BRICS has grown from five members to ten, but the foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi (14-15 May 2026) ended without a joint statement on the Iran-Israel war. Critically analyse whether BRICS embodies multipolarity or only its weight.

Introduction:

BRICS expanded in January 2024 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE) and January 2025 (Indonesia), reaching ten members holding 4.45 billion people and 44 percent of global GDP in PPP terms per IMF 2025. The foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi (14-15 May 2026) ended without a joint statement — exposing the gap between BRICS's weight and its strategic cohesion.

Weight: BRICS PPP GDP overtook the G7 in 2018; the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai, has lent over $35 billion since 2015 with a growing share in member currencies. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the BRICS Pay framework give the bloc balance-of-payments and clearing instruments.

Cohesion failure: At the 14-15 May 2026 New Delhi CFM, Iran sought condemnation of the US-Israel strikes; the UAE refused; India, as host, issued a Chair's Statement and Outcome Document without consensus paragraphs on West Asia. Earlier, the 16th Kazan Summit (October 2024) papered over differences with the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative but produced no currency-union outcome.

Multipolarity verdict: BRICS has weight without a unified strategy. India's line — articulated by Jaishankar — is 'non-Western, not anti-Western'; India 'has never been for de-dollarisation' and 'there is no proposal for a BRICS currency'. The bloc is a coordinating forum, not a counter-bloc.

Way forward / Conclusion:

Use BRICS for agenda-setting on UNSC reform, IMF quotas, DPI export and food security; deepen NDB local-currency lending; and resist enlargement that buys breadth at cohesion's cost — keeping multipolarity issue-based rather than doctrinal.