GS Paper 2 practice questions for UPSC Mains 2026.

Introduction: Article 200 lists three terminal choices — assent, withhold, reserve — plus a non-terminal return for reconsideration. There is no textual deadline; the phrase 'as soon as possible' is a standard, not a clock.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional text: Articles 200, 201 and 163 read with Shamsher Singh (1974); the second proviso makes reservation mandatory in some cases; (ii) the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025) verdict that fixed timelines and used Article 142 to declare 'deemed assent', and the November 2025 Presidential Reference that pulled back from court-manufactured assent while affirming judicial review of inaction; (iii) federal politics — Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Punjab episodes show pocket-veto behaviour against opposition-ruled states.

Way forward / Conclusion: Reasonable timelines through a Sarkaria-style convention or parliamentary law, plus reasoned orders — not Article 142 fixes — are the durable answer.

Introduction: Article 324(2) made CEC and EC appointments 'subject to the provisions of any law' by Parliament. For seventy-three years there was no such law; the executive picked the umpire alone.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) read in an interim collegium of PM, LoP and CJI till Parliament legislated; (ii) the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act 2023 replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister, giving the government a 2:1 majority — challenged in Jaya Thakur and connected petitions; (iii) structural asymmetry under Article 324(5): the CEC enjoys judge-like protection but ECs can be removed on the CEC's recommendation alone.

Way forward / Conclusion: A genuinely broad-based selection panel (Goswami Committee 1990, NCRWC 2002, 2nd ARC, 255th Law Commission Report), equalised tenure protection, and a statutory secretariat are the reforms that match the constitutional design.

Introduction: The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment 1985 and tightened by the 91st Amendment 2003, makes the Speaker the sole judge of disqualification under paragraph 6.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — grounds of voluntary giving up of membership and voting against the whip; the 2003 deletion of the 'split' defence; (ii) institutional flaw — the Speaker remains a partisan office, and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) allowed only post-decisional judicial review; the Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur (2020) suggested a three-month timeline and a permanent tribunal; (iii) contemporary stress — Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July 2025) reiterated that delay defeats the schedule.

Way forward / Conclusion: Hand adjudication to an Election Commission-led tribunal, write a constitutional deadline into paragraph 6, and confine the whip to confidence and money votes — the Dinesh Goswami and 170th Law Commission line.

Introduction: The High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections (Ram Nath Kovind, 2024) and the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill 2024 propose synchronised Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections, with a single voters' list and shortened residual terms.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) federalism — truncating an Assembly's life to align it with the Lok Sabha rewrites Article 172 and weakens the doctrine of separate state mandates; (ii) feasibility — mid-term collapse, Article 356 episodes, and the requirement of state ratification under Article 368(2) proviso; (iii) trade-offs — cost savings (Law Commission's 170th and 255th reports) versus the concentration of national-issue voting that dwarfs state-level accountability.

Way forward / Conclusion: Sequential reform — fixed-term Lok Sabha first, decoupled local elections later — is more compatible with the basic-structure protection of federalism than a single-stroke amendment.

Introduction: DBT has been the spine of welfare since 2013, anchored in the JAM trinity — Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile — and underwritten by the Aadhaar Act 2016 read with Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) governance gains — Economic Survey reports cumulative DBT savings of over Rs 3.48 lakh crore since 2013, with leakages in PAHAL LPG, PDS and PM-KISAN measurably reduced; (ii) exclusion errors — PDS denials in Jharkhand (Santoshi Kumari, 2017) and Aadhaar authentication failures flagged by CAG audits; Aadhaar Act Section 7 conditionality survived Puttaswamy but Section 57 was struck down; (iii) institutional gap — grievance redress under the Aadhaar Act and the absence of an enforceable social-security entitlement.

Way forward / Conclusion: Independent grievance tribunals, biometric exception protocols, and convergence on the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011 updated by SECC 2.0 — with statutory backing for proactive disclosure of DBT data — will protect the welfare floor that JAM enables.

Introduction: The National Judicial Data Grid reports over 5.2 crore pending cases as of 2025, with the subordinate judiciary carrying about 4.5 crore and High Courts about 62 lakh.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional and statutory base — Article 224A on ad hoc retired judges activated by the Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) verdict, and All India Judicial Service under Article 312; (ii) institutional — vacancy ratios in High Courts (about 30%), CrPC/BNSS undertrial backlog under Article 21 (Hussainara Khatoon, 1979), and inadequate use of plea bargaining and Lok Adalats under NALSA; (iii) reforms recommended by the Law Commission's 230th and 245th Reports and the Malimath Committee.

