GS Paper 2 practice questions for UPSC Mains 2026.

Introduction: The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment 1985 and tightened by the 91st Amendment 2003, makes the Speaker the sole judge of disqualification under paragraph 6.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — grounds of voluntary giving up of membership and voting against the whip; the 2003 deletion of the 'split' defence; (ii) institutional flaw — the Speaker remains a partisan office, and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) allowed only post-decisional judicial review; the Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker Manipur (2020) suggested a three-month timeline and a permanent tribunal; (iii) contemporary stress — Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (31 July 2025) reiterated that delay defeats the schedule.

Way forward / Conclusion: Hand adjudication to an Election Commission-led tribunal, write a constitutional deadline into paragraph 6, and confine the whip to confidence and money votes — the Dinesh Goswami and 170th Law Commission line.

Introduction: The High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections (Ram Nath Kovind, 2024) and the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill 2024 propose synchronised Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections, with a single voters' list and shortened residual terms.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) federalism — truncating an Assembly's life to align it with the Lok Sabha rewrites Article 172 and weakens the doctrine of separate state mandates; (ii) feasibility — mid-term collapse, Article 356 episodes, and the requirement of state ratification under Article 368(2) proviso; (iii) trade-offs — cost savings (Law Commission's 170th and 255th reports) versus the concentration of national-issue voting that dwarfs state-level accountability.

Way forward / Conclusion: Sequential reform — fixed-term Lok Sabha first, decoupled local elections later — is more compatible with the basic-structure protection of federalism than a single-stroke amendment.

Introduction: DBT has been the spine of welfare since 2013, anchored in the JAM trinity — Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile — and underwritten by the Aadhaar Act 2016 read with Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) governance gains — Economic Survey reports cumulative DBT savings of over Rs 3.48 lakh crore since 2013, with leakages in PAHAL LPG, PDS and PM-KISAN measurably reduced; (ii) exclusion errors — PDS denials in Jharkhand (Santoshi Kumari, 2017) and Aadhaar authentication failures flagged by CAG audits; Aadhaar Act Section 7 conditionality survived Puttaswamy but Section 57 was struck down; (iii) institutional gap — grievance redress under the Aadhaar Act and the absence of an enforceable social-security entitlement.

Way forward / Conclusion: Independent grievance tribunals, biometric exception protocols, and convergence on the Socio-Economic Caste Census 2011 updated by SECC 2.0 — with statutory backing for proactive disclosure of DBT data — will protect the welfare floor that JAM enables.

Introduction: The National Judicial Data Grid reports over 5.2 crore pending cases as of 2025, with the subordinate judiciary carrying about 4.5 crore and High Courts about 62 lakh.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional and statutory base — Article 224A on ad hoc retired judges activated by the Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) verdict, and All India Judicial Service under Article 312; (ii) institutional — vacancy ratios in High Courts (about 30%), CrPC/BNSS undertrial backlog under Article 21 (Hussainara Khatoon, 1979), and inadequate use of plea bargaining and Lok Adalats under NALSA; (iii) reforms recommended by the Law Commission's 230th and 245th Reports and the Malimath Committee.

Way forward / Conclusion: A time-bound AIJS, fast-tracked filling of High Court vacancies through a reformed collegium under the Memorandum of Procedure, and a statutory case-flow management code rooted in the Justice Delivery and Legal Reforms Mission can clear the backlog without weakening due process.

Introduction: National Family Health Survey-5 (2019-21) shows anaemia in 67% of children aged 6–59 months and 57% of women aged 15–49 — a hidden hunger that calorie-based welfare does not capture.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory base — National Food Security Act 2013 covering about 81.35 crore beneficiaries, recognising the right to food flowing from Article 21 and PUCL v. Union of India (2001); (ii) food fortification — mandatory rice fortification in PDS from April 2024 with iron, folic acid and B12 under FSSAI standards; controversies on sickle-cell and thalassemia patients; (iii) institutional — POSHAN Abhiyaan, Anganwadi convergence, and the National Multi-sectoral Action Plan.

Way forward / Conclusion: Pair fortification with dietary diversification through millets and pulses on the PDS basket, biofortified crops under ICAR's HarvestPlus, and an exit clause from rice fortification for at-risk groups.

Introduction: Neighbourhood First, articulated in 2014, sits on Gujral Doctrine asymmetry and is now competing with China's BRI footprint and India's HADR-first responses.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) economic — Lines of Credit, ITEC training, and the Indian Rupee Trade settlement framework deployed in Sri Lanka's 2022 crisis (about USD 4.5 billion) and Bangladesh post 2024 political transition; (ii) connectivity — Trincomalee oil tank-farm with Lanka IOC, BBIN MVA, India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Kaladan Multimodal; (iii) political churn — Maldives 'India Out' since 2023, Bangladesh interim government post-August 2024, Nepal's revised currency map controversy.

