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India-Sri Lanka Relations: Fisheries Dispute, Economic Crisis, China Factor & Tamil Issue

Analysis of India-Sri Lanka relations covering the Tamil ethnic conflict, fisheries dispute, Katchatheevu, 2022 economic crisis, Hambantota port, and Colombo Security Conclave for UPSC.

India-Sri Lanka Relations: Fisheries Dispute, Economic Crisis, China Factor & Tamil Issue featured image

India and Sri Lanka are separated by the Palk Strait (30 km at its narrowest) and connected by over 2,500 years of civilizational ties through Buddhism, trade, and shared cultural heritage. Emperor Ashoka's son Mahinda is credited with bringing Buddhism to Sri Lanka in the 3rd century BCE — a connection Sri Lanka acknowledges to this day.

Yet this relationship carries deep scars. The Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009), the LTTE, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi (1991), and the IPKF debacle created wounds that still influence policymaking. Today, the fisheries dispute, China's growing presence, and Tamil rights remain the defining issues.

UPSC tests this relationship consistently. GS-2 has asked about India's role in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and the fisheries dispute. Prelims covers the 13th Amendment, Katchatheevu, and the Colombo Security Conclave.

The Ethnic Conflict and Its Aftermath

The Sri Lankan Civil War (1983-2009) between the Sinhalese-majority government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, lasted 26 years and killed an estimated 80,000-100,000 people.

India's involvement came in phases:

Phase 1 — Covert Support (1983-1987): India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) trained Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, in camps in Tamil Nadu. This was partly a response to Sri Lanka's tilt toward the US, Israel, and Pakistan.

Phase 2 — IPKF Intervention (1987-1990): Under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (1987), India deployed the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce a ceasefire and disarm Tamil militants. The mission was a disaster. The IPKF fought the very LTTE it had once trained. Approximately 1,200 Indian soldiers were killed. The IPKF withdrew in 1990 without achieving its objectives.

Phase 3 — Rajiv Gandhi Assassination (1991): An LTTE suicide bomber assassinated former PM Rajiv Gandhi at an election rally in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu, on May 21, 1991. This single act turned Indian public opinion decisively against the LTTE and ended any Indian sympathy for the militant group.

Phase 4 — War's End (2009): The Sri Lankan military defeated the LTTE in May 2009 under President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The final offensive involved heavy civilian casualties. India was criticized for not intervening to protect Tamil civilians, particularly in Tamil Nadu where political pressure was intense.

The 13th Amendment and Tamil Rights

The 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka's Constitution was enacted in 1987 as a direct result of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. It established Provincial Councils and devolved power to provinces, including the Northern and Eastern Provinces where Tamils are concentrated.

India consistently pushes Sri Lanka to fully implement the 13th Amendment, including devolving police and land powers to provincial councils. Colombo has resisted meaningful implementation. Successive Sri Lankan governments have viewed full devolution as a threat to the unitary state structure.

The approximately 2.3 million Sri Lankan Tamils (11% of the population) continue to face issues of political representation, land rights, military occupation of northern territories, and accountability for wartime atrocities.

Common student mistake: Students confuse Sri Lankan Tamils with Indian-origin Tamils (plantation workers brought by the British). These are two distinct communities. India's primary diplomatic concern is Sri Lankan Tamils' political rights under the 13th Amendment.

The Fisheries Dispute: Palk Strait Politics

The fisheries dispute is the most emotionally charged recurring issue in India-Sri Lanka relations. It directly affects domestic politics in Tamil Nadu.

The core problem: Indian fishermen from Tamil Nadu — primarily from Rameswaram and Nagapattinam — regularly cross into Sri Lankan waters in the Palk Strait. They use mechanized bottom trawlers that destroy marine ecology and deplete fish stocks that Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen depend on.

Scale of the problem: Hundreds of Indian fishermen are arrested annually by the Sri Lankan Navy. Fishing boats are confiscated. Occasionally, fishermen are shot. Each incident triggers outrage in Tamil Nadu and pressure on the Central government.

Why Indian fishermen cross: Overfishing has depleted stocks on the Indian side. Bottom trawling (banned in many countries) is still practiced by Indian fishermen because it is highly profitable in the short term.

Katchatheevu Island

Katchatheevu is a 285-acre uninhabited island in the Palk Strait. India ceded Katchatheevu to Sri Lanka in 1974 through an agreement (not a formal treaty ratified by Parliament). India retained fishing and drying rights for its fishermen.

In 1976, a supplementary agreement restricted even these rights. Tamil Nadu political parties — across party lines — demand the retrieval of Katchatheevu. The DMK and AIADMK have both raised this issue in Parliament and courts.

