procedure, and a statutory case-flow management code rooted in the Justice Delivery and Legal Reforms Mission can clear the backlog without weakening due process.

Key points
  • National Judicial Data Grid pending cases: over 5.2 crore (2025)
  • Article 224A — ad hoc appointment of retired High Court judges
  • Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) revived Article 224A use
  • Article 312 — enabling provision for All India Judicial Service
  • Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) on speedy trial under Article 21
  • 230th Law Commission Report (Reforms in Judiciary, 2009) and 245th Report (Arrears and Backlog)
  • Section 436A CrPC / Section 479 BNSS — undertrial release

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Q.610 marks · 150w 9 min Medium

Article 21 has been judicially expanded from a procedural safeguard into a charter of substantive rights. With reference to recent judgments on personal liberty and inclusive digital access, discuss.

Subtopic: Polity · Fundamental Rights

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Introduction: Article 21 has evolved from A.K. Gopalan (1950) to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) reading 'procedure established by law' as 'fair, just and reasonable'.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) personal liberty — Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2023) on mandatory written grounds of arrest under Article 22; (ii) substantive expansion — right to privacy (Puttaswamy, 2017), right to die with dignity (Common Cause, 2018) and right to clean environment (M.C. Mehta cases); (iii) the 2025 Supreme Court ruling in Pragya Prasun v. Union of India recognising inclusive digital access as part of Article 21.

Way forward / Conclusion: The doctrinal arc shows judicial activism in writing positive obligations into a negatively framed right — a strength when backed by enforceable directions, a risk when courts substitute for the legislature.

Key points
  • A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) — narrow reading
  • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) — fair, just and reasonable procedure
  • K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) — right to privacy
  • Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) — right to die with dignity
  • Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (3 October 2023) — written grounds of arrest
  • Pragya Prasun v. Union of India (2025) — inclusive digital access
  • Article 22 read with Article 21 in arrest cases

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Q.710 marks · 150w 9 min Medium

Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups have remained outside the headline indicators of welfare. With reference to the constitutional and policy framework for PVTGs, examine.

Subtopic: Social Justice · Vulnerable Groups

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Introduction: The 75 PVTGs across 18 states and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands inherit the Dhebar Commission 1961 category of 'Primitive Tribal Groups', renamed in 2006.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional anchors — Article 46 DPSP, Fifth and Sixth Schedules, PESA 1996, Forest Rights Act 2006; (ii) institutional — Tribal Sub-Plan, Eklavya Model Residential Schools, and the PM-JANMAN mission launched 15 November 2023 with a Rs 24,104 crore outlay; (iii) gaps — absence of disaggregated census data, low Habitation Development Plan coverage.

Way forward / Conclusion: Group-specific Habitation Development Plans, PVTG enumeration in the next census, and convergence with the Forest Rights Act community-forest-resource rights are the policy levers.

Key points
  • 75 PVTGs across 18 states and Andaman and Nicobar Islands
  • Dhebar Commission 1961 created the 'Primitive Tribal Groups' category
  • Renamed Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups in 2006
  • Article 46 — DPSP for educational and economic interests of SCs/STs
  • PESA 1996 — Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act
  • PM-JANMAN launched 15 November 2023, outlay approximately Rs 24,104 crore
  • Forest Rights Act 2006 — individual and community forest rights

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Q.815 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

India’s nutrition transition has overtaken its food-security policy. With reference to the role of food fortification and PDS reform in addressing hidden hunger, critically analyse.

Subtopic: Social Justice · Health & Hunger

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Introduction: National Family Health Survey-5 (2019-21) shows anaemia in 67% of children aged 6–59 months and 57% of women aged 15–49 — a hidden hunger that calorie-based welfare does not capture.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory base — National Food Security Act 2013 covering about 81.35 crore beneficiaries, recognising the right to food flowing from Article 21 and PUCL v. Union of India (2001); (ii) food fortification — mandatory rice fortification in PDS from April 2024 with iron, folic acid and B12 under FSSAI standards; controversies on sickle-cell and thalassemia patients; (iii) institutional — POSHAN Abhiyaan, Anganwadi convergence, and the National Multi-sectoral Action Plan.