Way forward / Conclusion: Deepen people-to-people HADR (Operation Brahma, 2025), keep delivery cycles under three years, and convert SAARC paralysis into BIMSTEC-driven sub-regionalism.

Introduction: The 44th Amendment was passed in April 1979 by the Janata government to undo the most far-reaching provisions of the 42nd Amendment 1976, restoring the constitutional balance disturbed during the 1975-77 Emergency.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) safeguards enacted — Article 352 now requires 'armed rebellion' instead of 'internal disturbance', Article 358 suspends Article 19 only during external emergency, Article 359 cannot suspend Articles 20 and 21, written Cabinet advice is required for proclamation, and Article 74 mandates the President send back advice once; (ii) restoration of right to property — Article 31 omitted, Article 300A inserted, ending fundamental-right status; (iii) unenforced provisions — Section 3 on press freedom for parliamentary proceedings and Article 22(7) safeguards on preventive detention have not been notified, as flagged by Soli Sorabjee and successive Law Commission reports.

Way forward / Conclusion: Notify the pending Sections, codify a parliamentary review of every Emergency proclamation, and read Article 21 expansively into Article 22 to complete the 44th Amendment's promise.

Introduction: Article 356 allows the Centre to assume the functions of a State on receipt of a Governor's report or otherwise; B.R. Ambedkar called it a dead letter. President's Rule was imposed in Manipur on 13 February 2025 — the eleventh imposition in that State.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Article 355 duty to protect States; Articles 356 and 357 process; Article 365 for failure to comply with Centre's directions; parliamentary approval within two months; (ii) Sarkaria Commission 1988 recommendations and the S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) nine-judge bench guardrails — last resort, judicial review available, floor test on the floor of the House; (iii) Manipur 2025 episode — prolonged ethnic violence, Governor's report citing constitutional breakdown, opposition's federalism concerns.

Way forward / Conclusion: Pre-imposition warning under Article 355, mandatory floor test, time-bound restoration of Assembly, and Inter-State Council scrutiny as institutionalised by Punchhi Commission 2010 are the durable corrections.

Introduction: Article 280 constitutes a Finance Commission every five years to recommend devolution of net tax proceeds and grants-in-aid under Article 275; the 16th Finance Commission under Arvind Panagariya is to submit its report by 31 October 2025 for the period 2026–31.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) divisible pool — Article 270 excludes cesses, surcharges and Article 271 surcharges from devolution; the share of cesses and surcharges has risen from about 10.4 per cent of gross tax revenue in 2011-12 to over 19 per cent by 2024-25; (ii) 15th Finance Commission devolved 41 per cent of the divisible pool but the effective transfer to States, after netting out non-divisible levies, is lower; (iii) governance friction — repeated extension of the GST Compensation cess, special-category status demands, and the 'horizontal' allocation criteria favouring older population data.

Way forward / Conclusion: A constitutional cap on the share of cesses, sunset clauses, and an upper-house ratified Finance Commission framework will restore the Article 280 promise.

Introduction: Article 262 empowers Parliament to legislate on inter-state river-water disputes and to bar the jurisdiction of all courts, including the Supreme Court, in such matters; the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956 and the River Boards Act 1956 are its statutory expressions.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Entry 17 of State List on water, Entry 56 of Union List on inter-state rivers, Article 262 bar; (ii) tribunal record — eight tribunals constituted since 1969, of which only Krishna, Cauvery and Godavari have delivered substantive awards; State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2018) on Cauvery led to the Cauvery Water Management Authority; (iii) inefficiency — average pendency exceeds a decade, States routinely approach the Supreme Court under Article 131 despite the Article 262 bar.

Way forward / Conclusion: Operationalise a permanent Inter-State Water Disputes Tribunal under the Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill 2019, statutory time-limit, and a Dispute Resolution Committee for negotiated settlement.

Introduction: The collegium system was read into Articles 124 and 217 by the Second Judges Case (1993) and elaborated in the Third Judges Case (1998); Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act for violating judicial independence as part of the basic structure.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 124 (Supreme Court) and Article 217 (High Courts), with collegium primacy in proposing names; the executive can return a name only once; (ii) MoP deadlock — the Supreme Court asked the Centre in 2015 to finalise a new Memorandum of Procedure, including a secretariat, eligibility criteria and a complaints mechanism, but it remains unsigned; pending names have been delayed for over two years in many cases; (iii) reform options — National Judicial Appointments Commission models from the UK and South Africa, public criteria, and a permanent secretariat.

