GS Paper 2 practice questions for UPSC Mains 2026.

Introduction: India and Nepal share an open border under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, with a pegged Nepalese rupee at 1.6 INR and over 6 million Nepalese living in India.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Irritants: Nepal's Constitution (September 2015) was followed by a Madhesi blockade; the 2020 'new political map' included Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura; the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report (2018) remains unaccepted; (ii) Connectivity wins: Motihari-Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline (September 2019, 69 km), Jaynagar-Janakpur railway (April 2022), Arun-III hydropower (900 MW under SJVN); (iii) China factor: Nepal-China Trans-Himalayan Railway feasibility study and 2017 BRI MoU; the pro-China KP Sharma Oli government dissolved in mid-2024 to a Prachanda-Deuba coalition that recalibrated toward Delhi.

Way forward / Conclusion: Receive the EPG report, conclude the long-pending Pancheshwar DPR under the Mahakali Treaty 1996, expand 10,000 MW power-purchase agreements and let states (UP, Bihar) lead micro-cooperation under BBIN MVA.

Introduction: BIMSTEC, founded in 1997 as BIST-EC and renamed in 2004, links 5 South Asian states (India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka) with 2 Southeast Asian (Myanmar, Thailand). The BIMSTEC Charter entered into force 20 May 2024.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Strategic value: 22 percent of world population, $5+ trillion combined GDP, Bay of Bengal connectivity bridge for Act East; (ii) Sixth Summit Bangkok (4 April 2025) — Bangkok Vision 2030, BIMSTEC Centre of Excellence on Disaster Management at Noida, BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce, master plan on transport connectivity; (iii) Limits: pending BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement (mooted 2004), Myanmar civil war disrupts BIMSTEC Motor Vehicles Agreement, no joint defence framework yet.

Way forward / Conclusion: Close the BIMSTEC FTA, operationalise Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project and Trilateral Highway, and make BIMSTEC the Bay of Bengal connectivity backbone alongside MAHASAGAR.

Introduction: The Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia) was revived in 2017, elevated to leaders' level in 2021, and at the 2025 Quad summit (rotated to India in 2025) committed to working groups on critical and emerging technologies, supply chains, climate, health, and cybersecurity.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Convergences: Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), Quad Cybersecurity Partnership, Quad Open RAN deployment in Palau and Tuvalu, Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group; (ii) India's distinctive line: refuses NATO-like framing, calls it a 'force for global good', no Section 2 collective defence; (iii) Limits: no permanent secretariat, no joint command, ASEAN centrality strain, and Trump-era trade tariffs (50 percent on Indian goods August 2025) tested cohesion before the 2 February 2026 framework rolled back to 18 percent.

Way forward / Conclusion: Anchor the Quad in deliverables (semiconductor supply chains, undersea cables, dual-use space), preserve issue-based flexibility, and bridge through Quad-Plus with EU and South Korea on tech standards.

Introduction: BRICS expanded in January 2024 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE) and January 2025 (Indonesia), reaching ten members holding 4.45 billion people and 44 percent of global GDP (PPP) per IMF 2025.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Weight: 35 percent of world PPP GDP overtook the G7 in 2018; New Development Bank lends in member currencies; (ii) Cohesion failure: 14-15 May 2026 New Delhi foreign ministers' meeting ended without a joint statement; Iran sought condemnation of US-Israel, UAE refused; India issued Chair's Statement and Outcome Document; (iii) Multipolarity verdict: BRICS has weight without strategy; India's line is 'non-Western, not anti-Western'; Jaishankar reiterated India 'has never been for de-dollarisation' and there is 'no proposal for a BRICS currency'.

Way forward / Conclusion: Use BRICS for agenda-setting (UNSC reform, IMF quotas, DPI export, food security), not bloc-building; deepen New Development Bank local-currency lending; resist enlargement that buys breadth at cohesion's cost.

Introduction: India's G20 Presidency culminated in the New Delhi Leaders' Declaration (9-10 September 2023), built on the theme Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam — 'One Earth, One Family, One Future'.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Diplomatic wins: 100 percent consensus despite Ukraine war, AU membership as 21st permanent member, IMEC launched on the sidelines; (ii) Substantive deliverables: Global Biofuels Alliance, DPI as a public good (India Stack export), Voluntary SDG Action Plan, MDB reform agenda; (iii) Continuity: Brazil 2024 (Rio) carried forward, South Africa 2025, Trump's 2026 hosting in jeopardy after Russia-Iran tensions.