Way forward / Conclusion: Pair fortification with dietary diversification through millets and pulses on the PDS basket, biofortified crops under ICAR's HarvestPlus, and an exit clause from rice fortification for at-risk groups.

Key points
  • NFHS-5 (2019-21) — anaemia 67% in children, 57% in women 15–49
  • National Food Security Act 2013 — 81.35 crore beneficiaries
  • PUCL v. Union of India (2001) — right to food under Article 21
  • Mandatory rice fortification in PDS, ICDS, PM POSHAN from April 2024
  • FSSAI Food Fortification Regulations 2018 and the +F logo
  • POSHAN Abhiyaan (2018) and Mission POSHAN 2.0 (2021)
  • Sickle cell disease and thalassemia exemption concerns flagged by ICMR

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Q.915 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

Direct Benefit Transfer and Aadhaar-linked welfare have reorganised India’s social-sector spending, but exclusion errors persist. Discuss.

Subtopic: Social Justice · Welfare Delivery & E-Governance

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Introduction: DBT has been the spine of welfare since 2013, anchored in the JAM trinity — Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile — and underwritten by the Aadhaar Act 2016 read with Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) governance gains — Economic Survey reports cumulative DBT savings of over Rs 3.48 lakh crore since 2013, with leakages in PAHAL LPG, PDS and PM-KISAN measurably reduced; (ii) exclusion errors — PDS denials in Jharkhand (Santoshi Kumari, 2017) and Aadhaar authentication failures flagged by CAG audits; Aadhaar Act Section 7 conditionality survived Puttaswamy but Section 57 was struck down; (iii) institutional gap — grievance redress under the Aadhaar Act and the absence of an enforceable social-security entitlement.

Way forward / Conclusion: Independent grievance tribunals, biometric exception protocols, and convergence on the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011 updated by SECC 2.0 — with statutory backing for proactive disclosure of DBT data — will protect the welfare floor that JAM enables.

Key points
  • DBT launched 1 January 2013; over 56 schemes onboarded by 2024
  • JAM trinity — PMJDY (2014), Aadhaar Act 2016, mobile penetration
  • Aadhaar Act 2016 Section 7 (welfare conditionality) and Section 57 struck down in Puttaswamy II (2018)
  • Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) recognised privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21
  • Economic Survey reports cumulative DBT savings of approximately Rs 3.48 lakh crore
  • CAG Audit Report on Aadhaar (Report No. 24 of 2021)
  • PM-KISAN, PAHAL LPG, MGNREGA wage payments via DBT

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Q.1015 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

Neighbourhood First is being stress-tested by the China factor across South Asia. With reference to India’s response across Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives, examine.

Subtopic: IR · Neighbourhood

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Introduction: Neighbourhood First, articulated in 2014, sits on Gujral Doctrine asymmetry and is now competing with China's BRI footprint and India's HADR-first responses.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) economic — Lines of Credit, ITEC training, and the Indian Rupee Trade settlement framework deployed in Sri Lanka's 2022 crisis (about USD 4.5 billion) and Bangladesh post 2024 political transition; (ii) connectivity — Trincomalee oil tank-farm with Lanka IOC, BBIN MVA, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Kaladan Multimodal; (iii) political churn — Maldives 'India Out' since 2023, Bangladesh interim government post-August 2024, Nepal's revised currency map controversy.

Way forward / Conclusion: Deepen people-to-people HADR (Operation Brahma, 2025), keep delivery cycles under three years, and convert SAARC paralysis into BIMSTEC-driven sub-regionalism.

Key points
  • Neighbourhood First policy articulated in 2014
  • Gujral Doctrine 1996–97 — non-reciprocal asymmetry
  • India's Sri Lanka assistance approximately USD 4.5 billion in 2022–23
  • Trincomalee oil tank-farm Lanka IOC operationalised 2022 onwards
  • Maldives India Out campaign 2023 and military withdrawal May 2024
  • Bangladesh interim government from August 2024
  • BIMSTEC Sixth Summit Bangkok April 2024

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Q.1115 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

The 44th Constitutional Amendment 1978 was an attempt to rebalance the Constitution after the Emergency, but several of its safeguards remain unenforced. Examine.