Way forward / Conclusion: A time-bound AIJS, fast-tracked filling of High Court vacancies through a reformed collegium under the Memorandum of Procedure, and a statutory case-flow management code rooted in the Justice Delivery and Legal Reforms Mission can clear the backlog without weakening due process.

Introduction: National Family Health Survey-5 (2019-21) shows anaemia in 67% of children aged 6–59 months and 57% of women aged 15–49 — a hidden hunger that calorie-based welfare does not capture.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory base — National Food Security Act 2013 covering about 81.35 crore beneficiaries, recognising the right to food flowing from Article 21 and PUCL v. Union of India (2001); (ii) food fortification — mandatory rice fortification in PDS from April 2024 with iron, folic acid and B12 under FSSAI standards; controversies on sickle-cell and thalassemia patients; (iii) institutional — POSHAN Abhiyaan, Anganwadi convergence, and the National Multi-sectoral Action Plan.

Way forward / Conclusion: Pair fortification with dietary diversification through millets and pulses on the PDS basket, biofortified crops under ICAR's HarvestPlus, and an exit clause from rice fortification for at-risk groups.

Introduction: BRICS plus partners covers about 4.45 billion people (55.6% of world) and about 44% of global GDP at PPP (IMF, July 2025); a New Delhi foreign ministers' meeting on 14–15 May 2026 ended without a joint statement.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) weight — BRICS members about 35% of world GDP at PPP versus G7 about 30% in 2024 (PPP only, not nominal); ten full members after Indonesia joined January 2025; (ii) cohesion gap — the May 2026 Iran-UAE rupture on West Asia, with India issuing a Chair's Statement instead; (iii) India's stance — Modi's Kazan line (2024) that BRICS must not 'replace global institutions' and Jaishankar's rejection of a BRICS currency.

Way forward / Conclusion: Use BRICS for agenda-setting and UNSC reform, not bloc-building; keep the 'non-Western, not anti-Western' framing; lean on the New Development Bank and rupee internationalisation.

Introduction: The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor was announced as an MoU among eight parties on 9 September 2023 at the G20 New Delhi Summit; BRI, launched in 2013, has invested an estimated USD 1 trillion across about 147 countries.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) design contrast — IMEC is a multilateral club of governments (India, US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, EU, France, Germany, Italy) sharing public capital, while BRI is one-state bilateral credit; Israel and Jordan lie on the route but did not sign the MoU; (ii) the single point of failure — the planned Saudi-Israel rail link presumed an Abraham-Accords-style normalisation that the 7 October 2023 war froze; (iii) India's alternative channels — INSTC through Chabahar and parallel rupee trade, also disrupted by the 2026 West Asia conflict.

Way forward / Conclusion: Front-load IMEC's east-leg digital and port upgrades; harden INSTC; revive I2U2 project pipelines once the West Asia war stabilises.

Introduction: Neighbourhood First, articulated in 2014, sits on Gujral Doctrine asymmetry and is now competing with China's BRI footprint and India's HADR-first responses.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) economic — Lines of Credit, ITEC training, and the Indian Rupee Trade settlement framework deployed in Sri Lanka's 2022 crisis (about USD 4.5 billion) and Bangladesh post 2024 political transition; (ii) connectivity — Trincomalee oil tank-farm with Lanka IOC, BBIN MVA, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Kaladan Multimodal; (iii) political churn — Maldives 'India Out' since 2023, Bangladesh interim government post-August 2024, Nepal's revised currency map controversy.

Way forward / Conclusion: Deepen people-to-people HADR (Operation Brahma, 2025), keep delivery cycles under three years, and convert SAARC paralysis into BIMSTEC-driven sub-regionalism.

Introduction: The 44th Amendment was passed in April 1979 by the Janata government to undo the most far-reaching provisions of the 42nd Amendment 1976, restoring the constitutional balance disturbed during the 1975-77 Emergency.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) safeguards enacted — Article 352 now requires 'armed rebellion' instead of 'internal disturbance', Article 358 suspends Article 19 only during external emergency, Article 359 cannot suspend Articles 20 and 21, written Cabinet advice is required for proclamation, and Article 74 mandates the President send back advice once; (ii) restoration of right to property — Article 31 omitted, Article 300A inserted, ending fundamental-right status; (iii) unenforced provisions — Section 3 on press freedom for parliamentary proceedings and Article 22(7) safeguards on preventive detention have not been notified, as flagged by Soli Sorabjee and successive Law Commission reports.

