The Governor is the constitutional head of a state — the analogue of the President at the state level. Under Articles 153-162, the Governor is a nominal executive who acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Yet the office also carries discretionary powers that have repeatedly made it a site of political controversy. For UPSC Polity, the Governor's role is a GS-II staple, covering federalism, executive accountability, and centre-state tensions.
Constitutional Scheme
| Article | Content |
|---|---|
| Article 153 | There shall be a Governor for each State |
| Article 154 | Executive power of the State vests in the Governor |
| Article 155 | Appointment of Governor by the President |
| Article 156 | Term of office — pleasure of the President |
| Article 161 | Pardoning power |
| Article 163 | Council of Ministers to aid and advise; discretion of Governor |
| Article 200 | Reservation of bills for the President |
| Article 213 | Ordinance-making power |
| Article 356 | President's Rule on the Governor's report |
Discretionary Powers of the Governor
The Governor has three sets of explicit discretionary powers under the Constitution:
- Article 200 — Reservation of a state bill for consideration of the President.
- Article 356 — Submission of a report recommending President's Rule.
Beyond these, the Governor also exercises discretion in:
- Appointing the Chief Minister in a hung assembly.
- Dismissing the Chief Minister when confidence is lost.
- Recommending dissolution of the assembly.
- Inviting parties to form government.
Appointment of the Governor
Nomination vs Election — The Constituent Assembly Debate
The Constituent Assembly debated nomination vs election of Governors and settled on the Canadian system — appointment by the President.
Concerns Raised Over the Years
- 1st ARC (1966): "Burnt-out politicians and people with low integrity" should not be appointed; mandatory consultation with opposition leader.
- Sarkaria Commission (1988): Amend Article 155 to mandate consultation with the Chief Minister.
- NCRWC (2002): A committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Lok Sabha Speaker, and state Chief Minister should select Governors; transparent consultation; no civil servants or defence chiefs.
Supreme Court Observations
The Court has criticised appointments of:
- Defeated candidates (e.g., V.V. Giri, Gadgil in historical appointments).
- Men from the Centre's ruling party without due consultation.
Removal of the Governor
Article 156 says the Governor holds office "during the pleasure of the President." This has been exercised arbitrarily — and sometimes in large numbers — when governments change at the Centre.
Sarkaria Commission
- Five years of undisturbed tenure unless there is a compelling reason.
- President must get an explanation from the Vice-President and Lok Sabha Speaker / retired Chief Justice of India before removing a Governor.
- Termination must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.
Punchhi Commission (2010)
- The procedure for impeachment of the President, mutatis mutandis, could be made applicable for impeachment of Governors.
BP Singhal v. Union of India (2010)
The Supreme Court's landmark ruling:
- No Governor can be removed because of ideological mismatch or because the central government has lost confidence in the Governor.
- Article 156 is a "pleasure doctrine" but its use must be reasonable — not arbitrary.
Invitation to Form Government
Sarkaria's recommended order of preference in a hung assembly:
- Pre-poll alliance with a majority.
- Largest single party with the support of others.
- Post-poll alliance with everyone joining the government.
- Post-poll alliance with some outside support.
The floor test is the only definitive way to ascertain majority — Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) and subsequent rulings have underscored this.
Report Under Article 356
Sarkaria held that a Governor's report for President's Rule must be a "speaking document" with corroborating evidence. The SR Bommai (1994) guidelines provide further safeguards:
- Floor test before dismissing a ministry.
- No dissolution of the government if it enjoys majority.
- Judicial review to check mala fide intent.
Dismissal of the Chief Minister
- SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994): Floor test first is a must.
- No dissolution of the legislature if the government enjoys majority.
- The Court can reinstate a dismissed government.
- Any dismissal is subject to judicial review for mala fide intent.
The "Edit Speech" Controversy
The Governor delivers the opening address to the state legislature — but the contents are drafted by the Council of Ministers. In recent years, Governors have edited out portions they disagreed with, creating a constitutional flashpoint.
| Year | Governor | Incident |
|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Tathagata Roy (Tripura) | Omitted portions of the government's draft |
| 2018 | P. Sathasivam (Kerala) | Omitted parts |
| 2023 | R.N. Ravi (Tamil Nadu) | Altered the prepared speech |
Constitutional Position
- Article 176(1) obligates the Governor to read out the address.
