India and Bangladesh share a 4,096 km border, 54 transboundary rivers, a liberation war fought together in 1971, and a trade basket that has grown from USD 9 billion a decade ago to USD 14 billion in FY24. They also share an increasingly crowded neighbourhood — with China, Turkey and Pakistan all stepping up Dhaka engagement, and with the August 2024 political transition that saw former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina leave the country after mass protests. For UPSC GS II, the India-Bangladesh file tests the Neighbourhood First Policy, the politics of river diplomacy, and the limits of a relationship built on one political party.
Historical context
India recognised Bangladesh on 6 December 1971 during the Liberation War, supported the Mukti Bahini, and housed over 10 million refugees. The Mujib-Indira Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace (1972) framed early ties. Relations oscillated after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's assassination in 1975 but found durable footing after Sheikh Hasina's Awami League returned to power in 2009 — the basis for the "golden chapter" period from 2009 to 2024.
Areas of cooperation
Trade and economy
Bangladesh is India's biggest trade partner in South Asia. In FY24, total bilateral trade stood at USD 14.01 billion; Bangladesh is the largest export destination for Indian cotton (roughly 35% share, USD 2.4 billion). Top Indian exports: cotton, petroleum products, cereals; top import from Bangladesh: readymade garments. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) were nearing launch before the 2024 transition.
Connectivity
| Mode | Landmark projects |
|---|---|
| Rail | Haldibari-Chilahati, Akhaura-Agartala (inaugurated Nov 2023), Khulna-Mongla |
| Road | Petrapole-Benapole ICP; BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement framework |
| Waterway | Protocol on Inland Waterways Trade and Transit (PIWTT, since 1972) |
| Port | Operational use of Chittagong and Mongla ports by India (2023) |
| Energy | Maitree Super Thermal Power Plant; Bangladesh imports 1,160 MW from India; India-funded Rooppur nuclear plant support |
Security and border management
- Land Boundary Agreement (2015) resolved enclaves and adverse possessions — a textbook case of peaceful border settlement.
- Coordinated Border Management Plan (2011) with joint inspections and Director General level talks.
- Joint exercises Sampriti (army) and Bongo Sagar (navy).
- Bangladesh handed over several Indian insurgent leaders post-2009.
Water and rivers
The Ganga Waters Treaty (1996) governs Farakka releases and expires in 2026, making renegotiation imminent. The Kushiyara Treaty (2022) was a quiet win. The Teesta agreement, stalled by West Bengal's objections, remains the single biggest unfinished water file.
Points of friction
Illegal migration remains a live political issue in Assam and Bengal, amplified by the Citizenship Amendment Act and NRC discourse, both viewed sourly in Dhaka.
River water management — 54 common rivers, but treaties for only two. Teesta is the symbol.
Rising China footprint: Bangladesh is a BRI member, China’s second-largest arms export destination, and proposed a USD 1 billion Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project — which India has tried to counter-offer on.
Perceived Awami League tilt: India's close relationship with Sheikh Hasina's regime left it exposed when the Awami League fell in 2024. Other political forces in Bangladesh — especially the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami — have long viewed New Delhi as partisan.
Pakistan-Bangladesh thaw: Post-Hasina, Islamabad's High Commissioner met Bangladesh's interim leadership — a development India watches closely.
"India-Out" campaign: The BNP-led boycott of Indian goods during Ramadan 2024 tested the economic interdependence narrative.
Border killings: The deaths of Bangladeshi nationals along the border — 294 since 2010 per Dhaka — strain the coordinated border framework.
The 2024 political transition
In August 2024, mass student-led protests over job quotas escalated into a wider movement; Sheikh Hasina resigned and left for India. An interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus took charge. The transition created immediate challenges for New Delhi:
- Trade ties and a potential FTA/CEPA are on hold.
- Indian investments — edible oil, power, FMCG, auto, pharma — face uncertainty.
- Bangladesh's access to the Northeast via Chicken's Neck logistics is politically charged.
- Early signals from Yunus included outreach to Beijing and Islamabad alongside Delhi.
India's response has been patient engagement with whichever government emerges, while using economic interdependence as ballast.
Latest developments (2024-26)
- Hasina exit (August 2024) and the Yunus-led interim administration.
- G20 Presidency (India, 2023) produced the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) — Bangladesh not part of it, a strategic gap it wants closed via IMEC spurs.
