Coastal security has been a layered concern since 26/11. Critically evaluate the Coastal Security Scheme, the role of NCSMCS and the residual gaps in Sagarmala-era coastal infrastructure.

Introduction:

India's coastline is 7,516.6 km (MoEFCC 2024); the Coastal Security Scheme Phase III rolled out from 2020-21 with ~₹1,950 crore; the National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) chaired by the Cabinet Secretary coordinates the post-26/11 architecture. Joint Operations Centres operate at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi, and Port Blair.

Layered architecture:

The Indian Navy holds overall maritime responsibility. The Indian Coast Guard, with a sanctioned strength of ~17,000, covers territorial waters. State Marine Police patrol the 12-nautical-mile zone, while Customs, DRI, and Maritime Port Authorities anchor commercial security. The Information Fusion Centre — Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) at Gurugram, operational since 2018, fuses regional data with international liaison officers.

Residual gaps:

Only ~50% of fishing vessels carry AIS Class-B transponders; smaller fishing harbours lack CCTV-AIS coverage; minor ports rely on patchy surveillance. Coordination between Customs, ICG, and DRI on smuggling and dual-use cargo remains uneven. Operation Aakraman (2024) showed effective maritime drug interdiction but also exposed the volume of trafficking through fishing boats.

Sagarmala trade-off:

Port-led development under Sagarmala (2015) raises commercial throughput and dual-use security exposure simultaneously. Tuticorin (Sterlite case) and Vizhinjam scaling illustrate the security-economy interplay across India's western seaboard, with the 26/11 Mumbai sea-route entry remaining the cardinal lesson.

Way forward / Conclusion:

Make AIS Class-B universal for fishing vessels, deploy CCTV-AIS at all minor ports, expand the IFC-IOR partner-station network, modernise Coast Guard interceptor fleet, and upgrade Marine Police Training Institute capacity under MHA-MoD by 2028.