Way forward / Conclusion: Use Sherpa-track continuity to lock in DPI standards (Modular Open-Source Identity Platform), keep AU's permanent seat as Global South leverage, and push 2026 successor declaration on critical minerals governance.

Introduction: India's strategic autonomy was stress-tested when the US imposed a 25 percent reciprocal tariff plus a 25 percent penalty on Indian goods in August 2025, tied to a July 2025 executive order monitoring Russian-oil buyers.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Pressure metrics: India-US goods trade $129.2 billion (2024); US trade deficit with India $45.7 billion; tariffs landed because the US is India's largest goods export market at 18 percent of exports; (ii) Indian counterplay: Russian crude share rose from 2 percent (2021) to 35.9 percent (FY24); after Rosneft-Lukoil sanctions (21 November 2025), share fell to 21.2 percent by January 2026; (iii) 6 February 2026 framework rolled tariffs back to 18 percent without India officially conceding on Russian oil; Jaishankar reiterated strategic autonomy at Munich 14 February 2026.

Way forward / Conclusion: Diversify oil basket beyond Russia (now from 40 countries), conclude India-US trade pact, push rupee internationalisation rather than de-dollarisation, and harden CAATSA waiver clarity through legislation.

Introduction: The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), legislated under Regulation (EU) 2023/956, enters definitive phase from 1 January 2026, imposing a carbon levy on six sectors — iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity, hydrogen.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Trade exposure: India exported about $8.2 billion of CBAM-covered goods to EU in 2023-24, with iron-and-steel and aluminium most exposed; (ii) Equity argument: CBAM violates CBDR-RC principle of UNFCCC and Article 4 of the Paris Agreement; India and BASIC group oppose it as 'green protectionism'; (iii) Domestic response: India proposes its own Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS, 2023), Perform Achieve Trade (PAT) cycle credits, and a domestic carbon price to retain revenue.

Way forward / Conclusion: Bilateral CBAM-equivalence under the India-EU FTA (concluded 27 January 2026), accelerate hydrogen-based steel via National Green Hydrogen Mission, and contest CBAM at WTO under GATT Article XX(b)(g).

Introduction: China controls about 60 percent of world rare-earth mining but 91 percent of separation and refining and 94 percent of permanent magnets, turning a midstream chokepoint into geopolitical leverage.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Export-control timeline: gallium-germanium (July 2023), graphite-antimony (2024), seven rare earths (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium) on 4 April 2025, foreign-origin extension 1 December 2025; (ii) India's exposure: 100 percent import-dependent for lithium, cobalt, nickel; China supplies 30.8 percent of India's industrial-goods requirements (GTRI); India-China FY25 trade deficit $99.2 billion; (iii) Response: National Critical Mineral Mission (January 2025, Rs 16,300 crore for 7 years), Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) acquisitions in Argentina and Australia, Critical Minerals Initiative under Quad and Mineral Security Partnership.

Way forward / Conclusion: Domestic processing capacity via PLI, strategic stockpiling via NCMM, deep-sea mining licences from International Seabed Authority for Carlsberg Ridge polymetallic nodules, and rare-earth recycling under Battery Waste Management Rules 2022.

Introduction: India's diaspora — 1.34 crore NRIs plus 2.21 crore PIOs (MEA 2024) — is the largest in the world, with World Bank reporting record FY25 remittances of $135.46 billion, more than India's defence budget.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Recognition architecture: Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (9 January, marking Gandhi's return from South Africa 1915), OCI card under Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003, merger of PIO into OCI (2015), Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award; (ii) Welfare and rights: e-Migrate portal under Emigration Act 1983, MADAD grievance redress, Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana; SVEEP and ECI 2024 amendment for postal voting in select pilot constituencies; (iii) Strategic leverage: Gulf workers (about 9 million) and UAE alone 19 percent of remittances; H-1B Indian-American influence in US tech; UK-India migration mobility partnership (May 2021); Caribbean and Mauritius diasporas in MAHASAGAR.

Way forward / Conclusion: Operationalise diaspora-bond mechanism (RBI), extend overseas voting to OCI cardholders, ratify ILO C-189 to protect women domestic-worker migrants, and use diaspora networks in IMEC and African countries.