Subtopic: Polity · Constitutional Amendments

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Introduction: The 44th Amendment was passed in April 1979 by the Janata government to undo the most far-reaching provisions of the 42nd Amendment 1976, restoring the constitutional balance disturbed during the 1975-77 Emergency.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) safeguards enacted — Article 352 now requires 'armed rebellion' instead of 'internal disturbance', Article 358 suspends Article 19 only during external emergency, Article 359 cannot suspend Articles 20 and 21, written Cabinet advice is required for proclamation, and Article 74 mandates the President send back advice once; (ii) restoration of right to property — Article 31 omitted, Article 300A inserted, ending fundamental-right status; (iii) unenforced provisions — Section 3 on press freedom for parliamentary proceedings and Article 22(7) safeguards on preventive detention have not been notified, as flagged by Soli Sorabjee and successive Law Commission reports.

Way forward / Conclusion: Notify the pending Sections, codify a parliamentary review of every Emergency proclamation, and read Article 21 expansively into Article 22 to complete the 44th Amendment's promise.

Key points
  • 44th Constitutional Amendment Act 1978 (effective from 1979–80)
  • Article 352 — 'armed rebellion' replaced 'internal disturbance'
  • Article 359 — Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended even during Emergency
  • Article 74(1) — President may return Cabinet advice once for reconsideration
  • Article 300A — right to property as a constitutional, not fundamental, right
  • Article 358 — Article 19 suspended only during external emergency
  • Section 3 of the 44th Amendment on press freedom for Parliament reporting — never notified

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Q.1215 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

President’s Rule under Article 356 is meant to be the Constitution’s safety valve, not a routine political instrument. In the light of the eleventh imposition in Manipur in 2025, discuss the S.R. Bommai guardrails.

Subtopic: Polity · Federalism & Centre-State Relations

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Introduction: Article 356 allows the Centre to assume the functions of a State on receipt of a Governor's report or otherwise; B.R. Ambedkar called it a dead letter. President's Rule was imposed in Manipur on 13 February 2025 — the eleventh imposition in that State.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Article 355 duty to protect States; Articles 356 and 357 process; Article 365 for failure to comply with Centre's directions; parliamentary approval within two months; (ii) Sarkaria Commission 1988 recommendations and the S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) nine-judge bench guardrails — last resort, judicial review available, floor test on the floor of the House; (iii) Manipur 2025 episode — prolonged ethnic violence, Governor's report citing constitutional breakdown, opposition's federalism concerns.

Way forward / Conclusion: Pre-imposition warning under Article 355, mandatory floor test, time-bound restoration of Assembly, and Inter-State Council scrutiny as institutionalised by Punchhi Commission 2010 are the durable corrections.

Key points
  • Article 356 — failure of constitutional machinery in a State
  • Article 355 — Union's duty to protect every State
  • Article 365 — failure to comply with Union directions
  • S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — floor test, judicial review, federalism as basic structure
  • Sarkaria Commission Report 1988 — Article 356 as last resort
  • Punchhi Commission 2010 — pre-warning under Article 355
  • President's Rule in Manipur on 13 February 2025 — 11th imposition

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Q.1315 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

The Finance Commission under Article 280 is the constitutional umpire of fiscal federalism, but the rising share of cesses and surcharges outside the divisible pool is eroding its mandate. Examine.

