India’s two most consequential external relationships pull in opposite directions and India has declined to choose. Whether that is skilful hedging or deferred cost is the central question of contemporary Indian foreign policy.
This is chapter 48 of the PSIR Optional Notes, from the part on India and the World in the Paper II syllabus. The complete book is a free download.
UPSC syllabus
India and the Global Centres of Power: USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia. (This chapter covers the United States and Russia; Chapter 49 covers China, Japan and the European Union.)
In one page
- India–US relations moved from estranged democracies during the Cold War to a comprehensive global strategic partnership, and the turning point was the civil nuclear agreement.
- The 123 Agreement (2008) and the NSG waiver of September 2008 ended India’s nuclear isolation without requiring it to sign the NPT.
- The foundational agreements, LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020), together with GSOMIA (2002), created interoperability without alliance.
- The Quad, revived in 2017 and elevated to leader level in 2021, is the principal minilateral; iCET (2022) and its successor arrangements moved the relationship into technology.
- The frictions: trade and tariffs, immigration and visas, data and digital regulation, differences over Russia, and periodic American commentary on Indian domestic matters.
- India–Russia rests on defence, where Russia remains the largest cumulative supplier though its share of new acquisitions has fallen sharply, and on energy, which grew after 2022.
- The strains are structural: Russia’s deepening dependence on China, its arms relationship with Pakistan at the margins, and its reduced capacity to deliver technology on schedule.
- India’s position on Ukraine, abstention plus calls for dialogue plus discounted oil purchases, is the clearest test of multi-alignment and the subject of the 2025 question.
The United States
From estrangement to partnership
Cold War estrangement. American alliance with Pakistan through CENTO and SEATO from 1954; the American tilt during the 1971 war, including the despatch of the Seventh Fleet’s Task Force 74; sanctions and technology denial after 1974 and again after 1998; and Indian positions on Vietnam and on the Soviet role in Afghanistan. Dennis Kux’s phrase estranged democracies captures the period: shared political values, opposed strategic alignments.
The turn. The Soviet collapse removed India’s principal patron and the 1991 reforms made India economically interesting. Milestones: the Clinton visit of 2000; the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004); the July 2005 joint statement on civil nuclear cooperation; the Hyde Act (2006); the 123 Agreement (2008); the IAEA safeguards agreement and the NSG waiver of 6 September 2008, which permitted civil nuclear commerce with a non-NPT state for the first time.
Institutionalisation. The 2+2 ministerial dialogue from 2018; designation as a Major Defense Partner (2016); Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 status (2018); the foundational agreements below; the revival of the Quad in 2017 and its elevation to leader level in 2021; and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (2022) covering semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, space and defence innovation.
| Agreement | Year | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| GSOMIA | 2002 | General Security of Military Information Agreement: framework for sharing classified information |
| LEMOA | 2016 | Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement: reciprocal access to each other’s facilities for refuelling and replenishment, on a reimbursable basis |
| COMCASA | 2018 | Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement: access to encrypted, secure communications equipment on American-origin platforms |
| BECA | 2020 | Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement: sharing of geospatial intelligence, maps and satellite data, relevant to precision targeting |
Content and frictions
Defence. The United States has become one of India’s largest arms suppliers, with C-17, C-130J, P-8I, Apache, Chinook, M777 howitzers, MQ-9B and the GE-414 engine arrangement for the Tejas Mk2 as the significant items. Exercises: Malabar, Yudh Abhyas, Vajra Prahar, Cope India, Tiger Triumph.
Economic. The United States is India’s largest trading partner in goods and services combined; the diaspora of roughly four and a half million is politically and economically significant; and remittances and technology-sector linkages are substantial.
Frictions, stated fairly. Trade: tariff disputes, the withdrawal of India’s GSP benefits in 2019, agricultural market access, and periodic threats of reciprocal tariffs, which the 2025 paper connects to India’s turn toward the European Union. Immigration: H-1B policy and green-card backlogs. Digital: data localisation, e-commerce rules and equalisation levies. Russia: India’s continued defence dependence and oil purchases, and the question of CAATSA sanctions over the S-400. Values: American legislative and civil-society commentary on Indian domestic questions, which India treats as interference.
The alliance question. The 2024 paper’s phrasing, that the two need not become formal allies, states India’s own position. India declines alliance because it would forfeit decisional freedom, complicate relations with Russia and Iran, and commit India to contingencies, over Taiwan for instance, in which its interests are not engaged. The American calculation is that a strong independent India constrains China without requiring an alliance guarantee. The relationship is therefore best described as alignment without alliance, and its limit is that neither party is obliged to come to the other’s aid.
Russia
The inheritance
The Soviet relationship supplied what India could not obtain elsewhere: heavy industry at Bhilai, Bokaro and Visakhapatnam; rupee-rouble trade that conserved foreign exchange; consistent vetoes on Kashmir in the Security Council; and the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August 1971, whose Article IX obliged consultation in the event of an attack, and which underwrote India’s position during the Bangladesh war.
The relationship now
Defence remains the core. Russia is by a wide margin the largest cumulative supplier of India’s inventory, with the Su-30MKI, T-90 tanks, the Kilo-class and Akula-class submarines, the BrahMos joint venture and the S-400 system as the significant items. But Russia’s share of new Indian acquisitions has fallen sharply as India diversified to France, Israel, the United States and domestic production, and the Ukraine war has raised doubts about delivery schedules and spares.
