Does the BRICS summit signify a shift for Indian Foreign Policy?

Why in News?

The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi in September 2026, adopted the New Delhi Declaration. The declaration called for a more representative global order, reform of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions, opposition to unilateral coercive measures, stronger Global South representation, greater cooperation on cross-border payments and local currencies, and a negotiated resolution of conflicts. 

Its strong emphasis on multipolarity, sovereignty, the Bandung Spirit, financial diversification and Global South cooperation, alongside India’s simultaneous engagement with the US, Europe, Japan and other partners, raises an important question-

Is India moving away from its traditional foreign-policy orientation, or is BRICS another expression of its long-standing strategic autonomy? 

India’s stance- From Non-Alignment to Strategic Autonomy and Multi-Alignment

India’s foreign policy has evolved, but its core objective of preserving independent decision-making has shown considerable continuity.

• Non-alignment: During the Cold War, India avoided formal alignment with either superpower bloc while advocating decolonisation, sovereignty, peaceful coexistence and a greater voice for developing countries.
• Strategic autonomy: In the post-Cold War period, the emphasis shifted from avoiding blocs to preserving freedom of action and preventing excessive dependence on any single power.
• Multi-alignment: Contemporary India simultaneously engages with different and sometimes competing power centres. India can deepen cooperation with the US and Quad, maintain defence and energy ties with Russia, participate in BRICS and SCO, cooperate with France and Europe, and maintain strategic partnerships with Gulf countries.
• Multipolarity: India increasingly seeks not merely autonomy within the existing order but greater agency in shaping the rules and institutions of an emerging multipolar order.

The 2026 BRICS Summit fits into this broader evolution rather than representing a return to Cold War-style non-alignment.

Why does the 2026 Summit Appear to signal a shift?

• A stronger Global South orientation: The New Delhi Declaration repeatedly emphasised the Global South, multipolarity and reform of global governance. BRICS called for greater representation of emerging and developing economies in the UN and international financial institutions and reiterated support for reform of the UN Security Council. China and Russia supported India’s aspiration for a greater role in the UN, including the Security Council. 
• Greater emphasis on sovereignty and resistance to unilateral coercive measures: The declaration condemned unilateral coercive measures, including unilateral economic and secondary sanctions that are contrary to international law, and called for their elimination.  This resonates with India’s longstanding concern that unilateral sanctions and extraterritorial measures can constrain the policy space of developing countries.
• A more visible role for BRICS in West Asian diplomacy: The declaration expressed deep concern over the situation in West Asia, called for civilian protection and humanitarian access, supported Palestinian self-determination and reaffirmed the two-state solution. It also called on Israel to respect the Lebanon ceasefire and withdraw from Lebanese territories in which its forces remain.
• Financial diversification without abandoning the existing system: The summit advanced discussions on cross-border payment interoperability and trade settlements in local currencies. The BRICS Payment Task Force is examining interoperability of payment and messaging channels and practical mechanisms for faster, cheaper and safer cross-border payments. 

Why the Summit also represents Continuity?

• Multi-alignment rather than bloc politics: India’s participation in BRICS does not prevent simultaneous engagement with the Quad, G20, Indo-Pacific institutions, European partners or the US. This is the essence of contemporary multi-alignment: partnership with one country in one domain does not require strategic alignment with that country across all domains.
• Reform, not rejection, of the existing international order: India’s BRICS diplomacy seeks greater representation for developing countries within institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank and WTO. The New Delhi Declaration explicitly reaffirmed the importance of the G20, the IMF, World Bank and WTO while demanding reforms to make them more representative. 
• The Palestinian position predates the current BRICS moment: India’s support for a two-state solution and Palestinian statehood is not a new consequence of BRICS. The 2026 declaration itself reiterates an established diplomatic position. 
• BRICS remains a consensus-based and heterogeneous grouping: The expanded BRICS now brings together 11 countries across Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Collectively, the members account for around half of the world’s population and about 40% of global GDP.  Consequently, BRICS is better understood as a platform for coordination among diverse powers than as a coherent geopolitical bloc. 

BRICS as an Instrument of India’s Strategic Autonomy 2.0:

The significance of the 2026 Summit lies less in any single declaration and more in the expanding toolkit available to Indian diplomacy. BRICS allows India to:

• Shape Global South discourse: advocate greater representation of developing countries.
• Engage competing powers: maintain dialogue with China, Russia, Iran and other major powers without entering a formal alliance.
• Diversify economic partnerships: explore local-currency settlements, payment interoperability and development finance.
• Build institutions: use mechanisms such as the New Development Bank (NDB) rather than relying exclusively on established Western-led financial institutions.
• Influence global rule-making: coordinate positions on WTO reform, climate finance, technology and global economic governance.

The 2026 declaration specifically recognised the NDB’s growing role in development finance and encouraged greater local-currency financing, diversified funding and further expansion of its membership. 

What limits BRICS’ transformative potential?

• Internal divergences: India-China tensions, Russia’s relationship with the West, divergent West Asian interests and different economic priorities make sustained collective action difficult.
• Economic asymmetry: China’s enormous economic weight creates concerns about whether financial diversification could inadvertently produce new forms of dependence.
• From declaration to implementation: BRICS has produced an expanding institutional architecture, but the real measure of its influence will be whether declarations translate into trade facilitation, development finance, payment interoperability, technology cooperation and other operational outcomes.
• Consensus constraint: The very diversity that gives BRICS its broad geographical legitimacy can also make it difficult to formulate strong positions on contentious geopolitical issues.
• Not a security alliance: BRICS is not a collective-defence organisation. Its role is better understood through political coordination, economic cooperation, development finance and efforts to influence global governance.

What should India prioritise?

• Preserve strategic autonomy: India should retain the freedom to cooperate with different power centres according to the issue and national interest.
• Strengthen issue-based coalitions: India can use BRICS for Global South and economic issues while relying on other platforms such as the Quad, G20 and UN for different objectives.
• Convert rhetoric into institutions: Greater emphasis should be placed on operationalising payment interoperability, development finance, trade facilitation and technology cooperation.
• Avoid replacing one dependency with another: Diversification of payment, energy and technology partnerships should create resilience rather than excessive dependence on any alternative power centre.
• Maintain consistency with international law: India’s credibility as a proponent of a rules-based order depends on applying principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, civilian protection and peaceful dispute resolution consistently.
• Shape emerging rules: India should combine summit diplomacy with sustained engagement in the technical arenas where future rules are being created, including AI, digital governance, cyber security, space, critical technologies, climate finance and digital trade.

The 18th BRICS Summit does not mark a simple departure from India’s traditional foreign policy. Rather, it illustrates the maturation of India’s strategic autonomy into a more active form of multi-alignment and order-shaping diplomacy. 

Prelims Practice MCQ

Q. Consider the following statements:

1. The Bandung Conference preceded the formal establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. BRICS requires members to participate in collective military defence.
3. Local-currency trade settlement necessarily requires a common currency.

Which of the statements given above is/ are correct?

(a) 1 only
(b) 1 and 2 only
(c) 2 and 3 only
(d) 1, 2 and 3

Answer: (a) Bandung took place in 1955, and NAM was established in 1961. BRICS has no collective-defence obligation, and local-currency settlement does not require a common currency.

Mains Practice Question:

Q. “India’s participation in competing international groupings reflects both the possibilities and limitations of strategic autonomy.” Discuss with reference to BRICS.

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