Introduction: The Immigration and Foreigners Act 2025 (received Presidential assent 4 April 2025) repeals the Passport (Entry into India) Act 1920, Registration of Foreigners Act 1939, Foreigners Act 1946 and Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act 2000.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Consolidation: single statute for entry, stay, exit, deportation; Bureau of Immigration with statutory backing; e-Visa regime formalised; (ii) Strengthens diaspora links: clearer regime for OCI cardholders, biometric verification, faster deportation of overstaying foreigners; (iii) Concerns: Section 3 wide governmental discretion; civil-society worry on bonafide refugees absent UNHCR refugee convention ratification; Tibetan and Rohingya communities outside Bureau registry.

Way forward / Conclusion: Notify Refugee Bill 2023 to plug the protection gap, expand Mobility and Migration Partnerships (Germany 2022, UK 2021, Australia 2023), and equip BoI with AI-based facial recognition under DPDP Act 2023.

Introduction: Since the India-US Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific (2015) the partnership has moved from buyer-seller to a Major Defence Partner (2016) and an Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET, January 2023).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Defence breakthroughs: GE F414 jet-engine co-production MoU (June 2023, for Tejas Mk2), 31 MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones ($3.5 billion, 2024), Sonobuoy MoU between Ultra Maritime and Bharat Dynamics (2024); (ii) Technology: iCET extended to next-gen telecoms, AI, biotech, advanced materials; India joined Mineral Security Partnership (June 2023); (iii) Frictions: 50 percent tariffs (August 2025) until 6 February 2026 framework; Russia oil dispute; H-1B visa cap; US Department of Justice indictment of Indian officials over Pannun assassination plot (November 2023).

Way forward / Conclusion: Finalise India-US bilateral trade pact, operationalise General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) end-use, and ensure semiconductor co-fab via Tata Electronics-Analog Devices.

Introduction: The India-Russia 'Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership' (2010) re-extended its 2001 friendship treaty during the Putin-Xi May 2026 Beijing meeting, just as India recalibrates its defence and energy basket.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Defence diversification: SIPRI 2025 — Russia 70 percent (2011-15) to 40 percent (2021-25); France 29 percent, Israel 15 percent; S-400 (5 contracted 2018, 3 delivered, 2 delayed by Russia-Ukraine war); BrahMos JV; AK-203 Korwa JV; (ii) Energy pivot: Russian crude 1 percent (2021) to 35.9 percent (FY24); fell to 21.2 percent (January 2026) after Rosneft-Lukoil sanctions (21 November 2025); record near 2.3 million b/d in early May 2026; (iii) Strategic limits: Russia's deepening dependence on China; Putin-Xi May 2026 visit re-extended 2001 friendship treaty; RIC dormant since Galwan 2020.

Way forward / Conclusion: Continue defence diversification (FRAM Indian-design GE F414), retain Russia for spares and overhaul, push rupee-rouble trade settlement, and treat Russia as one card in multialignment not the ace.

Introduction: The 21 October 2024 patrolling arrangement at Depsang and Demchok closed the last two friction points from the 2020 Galwan stand-off. Modi-Xi held the first bilateral in five years at BRICS Kazan (23 October 2024).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Vocabulary: 'disengagement on patrolling' is not 'de-escalation' (force-thinning) or 'normalisation' (boundary resolution); (ii) Friction points cleared — Galwan, Pangong Tso, Gogra-Hot Springs (PP15/17A), Depsang Bulge, Demchok; (iii) Outstanding: WMCC (Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs) on confidence-building; LAC infrastructure asymmetry (Bharatmala-LAC roads now match China side); India-China trade deficit $99.2 billion FY25; visa relaxation for journalists and direct flights restored (2025).

Way forward / Conclusion: Sequence disengagement to de-escalation to normalisation per Special Representatives mechanism (33rd round 18 December 2024), resume Mansarovar Yatra under bilateral consular protocols, and maintain LAC infrastructure plus Mountain Strike Corps as deterrents.

Introduction: The UN Charter (Article 23) fixed the five permanent members (P5) in 1945. The Pact for the Future, adopted 22 September 2024 at the UN Summit of the Future, commits to UNSC reform without specifying timelines.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) India's case: founding member, fifth-largest economy, largest UN troop contributor (over 2.75 lakh peacekeepers since 1948), G20 host, 1.4 billion people; eighth non-permanent term (2021-22); (ii) Reform tracks: G4 (India, Japan, Germany, Brazil) joint candidature for permanent seats; Uniting for Consensus (Italy, Pakistan, etc.) opposes; African Union 'Ezulwini Consensus' (2005) demands 2 African permanent seats; (iii) Obstacles: P5 veto on amendments (Article 108), text-based negotiations stalled in Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) since 2008.