Way forward / Conclusion: Notify the pending Sections, codify a parliamentary review of every Emergency proclamation, and read Article 21 expansively into Article 22 to complete the 44th Amendment's promise.

Introduction: Article 370 was inserted in 1949 as a 'temporary provision' giving Jammu and Kashmir a special constitutional position; on 5 August 2019 Presidential Order C.O. 272 read with C.O. 273 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 ended that status.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 370(1)(d) allowed the President to extend constitutional provisions with the concurrence of the J&K Constituent Assembly; that body had dissolved in 1957, and Parliament was deemed to act in its place; (ii) the In re Article 370 judgment (11 December 2023) by a five-judge bench unanimously upheld the abrogation, held that the President could exercise Article 370(3) without J&K Constituent Assembly concurrence after 1957, and ordered Assembly elections by 30 September 2024; (iii) federal concerns — splitting a State into two Union Territories under Article 3 without consulting the State legislature, and the precedent for downgrading other States.

Way forward / Conclusion: Restore full Statehood at the earliest as the Solicitor General undertook, codify a clear procedure for Article 3 changes involving State consent, and read federalism — already part of the basic structure under S.R. Bommai (1994) — as a check on such use of constituent power.

Introduction: Article 356 allows the Centre to assume the functions of a State on receipt of a Governor's report or otherwise; B.R. Ambedkar called it a dead letter. President's Rule was imposed in Manipur on 13 February 2025 — the eleventh imposition in that State.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Article 355 duty to protect States; Articles 356 and 357 process; Article 365 for failure to comply with Centre's directions; parliamentary approval within two months; (ii) Sarkaria Commission 1988 recommendations and the S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) nine-judge bench guardrails — last resort, judicial review available, floor test on the floor of the House; (iii) Manipur 2025 episode — prolonged ethnic violence, Governor's report citing constitutional breakdown, opposition's federalism concerns.

Way forward / Conclusion: Pre-imposition warning under Article 355, mandatory floor test, time-bound restoration of Assembly, and Inter-State Council scrutiny as institutionalised by Punchhi Commission 2010 are the durable corrections.

Introduction: The 101st Constitutional Amendment Act 2016 inserted Article 279A creating the GST Council — Union Finance Minister as Chair, Union Minister of State for Finance and one Minister from each State, with weighted voting (Centre one-third, States two-thirds combined; 75 per cent threshold).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 246A concurrent power to tax goods and services, Article 269A on inter-state supplies, IGST mechanism, and a five-year compensation cess until 2022; (ii) Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (19 May 2022) held GST Council recommendations are 'persuasive' not binding, reading the federal trust-based design into Article 279A; (iii) governance friction — delayed compensation payments to States, slab-rationalisation debate (the 4-slab structure plus cess), and 56th GST Council Meeting reforms.

Way forward / Conclusion: A reasoned-decision norm, published voting records, a dispute-resolution mechanism under Article 279A(11), and a sunset on the compensation cess can reconcile pooled sovereignty with State fiscal autonomy.

Introduction: Article 280 constitutes a Finance Commission every five years to recommend devolution of net tax proceeds and grants-in-aid under Article 275; the 16th Finance Commission under Arvind Panagariya is to submit its report by 31 October 2025 for the period 2026–31.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) divisible pool — Article 270 excludes cesses, surcharges and Article 271 surcharges from devolution; the share of cesses and surcharges has risen from about 10.4 per cent of gross tax revenue in 2011-12 to over 19 per cent by 2024-25; (ii) 15th Finance Commission devolved 41 per cent of the divisible pool but the effective transfer to States, after netting out non-divisible levies, is lower; (iii) governance friction — repeated extension of the GST Compensation cess, special-category status demands, and the 'horizontal' allocation criteria favouring older population data.

Way forward / Conclusion: A constitutional cap on the share of cesses, sunset clauses, and an upper-house ratified Finance Commission framework will restore the Article 280 promise.

