BRICS has the weight of a pole in the international system but not the cohesion of one. In the light of the New Delhi foreign ministers’ meeting (14-15 May 2026), critically analyse.

Introduction:

BRICS-plus partners cover about 4.45 billion people (55.6% of world population) and about 44% of global GDP at PPP (IMF, July 2025); the New Delhi foreign ministers' meeting (14-15 May 2026) ended without a joint statement — the weight of a pole without the cohesion of one.

Weight: BRICS members overtook the G7 on PPP GDP in 2018 (PPP only, not nominal); the grouping has ten full members after Indonesia joined in January 2025, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE having entered in January 2024 and Saudi Arabia's formal entry deferred — a global-South footprint underwritten by the New Development Bank's USD 35 billion sanctioned lending portfolio.

Cohesion gap: The May 2026 meeting saw an Iran-UAE rupture on West Asia, forcing India as Chair to issue a Chair's Statement rather than a joint communiqué; the absence of consensus exposes the gap between coalition weight and coalition discipline, repeating the Kazan (2024) pattern on Ukraine and Gaza.

India's stance: Prime Minister Modi's Kazan line (October 2024) that BRICS must not 'replace global institutions' and External Affairs Minister Jaishankar's rejection of a BRICS currency anchor a 'non-Western, not anti-Western' posture, protecting India's G20 and Quad commitments.

Way forward / Conclusion:

Use BRICS for agenda-setting, UNSC reform, climate-finance coordination and local-currency settlement through the New Development Bank — not bloc-building — protecting India's strategic autonomy and the rupee internationalisation project under the 'non-Western, not anti-Western' frame.