GS Paper 2 practice questions for UPSC Mains 2026.

Introduction: The Preamble, drafted by the Drafting Committee and adopted on 26 November 1949, reflects the Objectives Resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehru on 13 December 1946.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) interpretive role — Berubari Union (1960) said the Preamble was not part of the Constitution; Kesavananda Bharati (1973) reversed this and held it is part of the Constitution and reflects the basic structure; (ii) the 42nd Amendment 1976 inserted 'Socialist, Secular and Integrity', upheld in Dr Balram Singh v. Union of India (25 November 2024); (iii) the words shape interpretation of Articles 14, 15, 25–28 and Article 1's 'Union of States'.

Way forward / Conclusion: The Preamble is not enforceable but it remains the lodestar of constitutional adjudication and of the basic structure doctrine.

Introduction: The 44th Amendment was passed in April 1979 by the Janata government to undo the most far-reaching provisions of the 42nd Amendment 1976, restoring the constitutional balance disturbed during the 1975-77 Emergency.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) safeguards enacted — Article 352 now requires 'armed rebellion' instead of 'internal disturbance', Article 358 suspends Article 19 only during external emergency, Article 359 cannot suspend Articles 20 and 21, written Cabinet advice is required for proclamation, and Article 74 mandates the President send back advice once; (ii) restoration of right to property — Article 31 omitted, Article 300A inserted, ending fundamental-right status; (iii) unenforced provisions — Section 3 on press freedom for parliamentary proceedings and Article 22(7) safeguards on preventive detention have not been notified, as flagged by Soli Sorabjee and successive Law Commission reports.

Way forward / Conclusion: Notify the pending Sections, codify a parliamentary review of every Emergency proclamation, and read Article 21 expansively into Article 22 to complete the 44th Amendment's promise.

Introduction: Article 370 was inserted in 1949 as a 'temporary provision' giving Jammu and Kashmir a special constitutional position; on 5 August 2019 Presidential Order C.O. 272 read with C.O. 273 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 ended that status.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 370(1)(d) allowed the President to extend constitutional provisions with the concurrence of the J&K Constituent Assembly; that body had dissolved in 1957, and Parliament was deemed to act in its place; (ii) the In re Article 370 judgment (11 December 2023) by a five-judge bench unanimously upheld the abrogation, held that the President could exercise Article 370(3) without J&K Constituent Assembly concurrence after 1957, and ordered Assembly elections by 30 September 2024; (iii) federal concerns — splitting a State into two Union Territories under Article 3 without consulting the State legislature, and the precedent for downgrading other States.

Way forward / Conclusion: Restore full Statehood at the earliest as the Solicitor General undertook, codify a clear procedure for Article 3 changes involving State consent, and read federalism — already part of the basic structure under S.R. Bommai (1994) — as a check on such use of constituent power.

Introduction: The First Constitutional Amendment 1951 inserted Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule to insulate land-reform legislation from challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) expansion — the Schedule has grown from 13 entries in 1951 to 284, including SEBC reservations, Sick Textile Undertakings Act and the Tamil Nadu 69% reservation Act; (ii) judicial scrutiny — Waman Rao v. Union of India (1980) cut off blanket protection at 24 April 1973 (the date of Kesavananda Bharati); (iii) I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) held that any Ninth Schedule law inserted after 24 April 1973 is open to challenge on basic-structure and fundamental-rights grounds.

Way forward / Conclusion: A constitutional convention that the Ninth Schedule is for agrarian reform only — and not a 'silencer' for politically inconvenient laws — would restore its original purpose.

Introduction: Article 356 allows the Centre to assume the functions of a State on receipt of a Governor's report or otherwise; B.R. Ambedkar called it a dead letter. President's Rule was imposed in Manipur on 13 February 2025 — the eleventh imposition in that State.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Article 355 duty to protect States; Articles 356 and 357 process; Article 365 for failure to comply with Centre's directions; parliamentary approval within two months; (ii) Sarkaria Commission 1988 recommendations and the S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) nine-judge bench guardrails — last resort, judicial review available, floor test on the floor of the House; (iii) Manipur 2025 episode — prolonged ethnic violence, Governor's report citing constitutional breakdown, opposition's federalism concerns.