Introduction: Article 262 empowers Parliament to legislate on inter-state river-water disputes and to bar the jurisdiction of all courts, including the Supreme Court, in such matters; the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956 and the River Boards Act 1956 are its statutory expressions.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Entry 17 of State List on water, Entry 56 of Union List on inter-state rivers, Article 262 bar; (ii) tribunal record — eight tribunals constituted since 1969, of which only Krishna, Cauvery and Godavari have delivered substantive awards; State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2018) on Cauvery led to the Cauvery Water Management Authority; (iii) inefficiency — average pendency exceeds a decade, States routinely approach the Supreme Court under Article 131 despite the Article 262 bar.

Way forward / Conclusion: Operationalise a permanent Inter-State Water Disputes Tribunal under the Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill 2019, statutory time-limit, and a Dispute Resolution Committee for negotiated settlement.

Introduction: The Constitution requires only that not more than six months elapse between two sittings of Parliament under Article 85; PRS Legislative Research data shows that the Lok Sabha sat for an average of 55 days a year between 2014 and 2024, against 130 days in the 1950s.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) institutional decline — average sitting days down, only 16 per cent of Bills referred to Department-Related Standing Committees in the 17th Lok Sabha (against 71 per cent in the 15th), suspension of MPs in December 2023 (146 MPs); (ii) constitutional design — Articles 85, 87, 100 (quorum), 105 (privileges); the Speaker decides Money Bill certification under Article 110, which Jairam Ramesh v. Union of India (2024) is examining; (iii) committee weakness — anti-defection whip, lack of research support, declining Question Hour productivity.

Way forward / Conclusion: A fixed annual calendar of at least 100 sittings (NCRWC 2002), mandatory committee referral for most Bills, and a stronger Parliamentary Research Service are the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution's prescription.

Introduction: The collegium system was read into Articles 124 and 217 by the Second Judges Case (1993) and elaborated in the Third Judges Case (1998); Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act for violating judicial independence as part of the basic structure.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 124 (Supreme Court) and Article 217 (High Courts), with collegium primacy in proposing names; the executive can return a name only once; (ii) MoP deadlock — the Supreme Court asked the Centre in 2015 to finalise a new Memorandum of Procedure, including a secretariat, eligibility criteria and a complaints mechanism, but it remains unsigned; pending names have been delayed for over two years in many cases; (iii) reform options — National Judicial Appointments Commission models from the UK and South Africa, public criteria, and a permanent secretariat.

Way forward / Conclusion: A jointly-signed MoP with a secretariat, published criteria and a constitutional time-limit on government action would preserve independence without reviving the NJAC.

Introduction: The Electoral Bonds Scheme 2018 allowed anonymous donations to political parties through SBI bearer-bonds; the Finance Act 2017 made the enabling amendments to the Companies Act 2013, the RBI Act 1934, the Income Tax Act 1961 and the Representation of the People Act 1951.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) the scheme — removed the 7.5 per cent cap on corporate donations (Section 182 Companies Act), amended Section 29C of RPA 1951 to exempt disclosure for bond donations; (ii) Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (15 February 2024) struck down the scheme as violative of voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and arbitrary under Article 14; (iii) post-judgment data — SBI disclosure (April 2024) showed Rs 16,518 crore in bonds redeemed between 2018 and 2024, with party-wise and corporate-donor breakdown published.

Way forward / Conclusion: Statutory cap on cash donations, a National Election Fund (Indrajit Gupta Committee 1998), and full disclosure under Section 29C RPA 1951 would deliver the transparency the Court demanded.

Introduction: Article 148 establishes the office of CAG, appointed by the President; Article 149 sets duties; Article 150 prescribes form of accounts; Article 151 requires reports to be laid before Parliament and the State legislatures; the CAG's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971 is the operating statute.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — appointed for six years or up to 65; removable like a Supreme Court judge; salary charged on the Consolidated Fund (Article 148(3)); (ii) institutional gaps — appointment process not collegial (criticised in Common Cause v. Union of India, 2019 petition), shrinking post-audit Special Audit Reports (down from 81 in 2015–16 to 26 in 2023–24 per CAG annual reports), under-utilisation of PAC scrutiny; (iii) emerging mandate — performance audits, audit of PPPs, and the right to audit private bodies receiving substantial government funds (Section 14 CAG Act, 1971).

Way forward / Conclusion: Multi-member CAG (2nd ARC recommendation), open appointment collegium, statutory backing for follow-up by Action Taken Notes — the Vinod Rai prescription — would restore the office's deterrent value.