The Quad’s 2025 Wilmington-to-2025 framework has shifted from a security caucus toward technology, supply chains and maritime security. Discuss India’s role and the limits of the Quad as a coalition for the Indo-Pacific.

Introduction:

The Quad — India, US, Japan, Australia — was revived in 2017, elevated to leaders' level in March 2021 and at the 2025 summit (rotated to India) committed to working groups on critical and emerging technologies, supply chains, climate, health and cybersecurity. The Wilmington Declaration (September 2024) reframed the grouping from a security caucus toward technology and resilience.

Convergences: The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative shares near-real-time maritime data with ASEAN, Indian Ocean and Pacific partners; the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership, the Open RAN deployment in Palau and Tuvalu, the Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group, and the Cancer Moonshot extend cooperation beyond hard security.

India's distinctive line: External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has rejected NATO-like framing, calling the Quad 'a force for global good' with no Section 2 collective-defence obligation. The 2+2 ministerial dialogues and iCET (January 2023) operationalise bilateral depth — GE F414 co-production, MQ-9B drones, Sonobuoy MoU — but plurilateral defence remains explicitly out.

Limits: No permanent secretariat, no joint command, ASEAN-centrality strain, and Trump-era 50 percent tariffs (August 2025) on Indian goods tested cohesion before the 6 February 2026 framework rolled them back to 18 percent. The Quad is a coordinating coalition, not an alliance.

Way forward / Conclusion:

Anchor the Quad in deliverables — semiconductor supply chains, undersea cables, dual-use space, Quad Open RAN — preserve issue-based flexibility, and bridge through Quad-Plus engagement with the EU and South Korea on tech standards.