Way forward / Conclusion: Pre-imposition warning under Article 355, mandatory floor test, time-bound restoration of Assembly, and Inter-State Council scrutiny as institutionalised by Punchhi Commission 2010 are the durable corrections.

Introduction: Article 280 constitutes a Finance Commission every five years to recommend devolution of net tax proceeds and grants-in-aid under Article 275; the 16th Finance Commission under Arvind Panagariya is to submit its report by 31 October 2025 for the period 2026–31.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) divisible pool — Article 270 excludes cesses, surcharges and Article 271 surcharges from devolution; the share of cesses and surcharges has risen from about 10.4 per cent of gross tax revenue in 2011-12 to over 19 per cent by 2024-25; (ii) 15th Finance Commission devolved 41 per cent of the divisible pool but the effective transfer to States, after netting out non-divisible levies, is lower; (iii) governance friction — repeated extension of the GST Compensation cess, special-category status demands, and the 'horizontal' allocation criteria favouring older population data.

Way forward / Conclusion: A constitutional cap on the share of cesses, sunset clauses, and an upper-house ratified Finance Commission framework will restore the Article 280 promise.

Introduction: Article 262 empowers Parliament to legislate on inter-state river-water disputes and to bar the jurisdiction of all courts, including the Supreme Court, in such matters; the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956 and the River Boards Act 1956 are its statutory expressions.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional design — Entry 17 of State List on water, Entry 56 of Union List on inter-state rivers, Article 262 bar; (ii) tribunal record — eight tribunals constituted since 1969, of which only Krishna, Cauvery and Godavari have delivered substantive awards; State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu (2018) on Cauvery led to the Cauvery Water Management Authority; (iii) inefficiency — average pendency exceeds a decade, States routinely approach the Supreme Court under Article 131 despite the Article 262 bar.

Way forward / Conclusion: Operationalise a permanent Inter-State Water Disputes Tribunal under the Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill 2019, statutory time-limit, and a Dispute Resolution Committee for negotiated settlement.

Introduction: Articles 323A and 323B, inserted by the 42nd Amendment 1976, empower Parliament and State Legislatures to set up administrative and other tribunals, originally with appeals lying directly to the Supreme Court.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) statutory base — Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 for CAT, and over fifteen subject tribunals; (ii) L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) struck down clauses excluding High Court jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227, restoring writ jurisdiction as a basic-structure feature; (iii) Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 abolished nine tribunals and standardised tenure and service conditions — Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021) struck down several provisions.

Way forward / Conclusion: A National Tribunals Commission (Justice R.C. Lahoti recommendation), separation of selection from administrative control, and clear procedural rules will deliver the original tribunal promise.

Introduction: Article 142 vests in the Supreme Court the power to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it; the same article and the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 also clothe its decree with enforceability.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) classical use — Union Carbide v. Union of India (1989) for the Bhopal settlement, Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) for bonded labour; (ii) expanded use — Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) writing workplace-harassment guidelines, the Ayodhya verdict (2019), and the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025) creating 'deemed assent'; (iii) the November 2025 Presidential Reference advisory pulled back from Article 142 used to manufacture executive consent.

Way forward / Conclusion: Article 142 is a residuary equity power, not a parallel legislature; the Bar Council of India v. Union of India (1981) caution against using it to override statutes is the right anchor.

Introduction: Article 263 empowers the President to constitute an Inter-State Council to inquire and advise on inter-state disputes and matters of common interest; the Sarkaria Commission's recommendation led to its constitution on 28 May 1990.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) composition — Prime Minister as Chair, Chief Ministers of all States and UTs with legislature, Administrators of others, and six Union Cabinet Ministers; (ii) under-use — the Council has met only twelve times since 1990, with long gaps such as 2006 to 2016; (iii) overlap with NITI Aayog's Governing Council and the GST Council under Article 279A has crowded its space.

Way forward / Conclusion: Statutory meeting calendar of two sessions a year, public minutes, and a Standing Committee under Justice M.M. Punchhi's 2010 model would revive cooperative federalism.

Introduction: The 101st Constitutional Amendment Act 2016 inserted Article 279A creating the GST Council — Union Finance Minister as Chair, Union Minister of State for Finance and one Minister from each State, with weighted voting (Centre one-third, States two-thirds combined; 75 per cent threshold).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 246A concurrent power to tax goods and services, Article 269A on inter-state supplies, IGST mechanism, and a five-year compensation cess until 2022; (ii) Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (19 May 2022) held GST Council recommendations are 'persuasive' not binding, reading the federal trust-based design into Article 279A; (iii) governance friction — delayed compensation payments to States, slab-rationalisation debate (the 4-slab structure plus cess), and 56th GST Council Meeting reforms.