- The Council of Ministers has an obligation not to include objectionable remarks.
- The Governor is not entitled to edit the speech unless it is critical of her own conduct.
Reservation of Bills (Article 200)
The Governor may:
- Give assent to a bill.
- Withhold assent.
- Reserve the bill for the President.
- Return a non-money bill for reconsideration (if sent back and passed again, must give assent).
The Delay Problem
There is no explicit time limit for the Governor to decide. Indefinite delays on state bills — in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Telangana, West Bengal — reached the Supreme Court in 2023.
Recent Court Rulings
- State of Telangana v. Governor (2023): Governor must act "as soon as possible."
- State of Punjab v. Governor (2023): Governor cannot sit on bills indefinitely; must act within a reasonable time.
- State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2023-24): Governor cannot withhold assent without communicating reasons to the legislature.
Discretionary Powers: The Guiding Principle
The Punchhi Commission summed it up: "Exercise of the discretionary power must be dictated by reason, activated by good faith, and tempered by caution."
Issues With the Office
- Politicisation of Governor appointments.
- Selective use of discretion to favour the Centre.
- Delays in granting assent to state bills.
- Partisan use of Article 356 reports.
- Edit speech controversies.
- Bypassing of the state CoM on appointments, convocations, etc.
Reforms Suggested
- Fixed tenure with compelling reasons for early removal.
- Collegial selection (PM, HM, Speaker, CM as per NCRWC).
- Mandatory consultation with Chief Ministers.
- No post-retirement political appointments for a cooling-off period.
- Time limits for assent to state bills.
- Cooling-off period before assuming office after holding political positions.
- Impeachment procedure analogous to the President (Punchhi).
Latest Developments (2024-26)
- Supreme Court repeatedly called out Governors for sitting on state bills.
- Edit-speech controversies have recurred in Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
- State government vs Governor cases have filed in record numbers — testing the limits of Article 200.
- Ex-bureaucrat appointments as Governor have continued to invite criticism.
UPSC Relevance
GS-II mapping: Executive at the state level; centre-state relations; federalism; constitutional bodies.
Prelims bullets:
- Article 155 — appointment; Article 156 — pleasure of the President.
- Article 163 — Council of Ministers; discretionary powers.
- Article 200 — reservation of bills.
- SR Bommai (1994); BP Singhal (2010); Rameshwar Prasad (2006).
- Sarkaria, Punchhi, NCRWC on Governor reforms.
Mains angles:
- "The Governor has become a flashpoint in centre-state relations." Discuss with reference to recent controversies.
- Examine the scope and limits of the Governor’s discretionary powers.
- Evaluate the recommendations of Sarkaria, Punchhi, and NCRWC Commissions on Governor reforms.
- How has the Supreme Court shaped the office of the Governor through recent judgments?
Constitutional Immunity of the Governor (Article 361)
Article 361 gives the Governor a protective shield that often surprises aspirants. Clause (1) provides that the Governor is not answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of the office, or for any act done or purporting to be done in that exercise. This personal immunity is absolute while in office and is why a sitting Governor cannot be summoned, examined as a witness, or made a party in proceedings over official acts. Clauses (2) to (4) extend the shield to bar criminal proceedings during the term and to suspend civil suits against personal acts unless two months’ prior notice is served. The protection is personal, not institutional: it insulates the holder of the office, but it does not place the Governor’s decisions beyond reach.
The Supreme Court has been careful to distinguish the person from the act. In Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006) the Court held that while the Governor enjoys complete immunity under Article 361(1), the immunity does not take away the power of the judiciary to examine the validity of the action itself, including on grounds of malafide. More recently, in the 2023 Telangana and 2024 Tamil Nadu/West Bengal litigation on delayed assent, courts reiterated that gubernatorial inaction on Bills is justiciable even though the Governor personally stays beyond summons. So Article 361 answers a common prelims trap (as in GPSC 2026): the Governor cannot be held answerable in court for official acts, yet those acts remain subject to judicial review — immunity for the person, accountability for the office.
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