New Delhi’s ‘balancing act’ risks eroding Russia’s Trust

Why in News? 

India’s positions at the 2026 SCO Summit in Bishkek and the BRICS Summit in New Delhi have renewed debate over its ability to maintain close relations with competing powers.

At Bishkek, India endorsed a declaration condemning military strikes against Iran and supporting its sovereignty. The Indian Prime Minister publicly urged the Russian President to pursue peace in Ukraine.

What do Recent Developments show?

• Support for Iran’s sovereignty: The Bishkek Declaration condemned military strikes against Iran as contrary to international law, expressed condolences over the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and supported a diplomatic settlement.
• Continued support for Palestinian rights: The 2026 BRICS New Delhi Declaration supported a ceasefire, humanitarian access, Palestinian self-determination and a two-state solution. It also opposed forced displacement and stressed the protection of civilians.
• Public appeal for peace in Ukraine: At his meeting with Putin, Modi called for a shift from continuing war to its termination. India had already emphasised dialogue and diplomacy at the 2022 SCO Samarkand meeting, specifically highlighting the crisis in Ukraine. 

Editorial’s Central Argument:

The author identifies three possible costs of India’s balancing strategy:

• Selective public criticism: Moscow may perceive public appeals directed at Russia, without comparable language towards other partners, as unequal treatment.
• Conflicting reassurance: A statement intended to reassure Washington may unsettle Moscow, while support for a non-Western declaration may concern Western partners.
• A more transactional relationship: If ties become concentrated on oil and arms purchases, disagreements may be harder to absorb through broader political trust.

Does Multi-Alignment necessarily Erode Trust?

(i) Arguments supporting the editorial’s concern:

• Uncertainty about strategic commitments: India’s decision to procure Russia’s S-400 air-defence system, alongside closer defence cooperation with the U.S., generated American concerns about interoperability. This illustrates how cooperation with competing powers can create conflicting expectations.
• Perception of inconsistency: India did not participate in discussions on the June 2025 SCO statement on Israel-Iran tensions, but endorsed the 2026 Bishkek Declaration condemning strikes against Iran. Such changes require clear explanation to prevent policy adjustment from being perceived as inconsistency. 
• Limits of economic interdependence: Despite continuing defence and energy cooperation with Russia, India publicly advocated an end to the Ukraine war at Bishkek. This demonstrates that substantial commercial ties do not eliminate differences over major geopolitical issues. 

(ii) Counterarguments: Resilience of Strategic Autonomy

• Partnership permits disagreement: Modi visited Moscow in 2024 and Kyiv in 2024. Engagement with both countries illustrates India’s ability to preserve relations with Russia while maintaining an independent diplomatic relationship with Ukraine.
• Peace advocacy serves national interests: The 2023 G20 New Delhi Declaration highlighted the Ukraine war’s effects on food, fertiliser and energy security. India’s support for peace therefore has concrete economic and developmental foundations.
• Multilateral consensus accommodates differences: The 2026 Bishkek Declaration recorded support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative from specified members, excluding India. India could endorse the broader declaration while retaining its distinct position on connectivity. 
• Institutional cooperation provides stability: BrahMos joint development and the Kudankulam nuclear project give India-Russia relations long-term technological and institutional foundations beyond individual diplomatic statements.

Thus, Multi-alignment allows India to cooperate without complete convergence, but its sustainability depends on explaining differences clearly and delivering consistently on agreed commitments.

Why does Russia remain Important to India?

• Defence cooperation: Russia remains a major supplier, while cooperation also includes licensed production and joint development. BrahMos, Su-30 aircraft and T-90 tanks illustrate the depth of this relationship. Existing platforms create continuing requirements for maintenance, spare parts and upgrades. 
• Energy security: Oil trade and civil nuclear cooperation make Russia important to India’s energy interests. The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project is a significant example of long-term cooperation extending beyond commodity purchases.
• Eurasian engagement: Relations with Russia support India’s engagement with Eurasia and provide opportunities for cooperation on connectivity, regional security and multilateral diplomacy. 
• Diversification of partnerships: A substantive relationship with Russia helps India retain foreign-policy options and avoid excessive dependence on any single external partner.

Why is the Relationship Changing?

• India is diversifying defence procurement: According to SIPRI, Russia’s share of India’s imports of major arms declined from 70% in 2011-15 to 40% in 2021-25. 
• India and Russia face different strategic pressures: India seeks stronger cooperation with Western partners while retaining Russian ties. Russia’s confrontation with the West creates a different set of priorities. These differences can complicate expectations of diplomatic support.
• The China factor adds complexity: Russia’s growing closeness to China could reduce Moscow’s willingness or ability to accommodate Indian interests when they diverge from Beijing’s.

Way Forward: 

To preserve its strategic autonomy without eroding vital legacy partnerships, India should adopt a four-pronged diplomatic framework:

• Transition to Principle-Based Diplomacy: Move away from reactive, audience-specific rhetoric toward a highly consistent, principle-based positioning. Ground all public statements strictly in the universal tenets of the UN Charter, state sovereignty, and international law, applying them uniformly regardless of the targeted geography.
• Accelerate Defence Co-Production: Move rapidly from importing defence platforms to accelerating joint production. Use initiatives like Atmanirbhar Bharat to build co-development models with Russia (modelled on the BrahMos framework) while expanding similar technology transfers with France and the US.
• Deepen Backchannel Strategic Dialogue: Utilise high-level, institutionalised national security advisor (NSA) and foreign office consulting frameworks to communicate sensitive diplomatic positions privately, mitigating the friction caused by public pronouncements.
• Insulate Economic & Energy Vectors: Build and fortify independent, resilient bilateral payment channels (E.g., rupee-ruble mechanisms and interconnected local messaging systems) to shield essential commodity flows from secondary Western sanctions.

India’s strategic autonomy depends on retaining freedom of choice while remaining a predictable partner. Managing disagreements transparently and sustaining practical cooperation will be central to preserving trust with Russia.

Mains Practice Question:

Q. “Multi-alignment expands India’s diplomatic options but also increases the challenge of maintaining strategic trust.” Discuss with reference to India-Russia relations.

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