Subtopic: Polity · Federalism & Fiscal Federalism

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Introduction: Article 280 constitutes a Finance Commission every five years to recommend devolution of net tax proceeds and grants-in-aid under Article 275; the 16th Finance Commission under Arvind Panagariya is to submit its report by 31 October 2025 for the period 2026–31.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) divisible pool — Article 270 excludes cesses, surcharges and Article 271 surcharges from devolution; the share of cesses and surcharges has risen from about 10.4 per cent of gross tax revenue in 2011-12 to over 19 per cent by 2024-25; (ii) 15th Finance Commission devolved 41 per cent of the divisible pool but the effective transfer to States, after netting out non-divisible levies, is lower; (iii) governance friction — repeated extension of the GST Compensation cess, special-category status demands, and the 'horizontal' allocation criteria favouring older population data.

Way forward / Conclusion: A constitutional cap on the share of cesses, sunset clauses, and an upper-house ratified Finance Commission framework will restore the Article 280 promise.

Key points
  • Article 280 — Finance Commission every five years
  • Article 270 — divisible pool excludes cesses and surcharges
  • Article 275 — grants-in-aid to States
  • 15th Finance Commission devolved 41% of divisible pool (after 1% J&K carve-out)
  • 16th Finance Commission constituted 31 December 2023, Chair Arvind Panagariya
  • Cesses and surcharges rose from 10.4% (2011-12) to over 19% (2024-25) of gross tax revenue
  • Article 271 — surcharges accrue only to the Union

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Q.1415 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

Inter-state water disputes have outlived the constitutional and statutory machinery designed to resolve them. With reference to Article 262 and the ISRWD Act 1956, examine.

Subtopic: Polity · Separation of Powers & Dispute Redressal

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Introduction: Article 262 empowers Parliament to legislate on inter-state river-water disputes and to bar the jurisdiction of all courts, including the Supreme Court, in such matters; the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956 and the River Boards Act 1956 are its statutory expressions.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Entry 17 of State List on water, Entry 56 of Union List on inter-state rivers, Article 262 bar; (ii) tribunal record — eight tribunals constituted since 1969, of which only Krishna, Cauvery and Godavari have delivered substantive awards; State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2018) on Cauvery led to the Cauvery Water Management Authority; (iii) inefficiency — average pendency exceeds a decade, States routinely approach the Supreme Court under Article 131 despite the Article 262 bar.

Way forward / Conclusion: Operationalise a permanent Inter-State Water Disputes Tribunal under the Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill 2019, statutory time-limit, and a Dispute Resolution Committee for negotiated settlement.

Key points
  • Article 262 — disputes relating to inter-state rivers
  • Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956
  • Entry 17 State List on water; Entry 56 Union List on inter-state rivers
  • Eight tribunals constituted since 1969 — Krishna, Cauvery, Ravi-Beas, Godavari among them
  • State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2018) on Cauvery — Cauvery Water Management Authority
  • Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill 2019 — permanent tribunal proposal
  • Article 131 jurisdiction over Centre-State and inter-State disputes

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Q.1510 marks · 150w 9 min Medium

Tribunals were created to deliver speedy specialised justice but the L. Chandra Kumar judgment kept the High Courts as the ultimate constitutional check. Discuss.

Subtopic: Polity · Separation of Powers & Judicial Review

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Introduction: Articles 323A and 323B, inserted by the 42nd Amendment 1976, empower Parliament and State Legislatures to set up administrative and other tribunals, originally with appeals lying directly to the Supreme Court.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory base — Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 for CAT, and over fifteen subject tribunals; (ii) L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) struck down clauses excluding High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227, restoring writ jurisdiction as a basic-structure feature; (iii) Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 abolished nine tribunals and standardised tenure and service conditions — Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down several provisions.

Way forward / Conclusion: A National Tribunals Commission (Justice R.C. Lahoti recommendation), separation of selection from administrative control, and clear procedural rules will deliver the original tribunal promise.

Key points
  • Articles 323A and 323B inserted by 42nd Amendment 1976
  • Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 — Central Administrative Tribunal
  • L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) — High Court writ jurisdiction preserved
  • Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 — abolished nine tribunals
  • Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) on tribunal tenure
  • Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019) on tribunals' independence
  • National Tribunals Commission recommended by 272nd Law Commission Report

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Q.1615 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

The collegium system is a judicial invention to protect independence but it has been criticised for opacity. With reference to the Memorandum of Procedure deadlock since 2015, comment.