Way forward / Conclusion: A reasoned-decision norm, published voting records, a dispute-resolution mechanism under Article 279A(11), and a sunset on the compensation cess can reconcile pooled sovereignty with State fiscal autonomy.

Introduction: The Constitution requires only that not more than six months elapse between two sittings of Parliament under Article 85; PRS Legislative Research data shows that the Lok Sabha sat for an average of 55 days a year between 2014 and 2024, against 130 days in the 1950s.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) institutional decline — average sitting days down, only 16 per cent of Bills referred to Department-Related Standing Committees in the 17th Lok Sabha (against 71 per cent in the 15th), suspension of MPs in December 2023 (146 MPs); (ii) constitutional design — Articles 85, 87, 100 (quorum), 105 (privileges); the Speaker decides Money Bill certification under Article 110, which Jairam Ramesh v. Union of India (2024) is examining; (iii) committee weakness — anti-defection whip, lack of research support, declining Question Hour productivity.

Way forward / Conclusion: A fixed annual calendar of at least 100 sittings (NCRWC 2002), mandatory committee referral for most Bills, and a stronger Parliamentary Research Service are the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution's prescription.

Introduction: The Rajya Sabha was modelled on the US Senate but with State legislatures as the electing college; the Constituent Assembly Debates (28 July 1947) record Gopalaswami Ayyangar's defence of bicameralism as a check on hasty legislation.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 80 (composition of 245 with 12 nominated), Article 84 (qualifications), Article 249 (legislation on State List by two-thirds majority), Article 312 (creation of All India Services); (ii) federal voice — the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act 2003 removed the domicile requirement, criticised in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) as diluting federal representation, though upheld; (iii) performance — fewer Bills properly debated, the Money Bill route under Article 110 has bypassed the Upper House on key laws.

Way forward / Conclusion: Restore the domicile requirement, narrow the Money Bill exception by judicial review, and use Article 249 as a federal trust mechanism rather than a Union override.

Introduction: The Department-Related Standing Committee system was constituted on 8 April 1993 on a recommendation of the Rules Committee; 24 DRSCs cover the work of all 99 Ministries and Departments.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional source — Articles 105 (privileges) and 118 (rules of procedure) provide the base; the Speaker constitutes committees on the floor; (ii) function — Bill scrutiny, Demands for Grants, subject reports; PRS data shows only 16 per cent of Bills referred in the 17th Lok Sabha (against 71 per cent in the 15th); (iii) systemic gaps — no research staff per Member, no sub-committee on legislation, anti-defection whip eroding free debate.

Way forward / Conclusion: Mandatory referral norms in the Rules of Procedure, public hearings on Bills, and a Parliamentary Budget Office on the US-Australia model would revive committee scrutiny.

Introduction: The collegium system was read into Articles 124 and 217 by the Second Judges Case (1993) and elaborated in the Third Judges Case (1998); Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act for violating judicial independence as part of the basic structure.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 124 (Supreme Court) and Article 217 (High Courts), with collegium primacy in proposing names; the executive can return a name only once; (ii) MoP deadlock — the Supreme Court asked the Centre in 2015 to finalise a new Memorandum of Procedure, including a secretariat, eligibility criteria and a complaints mechanism, but it remains unsigned; pending names have been delayed for over two years in many cases; (iii) reform options — National Judicial Appointments Commission models from the UK and South Africa, public criteria, and a permanent secretariat.

Way forward / Conclusion: A jointly-signed MoP with a secretariat, published criteria and a constitutional time-limit on government action would preserve independence without reviving the NJAC.

Introduction: The President is the head of the Indian Union under Article 52; Article 74 binds the President to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, as clarified by the 42nd and 44th Amendments.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 53 (executive power), Article 74(1) (binding advice, may be returned once), Article 75 (Council of Ministers), Article 78 (PM duty to communicate); (ii) discretionary spaces — appointment of PM when no party has a clear majority (Article 75), dissolution of Lok Sabha on PM's loss of majority, returning a bill under Article 111 (pocket veto by President Zail Singh on Postal Bill 1986), and pardoning power under Article 72 limited by Maru Ram (1981) and Epuru Sudhakar (2006); (iii) office in practice — President Droupadi Murmu's 2025 Reference under Article 143 on Governor's role.