Way forward / Conclusion: A jointly-signed MoP with a secretariat, published criteria and a constitutional time-limit on government action would preserve independence without reviving the NJAC.

Introduction: The Electoral Bonds Scheme 2018 allowed anonymous donations to political parties through SBI bearer-bonds; the Finance Act 2017 made the enabling amendments to the Companies Act 2013, the RBI Act 1934, the Income Tax Act 1961 and the Representation of the People Act 1951.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) the scheme — removed the 7.5 per cent cap on corporate donations (Section 182 Companies Act), amended Section 29C of RPA 1951 to exempt disclosure for bond donations; (ii) Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (15 February 2024) struck down the scheme as violative of voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and arbitrary under Article 14; (iii) post-judgment data — SBI disclosure (April 2024) showed Rs 16,518 crore in bonds redeemed between 2018 and 2024, with party-wise and corporate-donor breakdown published.

Way forward / Conclusion: Statutory cap on cash donations, a National Election Fund (Indrajit Gupta Committee 1998), and full disclosure under Section 29C RPA 1951 would deliver the transparency the Court demanded.

Introduction: The Constitution requires only that not more than six months elapse between two sittings of Parliament under Article 85; PRS Legislative Research data shows that the Lok Sabha sat for an average of 55 days a year between 2014 and 2024, against 130 days in the 1950s.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) institutional decline — average sitting days down, only 16 per cent of Bills referred to Department-Related Standing Committees in the 17th Lok Sabha (against 71 per cent in the 15th), suspension of MPs in December 2023 (146 MPs); (ii) constitutional design — Articles 85, 87, 100 (quorum), 105 (privileges); the Speaker decides Money Bill certification under Article 110, which Jairam Ramesh v. Union of India (2024) is examining; (iii) committee weakness — anti-defection whip, lack of research support, declining Question Hour productivity.

Way forward / Conclusion: A fixed annual calendar of at least 100 sittings (NCRWC 2002), mandatory committee referral for most Bills, and a stronger Parliamentary Research Service are the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution's prescription.

Introduction: Article 148 establishes the office of CAG, appointed by the President; Article 149 sets duties; Article 150 prescribes form of accounts; Article 151 requires reports to be laid before Parliament and the State legislatures; the CAG's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971 is the operating statute.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — appointed for six years or up to 65; removable like a Supreme Court judge; salary charged on the Consolidated Fund (Article 148(3)); (ii) institutional gaps — appointment process not collegial (criticised in Common Cause v. Union of India, 2019 petition), shrinking post-audit Special Audit Reports (down from 81 in 2015–16 to 26 in 2023–24 per CAG annual reports), under-utilisation of PAC scrutiny; (iii) emerging mandate — performance audits, audit of PPPs, and the right to audit private bodies receiving substantial government funds (Section 14 CAG Act, 1971).

Way forward / Conclusion: Multi-member CAG (2nd ARC recommendation), open appointment collegium, statutory backing for follow-up by Action Taken Notes — the Vinod Rai prescription — would restore the office's deterrent value.

Introduction: NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission on 1 January 2015 by a Union Cabinet resolution — a non-statutory, non-constitutional think-tank with the Prime Minister as Chair and Chief Ministers as Governing Council members.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) governance architecture — Governing Council (apex), CEO, sectoral verticals, Three Year Action Agenda (2017), Strategy for New India @ 75; (ii) cooperative federalism instruments — Aspirational Districts Programme launched 5 January 2018 covering 112 districts, Aspirational Blocks Programme (500 blocks, January 2023), SDG India Index, Health Index and Composite Water Management Index; (iii) gaps — no resource-allocation power (transferred to the Finance Ministry), declining attendance at Governing Council meetings (some CMs boycotted the 9th meeting on 27 July 2024), and absence of a statutory base under Article 263.

Way forward / Conclusion: A statutory NITI Aayog under Article 263 with binding minimum standards for index data, a clear resource-coordination role with Finance Commission and concurrent-list mandate areas would consolidate the cooperative-federalism gains of the first decade.

Introduction: The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016 replaced the 1995 Act to give effect to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) which India ratified on 1 October 2007; the Act covers 21 disabilities (up from 7) and reads Article 14, 19 and 21 expansively.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory architecture — Section 3 (non-discrimination), Section 24 (social security), Section 32 (reservation in higher education at 5 per cent), Section 34 (4 per cent reservation in government jobs), Chief Commissioner and State Commissioners as enforcement bodies; (ii) implementation gap — Census 2011 enumerated 2.21 per cent PwDs but NSSO 76th round (2018) estimated 2.2 crore living with disabilities; only 36 per cent of public buildings audited under the Accessible India Campaign 2015 met basic accessibility norms by 2024; (iii) judicial corrective — Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) on scribe rights, Avni Prakash v. NTA (2023) on PwD test concessions, and Pragya Prasun v. Union of India (2025) extending Article 21 to inclusive digital access.