Subtopic: Polity · Executive & Judiciary

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Introduction: The collegium system was read into Articles 124 and 217 by the Second Judges Case (1993) and elaborated in the Third Judges Case (1998); Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act for violating judicial independence as part of the basic structure.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 124 (Supreme Court) and Article 217 (High Courts), with collegium primacy in proposing names; the executive can return a name only once; (ii) MoP deadlock — the Supreme Court asked the Centre in 2015 to finalise a new Memorandum of Procedure, including a secretariat, eligibility criteria and a complaints mechanism, but it remains unsigned; pending names have been delayed for over two years in many cases; (iii) reform options — National Judicial Appointments Commission models from the UK and South Africa, public criteria, and a permanent secretariat.

Way forward / Conclusion: A jointly-signed MoP with a secretariat, published criteria and a constitutional time-limit on government action would preserve independence without reviving the NJAC.

Key points
  • Article 124 — Supreme Court appointments; Article 217 — High Court appointments
  • Second Judges Case S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) overruled in 1993
  • Second Judges Case Advocates-on-Record (1993) — collegium primacy
  • Third Judges Case In re Special Reference (1998) — five-judge SC collegium
  • 99th Constitutional Amendment Act 2014 — NJAC
  • Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record v. Union of India (2015) — NJAC struck down
  • Memorandum of Procedure unsigned since December 2015

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Q.1715 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

The 2024 Supreme Court verdict striking down the Electoral Bonds Scheme has reopened the question of how political parties should be funded. With reference to the Association for Democratic Reforms judgment, examine.

Subtopic: Polity · Representation of the People Act

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Introduction: The Electoral Bonds Scheme 2018 allowed anonymous donations to political parties through SBI bearer-bonds; the Finance Act 2017 made the enabling amendments to the Companies Act 2013, the RBI Act 1934, the Income Tax Act 1961 and the Representation of the People Act 1951.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) the scheme — removed the 7.5 per cent cap on corporate donations (Section 182 Companies Act), amended Section 29C of RPA 1951 to exempt disclosure for bond donations; (ii) Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (15 February 2024) struck down the scheme as violative of voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and arbitrary under Article 14; (iii) post-judgment data — SBI disclosure (April 2024) showed Rs 16,518 crore in bonds redeemed between 2018 and 2024, with party-wise and corporate-donor breakdown published.

Way forward / Conclusion: Statutory cap on cash donations, a National Election Fund (Indrajit Gupta Committee 1998), and full disclosure under Section 29C RPA 1951 would deliver the transparency the Court demanded.

Key points
  • Electoral Bonds Scheme 2018 notified through Finance Act 2017
  • Section 29C of RPA 1951 — political party disclosure
  • Section 182 of Companies Act 2013 — corporate donation cap removed by Finance Act 2017
  • Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (15 February 2024, 2024 INSC 113)
  • Article 19(1)(a) — voters' right to information
  • SBI bond disclosure: Rs 16,518 crore redeemed between March 2018 and April 2024
  • Indrajit Gupta Committee 1998 on State funding of elections

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Q.1815 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

Parliament’s effectiveness depends on the number and quality of sittings it holds. With reference to the decline in sitting days and Bill scrutiny since 2014, examine the case for a fixed parliamentary calendar.

Subtopic: Polity · Parliament & Legislative Scrutiny

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Introduction: The Constitution requires only that not more than six months elapse between two sittings of Parliament under Article 85; PRS Legislative Research data shows that the Lok Sabha sat for an average of 55 days a year between 2014 and 2024, against 130 days in the 1950s.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) institutional decline — average sitting days down, only 16 per cent of Bills referred to Department-Related Standing Committees in the 17th Lok Sabha (against 71 per cent in the 15th), suspension of MPs in December 2023 (146 MPs); (ii) constitutional design — Articles 85, 87, 100 (quorum), 105 (privileges); the Speaker decides Money Bill certification under Article 110, which Jairam Ramesh v. Union of India (2024) is examining; (iii) committee weakness — anti-defection whip, lack of research support, declining Question Hour productivity.