- BRICS expansion (2024) with the UAE, Egypt, Iran and Ethiopia joining; Bangladesh applied, status pending.
- Quad Summit, Wilmington (2024) raised Bay of Bengal maritime domain awareness — indirectly relevant to Dhaka.
- Red Sea crisis (2024) rerouted Bangladesh-bound shipping and sharpened reliance on regional ports.
- Operation Sindhu Thakur style evacuations and Northeast internal security sensitivity in 2024-25.
- Akhaura-Agartala rail link began full services in 2024.
- Ganga Treaty renewal talks flagged for 2026.
- AI Action Summit (Paris, 2025) saw India and Bangladesh align on developing-country digital governance positions despite political cooling.
- Russia-Ukraine updates pushed both countries to manage energy imports; Bangladesh's Rooppur reactor depends on Russian fuel.
Future areas of cooperation
- Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement — finalising it once political dust settles.
- Sub-regional power grid (BBIN) — India-Nepal-Bangladesh tripartite power trade is already in pilot.
- BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement operationalisation with or without Bhutan.
- LDC graduation (2026): Bangladesh's graduation will change tariff regimes and reshape trade.
- Connectivity for the Northeast through Chittagong and Mongla ports.
- Energy trade — tripartite Nepal-India-Bangladesh electricity corridor can scale to 1,000 MW+ by 2027.
- Digital Public Infrastructure — UPI, RuPay, ONDC outreach; Bangladesh's Digital Bangladesh programme complements India Stack.
- Climate cooperation — both coastal, low-lying, highly exposed; joint adaptation financing under LDCF and Green Climate Fund.
- Education — more ICCR scholarships and joint university programmes in medicine and engineering.
- Visa liberalisation — long-term multi-entry categories for businesses and students.
Strategic framework
India's Bangladesh strategy has historically relied on two assumptions — geographic indispensability and Awami League continuity. The 2024 transition stress-tested the second assumption. What remains resilient is the first: geography makes interdependence cheaper than rivalry. Dhaka's choice is not between India and China; it is between using both and being used by neither. New Delhi's task is to make that middle path the obviously better choice — through execution speed on connectivity, calibration on water treaties, respect for Dhaka's political autonomy, and visible results for Bangladeshi citizens, not just governments.
Public discourse and optics
India's Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), National Register of Citizens (NRC), and domestic statements about "illegal Bangladeshi migrants" have diplomatic costs. Even well-intentioned policy can generate strategic friction when communicated casually. The challenge for India is to manage internal political debates without outsourcing diplomatic damage to the MEA.
Connectivity projects scorecard
| Project | Status |
|---|---|
| Haldibari-Chilahati rail | Operational |
| Akhaura-Agartala rail | Operational since Nov 2023 |
| Khulna-Mongla Port rail | Operational since Nov 2023 |
| Chilahati-Mogalhat rail | Operational |
| Radhikapur-Birol rail | Operational |
| Petrapole-Benapole | India's largest land port |
| Maitree Super Thermal Power Plant | 1,320 MW — operational; India-backed |
| Rooppur Nuclear Plant | Russian-led; Indian companies support |
| Cross-border power transmission | Bheramara-Baharampur; 1,160 MW import by Bangladesh |
| Jamuna rail bridge | India-JICA-Bangladesh cooperation |
| Chittagong-Mongla port use | Operational 2023 |
Five-decade relationship in figures
- 1971: India recognises Bangladesh on 6 December.
- 2001: First rail link at Petrapole-Benapole.
- 2010: Sheikh Hasina visits India — framework agreements.
- 2015: Modi-Hasina summit; Land Boundary Agreement ratified.
- 2019: 2+2 style dialogue frameworks.
- 2022: Kushiyara Treaty.
- 2023: Akhaura-Agartala rail; Chittagong-Mongla port use operational.
- 2024: Political transition; Yunus interim government.
UPSC Relevance
India-Bangladesh is a perennial GS II topic — effect of policies of neighbours on India's interests and regional groupings (SAARC, BIMSTEC, BBIN). Prelims has tested the LBA (2016) and river treaties. Mains prompts focus on illegal migration, the Teesta impasse, connectivity, and the post-2024 transition.
Practice question (Mains): "The India-Bangladesh relationship had been built around a single political party." Critically analyse this proposition in light of the 2024 political transition. (250 words)
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