Energy. Historically modest, transformed after February 2022: discounted Russian crude moved from a negligible share of Indian imports to a very large one, making Russia India’s largest supplier of crude. India’s defence of this rests on the argument that its per capita consumption is low, that Western states continued their own purchases of Russian energy, and that a developing economy cannot absorb a price shock for a conflict in which it is not a party.
Nuclear and space. Kudankulam is the flagship civil nuclear project; cooperation extends to space, including support for the human spaceflight programme.
Institutional. The annual summit, the 2+2 dialogue from 2021, and shared membership of BRICS, the SCO and the Russia-India-China format, which has met irregularly.
The structural strains
- Russia’s dependence on China. The deepening asymmetry after 2022 reduces Russia’s freedom to act against Chinese preferences, which is the most consequential long-term problem for India.
- Russia and Pakistan. Limited but real defence engagement, and Russian participation in formats where Pakistan is present.
- Technology. Sanctions and wartime production constrain Russia’s ability to deliver advanced systems, and payment and spares have become practical difficulties.
- Trade imbalance. The energy surge produced a large deficit with limited Indian exports to offset it, and rupee-settlement arrangements have had limited uptake.
- Western pressure, including the sanctions risk to Indian entities dealing with Russia.
India’s Ukraine position
The 2025 paper asked about India’s stance on the war. The elements: abstention on the substantive Security Council and General Assembly resolutions; consistent calls for dialogue and diplomacy and for respect of the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity; humanitarian assistance to Ukraine; refusal to join sanctions; continued and expanded energy purchases; and leader-level engagement with both capitals, including the widely cited remark that this is not an era of war.
Assessment. Defensible on India’s own terms: a state dependent on Russia for defence inventory, seeking to prevent Russia’s complete absorption into China’s orbit, and unable to absorb an energy shock, has interests that dictate abstention rather than alignment; and India’s access to both parties has value that condemnation would forfeit. Costly in that it strains partnerships with states whose technology India needs, invites the charge of inconsistency given India’s own insistence on territorial integrity where its borders are concerned, and rests on a Russian relationship whose long-term trajectory is toward Beijing.
Where answers lose marks
- Calling the India–US relationship an alliance. There is no mutual defence obligation, and both sides say so; alignment without alliance is the accurate description.
- Listing the foundational agreements without saying what each does. LEMOA is logistics, COMCASA communications, BECA geospatial.
- Saying the NSG waiver required India to sign the NPT. Its significance is precisely that it did not.
- Treating India–Russia as unchanged. Russia’s share of new acquisitions has fallen sharply while energy has surged; the composition has inverted.
- Presenting India’s Ukraine position as neutrality. It is abstention with stated principles, humanitarian assistance and continued trade, which is a different thing.
Asked before
- India and the United States need not become formal allies. Comment. (2024, Paper II, 15 marks)
- India has been criticised for its position on Russia’s war against Ukraine. Comment. (2025, Paper II, 20 marks)
Answer skeleton
India and the United States need not become formal allies. Comment. (15 marks, 250 words)
Frame. Agree with the proposition and explain why the relationship has been designed to deliver alliance-like cooperation without the obligation.
How far it has come. From estranged democracies to comprehensive global strategic partnership: the 123 Agreement and the NSG waiver of 2008; Major Defense Partner status 2016; the foundational agreements GSOMIA 2002, LEMOA 2016, COMCASA 2018, BECA 2020; the Quad at leader level from 2021; iCET from 2022; and one of India’s largest defence supply relationships.
Why alliance is unnecessary. The agreements already deliver interoperability, logistics access and intelligence sharing. Convergence on China does the work an alliance would formalise, without requiring it.
Why alliance is undesirable for India. It forfeits decisional freedom, which is the organising objective of Indian foreign policy; it would commit India to contingencies such as Taiwan where its interests are not engaged; it would foreclose the Russia and Iran relationships; and it would divide domestic opinion.
Why it is undesirable for the United States. An allied India would be a claimant on American guarantees; an independent, capable India constrains China at no cost in commitments, which is the better bargain.
The limits of the arrangement. Neither is obliged to assist the other, which was visible in 2020 on the Line of Actual Control; and trade, immigration, digital regulation and India’s Russia ties remain live frictions.
Conclude. Alignment without alliance is a deliberate design and a stable one, and its test is whether it delivers in a contingency. Until it is tested, both parties gain from leaving the question open.
Last-mile revision
- Estranged democracies (Kux); CENTO and SEATO 1954; Task Force 74 in 1971; sanctions 1974 and 1998.
- Turn: Clinton visit 2000, NSSP 2004, July 2005 statement, Hyde Act 2006, 123 Agreement 2008, NSG waiver 6 September 2008.
- Foundational agreements: GSOMIA 2002, LEMOA 2016, COMCASA 2018, BECA 2020; Major Defense Partner 2016; STA-1 2018; 2+2 from 2018; Quad revived 2017, leader level 2021; iCET 2022.
- Frictions: tariffs and GSP withdrawal 2019, H-1B, data localisation, CAATSA and the S-400, commentary on domestic matters.
- Russia: Bhilai, Bokaro, Visakhapatnam; rupee-rouble trade; Treaty of August 1971 Article IX; Su-30MKI, T-90, Kilo and Akula, BrahMos, S-400; Kudankulam; annual summit and 2+2 from 2021.
- Strains: Russian dependence on China, Russia-Pakistan contacts, delivery and spares, trade imbalance, sanctions risk.
- Ukraine: abstentions, calls for dialogue, humanitarian aid, no sanctions, expanded crude purchases, not an era of war.
Read the rest. This chapter is one of 58 in the complete PSIR Optional Notes, covering Paper I and Paper II in full — free to download.
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