Way forward / Conclusion: A fixed annual calendar of at least 100 sittings (NCRWC 2002), mandatory committee referral for most Bills, and a stronger Parliamentary Research Service are the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution's prescription.

Key points
  • Article 85 — President summons Parliament; gap between sessions not more than six months
  • Article 100 — quorum; Article 105 — privileges
  • Article 110 — Money Bill certification by Speaker
  • Lok Sabha average sittings: 55 per year (2014–2024) vs 130 in 1950s
  • 17th Lok Sabha — only 16% Bills referred to DRSCs
  • 146 MPs suspended in December 2023 winter session
  • NCRWC 2002 recommended 120 sittings for Lok Sabha and 100 for Rajya Sabha

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Q.1915 marks · 250w 14 min Medium

The Comptroller and Auditor General is the guardian of the public purse under Articles 148 to 151, but its post-audit reports have lost political traction. Examine.

Subtopic: Polity · Appointments to Constitutional Posts

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Introduction: Article 148 establishes the office of CAG, appointed by the President; Article 149 sets duties; Article 150 prescribes form of accounts; Article 151 requires reports to be laid before Parliament and the State legislatures; the CAG's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971 is the operating statute.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — appointed for six years or up to 65; removable like a Supreme Court judge; salary charged on the Consolidated Fund (Article 148(3)); (ii) institutional gaps — appointment process not collegial (criticised in Common Cause v. Union of India, 2019 petition), shrinking post-audit Special Audit Reports (down from 81 in 2015–16 to 26 in 2023–24 per CAG annual reports), under-utilisation of PAC scrutiny; (iii) emerging mandate — performance audits, audit of PPPs, and the right to audit private bodies receiving substantial government funds (Section 14 CAG Act, 1971).

Way forward / Conclusion: Multi-member CAG (2nd ARC recommendation), open appointment collegium, statutory backing for follow-up by Action Taken Notes — the Vinod Rai prescription — would restore the office's deterrent value.

Key points
  • Article 148 — appointment of CAG
  • Article 149 — duties and powers
  • Article 150 — form of accounts of the Union and States
  • Article 151 — submission of audit reports
  • CAG's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971
  • Tenure: six years or 65 years, whichever is earlier
  • 2nd ARC recommended multi-member CAG audit board

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Q.2010 marks · 150w 9 min Medium

Pressure groups and civil-society associations are protected under Article 19(1)(c) but increasingly squeezed by regulatory frameworks. With reference to cooperative societies, farmer producer organisations and trade unions, comment.

Subtopic: Polity · Pressure Groups & Associations

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Introduction: Article 19(1)(c) protects the right to form associations and unions, subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(4); the 97th Constitutional Amendment Act 2011 made cooperative-society formation a fundamental right.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) cooperatives — Article 19(1)(c) right to form cooperatives, Part IXB (Articles 243ZH to 243ZT) struck down for States in Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (2021); Ministry of Cooperation set up 2021; National Cooperative Policy 2025; (ii) FPOs — Companies Act Section 581A category, Central Sector Scheme for 10,000 FPOs (2020) led by SFAC and NABARD; (iii) trade unions — Trade Unions Act 1926, Industrial Relations Code 2020 raising recognition threshold; All India Trade Union Congress and other federations facing eroded bargaining space.

Way forward / Conclusion: A facilitative-regulatory balance, judicially enforced under Article 19(1)(c), is the basis for healthy pluralism.

Key points
  • Article 19(1)(c) — right to form associations and unions
  • 97th Constitutional Amendment Act 2011 — cooperatives as fundamental right
  • Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah (2021) — Part IXB inapplicable to State cooperatives
  • Ministry of Cooperation created 6 July 2021
  • National Cooperative Policy 2025 — Sahkar se Samriddhi vision
  • Central Sector Scheme for 10,000 FPOs (2020) — SFAC, NABARD, NCDC
  • Industrial Relations Code 2020 — recognition threshold for unions

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