Way forward / Conclusion: Disability-disaggregated data through Census 2026, full notification of Disability Commissioners, and accessibility audits in DigiLocker and UPI infrastructure under Section 40 RPwD Act 2016 will operationalise the inclusion the law promises.

Introduction: The National Food Security Act 2013 covers 81.35 crore beneficiaries with subsidised foodgrains; the Global Hunger Index 2024 ranked India 105 out of 127 countries, a ranking contested by the Government of India for methodology.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory base — NFSA 2013 entitles 75% rural and 50% urban households to 5 kg per person per month at Rs 3 (rice), Rs 2 (wheat), Re 1 (millets); PM Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana extended free foodgrains to December 2028; (ii) GHI methodology — 4 indicators (undernourishment, child wasting, child stunting, child mortality); MoWCD critique that wasting (NFHS-5 19.3% under-5) and stunting (35.5%) reflect long-term and not current hunger; (iii) gaps — One Nation One Ration Card portability scaled to all 36 States/UTs, but ration access for migrants remains uneven; PDS leakages, Aadhaar authentication failures.

Way forward / Conclusion: Diversify the PDS basket to millets and pulses, integrate the Anganwadi-supplied take-home rations, and publish district-level GHI-style data to convert NFSA from a calorie scheme to a nutrition entitlement.

Introduction: The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act 2013 was passed after the India Against Corruption movement and the 2nd ARC Fourth Report (Ethics in Governance, 2007); the Lokpal Chairman was first appointed only on 19 March 2019 after Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) directions.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory base — Lokpal is a multi-member body of Chairperson and up to 8 members (50% judicial, 50% from SC/ST/OBC/minorities/women); jurisdiction covers PM (with safeguards under Section 14), MPs, Group A–D officers; Section 19 inquiry directions, Section 20 preliminary inquiry; (ii) operational gaps — only 24 complaints disposed in 2023-24 (Lokpal Annual Report); States have been slow to constitute Lokayuktas; the Lokpal building, regulations and prosecution wing remain incomplete; (iii) parallel anti-corruption framework — CVC under CVC Act 2003, CBI under Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946, and the Prevention of Corruption Act (Amendment) 2018 raising the threshold for prosecuting public servants.

Way forward / Conclusion: A statutory selection committee with Leader of Opposition (currently 'Leader of largest opposition party'), an independent investigation wing under Section 11, and a public dashboard of complaints disposed will operationalise the 2013 Act.

Introduction: The Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act 1996 was enacted on 24 December 1996 to extend Part IX of the Constitution to the Fifth Schedule areas across 10 States, following the Bhuria Committee Report 1995.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory architecture — Gram Sabha as primary unit of self-government, mandatory consultation on land acquisition and minor minerals, ownership of minor forest produce, control over money-lenders and intoxicants; (ii) implementation gap — only six of the ten Fifth Schedule States have notified PESA Rules (Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Telangana, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Odisha); (iii) judicial corrective — Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) on tribal land alienation, and Niyamgiri case (Orissa Mining Corporation v. Union of India, 2013) on Gram Sabha consent for forest diversion.

Way forward / Conclusion: Notify PESA Rules in all Fifth Schedule States, statutory enforcement of Gram Sabha consent under Section 4(d) PESA read with Section 6 Forest Rights Act 2006, and convergence with PM-JANMAN are the steps to operationalise tribal self-rule.

Introduction: The Ministry of Cooperation was carved out of the Ministry of Agriculture on 6 July 2021; the National Cooperative Policy 2025 succeeds the 2002 Vaidyanathan Committee architecture with the 'Sahkar se Samriddhi' vision.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional and statutory base — Article 19(1)(c) right to form cooperatives, 97th Constitutional Amendment Act 2011 (Part IXB struck down for State cooperatives in Rajendra N. Shah, 2021); Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act 2002 amended in 2023 to create a Cooperative Election Authority; (ii) policy — National Cooperative Policy 2025 targets 3 lakh new Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS) by 2027, 2 lakh new Dairy and Fishery cooperatives; (iii) institutional architecture — NCDC under NCDC Act 1962, NABARD, computerisation of all 63,000 PACS with Rs 2,516 crore Cabinet approval (2022).

Way forward / Conclusion: Reconcile concurrent Union-State jurisdiction post-Rajendra Shah through Inter-State Council convergence, statutorily protect cooperative autonomy, and link PACS digitisation with public-service delivery under the JAM trinity.