Way forward / Conclusion: The Shamsher Singh (1974) line — that the President is a constitutional head — is the right anchor; the discretionary corridors must be narrow and reasoned.

Introduction: The Electoral Bonds Scheme 2018 allowed anonymous donations to political parties through SBI bearer-bonds; the Finance Act 2017 made the enabling amendments to the Companies Act 2013, the RBI Act 1934, the Income Tax Act 1961 and the Representation of the People Act 1951.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) the scheme — removed the 7.5 per cent cap on corporate donations (Section 182 Companies Act), amended Section 29C of RPA 1951 to exempt disclosure for bond donations; (ii) Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (15 February 2024) struck down the scheme as violative of voters' right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and arbitrary under Article 14; (iii) post-judgment data — SBI disclosure (April 2024) showed Rs 16,518 crore in bonds redeemed between 2018 and 2024, with party-wise and corporate-donor breakdown published.

Way forward / Conclusion: Statutory cap on cash donations, a National Election Fund (Indrajit Gupta Committee 1998), and full disclosure under Section 29C RPA 1951 would deliver the transparency the Court demanded.

Introduction: Article 148 establishes the office of CAG, appointed by the President; Article 149 sets duties; Article 150 prescribes form of accounts; Article 151 requires reports to be laid before Parliament and the State legislatures; the CAG's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971 is the operating statute.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — appointed for six years or up to 65; removable like a Supreme Court judge; salary charged on the Consolidated Fund (Article 148(3)); (ii) institutional gaps — appointment process not collegial (criticised in Common Cause v. Union of India, 2019 petition), shrinking post-audit Special Audit Reports (down from 81 in 2015–16 to 26 in 2023–24 per CAG annual reports), under-utilisation of PAC scrutiny; (iii) emerging mandate — performance audits, audit of PPPs, and the right to audit private bodies receiving substantial government funds (Section 14 CAG Act, 1971).

Way forward / Conclusion: Multi-member CAG (2nd ARC recommendation), open appointment collegium, statutory backing for follow-up by Action Taken Notes — the Vinod Rai prescription — would restore the office's deterrent value.

Introduction: The Union Public Service Commission traces back to the Public Service Commission set up in October 1926 under the Government of India Act 1919; Article 315 of the Constitution gave it constitutional status from 26 January 1950.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Article 315 (UPSC and State PSCs), Article 316 (appointment), Article 320 (functions: recruitment, advice on disciplinary matters), Article 322 (expenses on Consolidated Fund); (ii) functional concerns — exam-paper leaks at the State level, lateral entry (UPSC advertisement July 2024 for joint secretaries withdrawn), and faceless interview reform proposals; (iii) reform agenda — Baswan Committee 2016 on CSE pattern, 2nd ARC's Tenth Report on personnel administration, and the case for moving from selection-only to a strategic HR function for the Union.

Way forward / Conclusion: Operationalise the National Recruitment Agency, codify lateral-entry safeguards through legislation, and a public-facing performance audit of UPSC processes would modernise Article 315.

Introduction: Article 82 requires Parliament to enact a Delimitation Act after every census; the 42nd Amendment 1976 froze Lok Sabha seat allocation until the 2001 Census, and the 84th Amendment 2001 read with the 87th Amendment 2003 extended this freeze to the first census after 2026.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) constitutional architecture — Articles 81 (composition of Lok Sabha), 82 (delimitation), 170 (Assembly composition); the freeze rewarded States that controlled fertility; (ii) demographic asymmetry — SRS 2022 TFR: South 1.6, Northern Hindi-belt 2.6; a population-based redistribution would shift between 30 and 65 Lok Sabha seats from South and East to North; (iii) federalism concerns — Rajya Sabha as a counterweight, the Tamil Nadu Joint Action Committee 2025 resolution, and the case for a composite formula (population plus governance metrics or capping the North's gain).

Way forward / Conclusion: A constitutional amendment that protects existing State seat shares while expanding the House size, strengthening the Rajya Sabha's federal voice, and aligning with the One Nation One Election timeline would reconcile population equality with federal fairness.