Critical-mineral supply chains have become a tool of statecraft for both China and the United States. With reference to the National Critical Mineral Mission (January 2025), discuss India’s response.

Introduction:

Critical-mineral supply chains have become a tool of statecraft. The Union Cabinet approved the National Critical Mineral Mission on 29 January 2025 with Rs 16,300 crore outlay over seven years plus expected Rs 18,000 crore PSU investment.

Vulnerability: India is 100 percent import-dependent for lithium, cobalt and nickel; China refines 91 percent of rare earths and 94 percent of permanent magnets; Beijing's 4 April 2025 export licensing on seven rare earths — extended 1 December 2025 to foreign-made products — cut yttrium, dysprosium and terbium exports about 50 percent below baseline. The US Inflation Reduction Act 2022 and CHIPS Act 2022 weaponise mineral access from the other side.

NCMM architecture: The Mission notifies 30 critical minerals, mandates the Geological Survey of India to deliver 1,200 exploration projects, and operationalises offshore block auctions under the Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act 2023. The MMDR Amendment Act 2023 transferred 24 critical and atomic minerals to Central auction, ending State licensing of strategic deposits.

International stack: Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) signed lithium exploration deals in Argentina (January 2024) and Australia. India joined the Mineral Security Partnership (June 2023) and the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative (2024). The Critical Minerals Centre of Excellence operationalises recycling under the Battery Waste Management Rules 2022.

Way forward / Conclusion:

Build domestic processing capacity via PLI, strategic stockpiling on the US DPA Title III model, International Seabed Authority licences for Carlsberg Ridge polymetallic nodules, and rare-earth recycling — converting NCMM into a working chokepoint hedge.