The Supreme Court in 2008 noted that the cession without parliamentary approval raises constitutional questions but did not order retrieval. Katchatheevu remains politically sensitive in every Tamil Nadu election.

IssueDetailsCurrent Status
Fishermen arrested annuallyHundredsOngoing, joint working group meetings
Katchatheevu IslandCeded 1974, 285 acresTN demands retrieval
Bottom trawlingIndian fishermen in SL watersSL demands India ban trawling
13th AmendmentProvincial Council devolutionIndia pushes, SL resists full implementation
IPKF casualties~1,200 Indian soldiers killed1987-1990
LTTE war endedMay 2009Post-war reconciliation incomplete

The 2022 Economic Crisis: India Steps Up

Sri Lanka's 2022 economic crisis was its worst since independence. The country's external debt reached $51 billion, foreign exchange reserves dropped to near zero, and the government defaulted on its sovereign debt for the first time.

The causes: excessive borrowing (particularly from China), COVID-19 tourism collapse, the disastrous organic farming mandate that crashed agricultural output, and mismanaged tax cuts.

India's response was immediate and substantial — approximately $4 billion in emergency assistance:

  • $400 million currency swap under the SAARC framework
  • $1 billion credit line for essential imports (food, fuel, medicine)
  • $500 million credit line for petroleum purchases
  • Deferred payments on existing obligations
  • Supplied 40,000 MT of rice, medicines, and other essentials

This was India's largest bilateral assistance package to any country. It demonstrated India's role as the first responder in the neighbourhood, contrasting with China's slower and more conditional response.

China Factor: Hambantota, Colombo Port City, and Strategic Competition

China's presence in Sri Lanka is the most visible example of debt-trap diplomacy in India's neighbourhood.

Hambantota Port: Sri Lanka borrowed heavily from China to build this port, which proved commercially unviable. Unable to service the debt, Sri Lanka leased the port to China Merchants Port Holdings for 99 years in 2017 for $1.12 billion. India and Western analysts cite Hambantota as the textbook example of China's debt-trap strategy, though China disputes this characterization.

Colombo Port City: A massive $15 billion Chinese-funded reclamation project creating a new financial district on reclaimed land adjoining Colombo port. It operates under special economic zone laws with separate regulations, raising concerns about a Chinese economic enclave.

Submarine docking (2014): Chinese submarines docked at Colombo port twice in 2014 without advance notice to India. This triggered alarm in New Delhi about Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

India's counter-strategy:

  • Adani Group's Colombo West International Container Terminal — India's strategic investment in Colombo port operations
  • Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm — joint development of World War II-era oil storage facilities, giving India an energy footprint in northeastern Sri Lanka
  • Indian Housing Project — over 60,000 houses built in war-affected northern and eastern provinces, creating goodwill among Sri Lankan Tamils

For India's Indo-Pacific approach to countering Chinese influence, see Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Defence and Maritime Security

The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) is India's primary maritime security mechanism in the Indian Ocean region. Members include India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Mauritius. Bangladesh and Seychelles are observers.

The CSC focuses on:

  • Maritime domain awareness
  • Counter-terrorism cooperation
  • Combating drug and human trafficking
  • Cybersecurity

India provides significant defence assistance to Sri Lanka, including Dornier maritime patrol aircraft, patrol vessels, and training for Sri Lankan military personnel at Indian institutions. India's Comprehensive Defence Cooperation Agreement with Sri Lanka aims to deepen military ties.

India also closely monitors Sri Lanka's decisions on foreign military presence. After the 2014 submarine incidents, Sri Lanka informally agreed not to allow Chinese submarine visits without consulting India.

India's Neighbourhood First Policy in Action

India-Sri Lanka relations demonstrate both the strengths and limitations of India's Neighbourhood First Policy. India is the first responder in crises (2004 tsunami, 2019 Easter bombings, 2022 economic crisis). But India struggles to counter China's financial firepower and infrastructure investments.

The relationship requires India to balance Tamil Nadu's domestic politics (fisheries, Tamil rights) with strategic objectives (countering China, maritime security). This dual pressure makes India-Sri Lanka diplomacy uniquely complex.

For understanding India's constitutional framework that influences foreign policy, see Preamble of the Indian Constitution.

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Written by

Rahul Puri Sir

Director & Mentor · Anantam IAS

Rahul Puri is the Director & Mentor at Anantam IAS. He leads the institution's teaching philosophy — focused not on syllabus completion but on the thinking, clarity and consistency that actually crack UPSC. A long-time mentor to hundreds of civil services aspirants and interview toppers (including AIR 28, 48, 56, 73, 96, 106, 116, 143 in CSE 2025), he anchors Anantam's flagship Interview Guidance Programme.

Specialises in · Institutional leadership, mentoring and programme design Experience · 10+ years Visit website ↗

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