Way forward / Conclusion: Move IGN to text-based negotiations, build a G4-AU bridge under Ezulwini, secure African Union as 21st G20 member as a template, and tie reform to the UN's 80th-anniversary review (2025-26).

Introduction: The WTO's two-tier dispute settlement system (DSU 1994) has had a paralysed Appellate Body since December 2019, when the US blocked new judges. MC13 in Abu Dhabi (February 2024) failed to revive it.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Paralysis impact: 'appeal into the void' tactic by losing parties; 30+ pending appeals as of 2025; Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) — 53 members, India outside; (ii) India's interests: WTO panel ruled against India in ICT tariffs case (April 2023); India's challenge to EU CBAM hinges on appellate review; (iii) Reform agenda: MC13 mandated 'fully and well-functioning DS system by 2024' but no progress; agriculture and Public Stockholding (PSH) permanent solution still pending.

Way forward / Conclusion: Join the MPIA pragmatically to protect interim rulings, push G20 trade ministers on DS reform, defend PSH at MC14 (Cameroon 2026), and use WTO TRIPS Section 31bis flexibility for pharma exports.

Introduction: The IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report (March 2023) warned that the 1.5 degree pathway requires global GHG emissions to peak before 2025 and decline 43 percent by 2030 (relative to 2019).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) India's Updated NDC (August 2022): 45 percent reduction in emissions intensity of GDP by 2030 (from 2005), 50 percent non-fossil installed capacity, net zero by 2070; LIFE (Lifestyle for Environment) added at COP27; (ii) COP30 Belem (November 2025) — India pushed CBDR-RC, Loss and Damage Fund operationalisation (post-COP28), and a Just Transition narrative; (iii) Domestic delivery: 232 GW renewable capacity (March 2026), Green Hydrogen Mission (Rs 19,744 crore), India SDG Index score 71/100 (NITI Aayog 2023-24).

Way forward / Conclusion: Submit NDC 3.0 in 2025-26 cycle, push Loss and Damage finance from developed countries ($300 billion New Collective Quantified Goal at COP29), and align CCTS with EU CBAM equivalence.

Introduction: India-EU FTA negotiations, paused since 2013, restarted in June 2022 alongside the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and concluded on 27 January 2026, creating a trade zone covering 2 billion people and roughly a quarter of world GDP.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Architecture: FTA + Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) + Geographical Indications (GI) Agreement; tariff cuts on autos, wines and spirits, dairy; (ii) Residual chapters: CBAM equivalence dispute, public procurement, mode-4 services (movement of natural persons), Sustainability and Trade chapter referencing ILO core conventions; (iii) Strategic value: EU is India's largest trading partner ($137.4 billion in 2023-24 for goods); buttresses IMEC; counterweight to RCEP that India did not join.

Way forward / Conclusion: Ratify across 27 EU national parliaments and the European Parliament, sequence CBAM equivalence with India's CCTS, and use Trade and Technology Council for semiconductors and AI governance.

Introduction: The Union Cabinet approved the National Critical Mineral Mission on 29 January 2025 with Rs 16,300 crore outlay over 7 years plus expected Rs 18,000 crore PSU investment, in response to weaponised mineral chokepoints.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Vulnerability: India 100 percent import-dependent for lithium, cobalt, nickel; China refines 91 percent of rare earths; the 4 April 2025 Chinese export licensing on 7 rare earths cut yttrium, dysprosium and terbium exports about 50 percent below baseline; (ii) NCMM architecture: 30 critical minerals notified, Geological Survey of India to do 1,200 exploration projects, offshore mineral block auctions under Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act 2023; (iii) International: Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL), Mineral Security Partnership (June 2023), Quad Critical Minerals Initiative.

Way forward / Conclusion: Domestic processing capacity via PLI, strategic stockpiling (US DPA Title III model), International Seabed Authority licences for Carlsberg Ridge polymetallic nodules, and rare-earth recycling under Battery Waste Management Rules 2022.

Introduction: The India Semiconductor Mission (December 2021) anchors Programme for Development of Semiconductors and Display Manufacturing Ecosystem in India with Rs 76,000 crore outlay, expanded under ISM 2.0 in 2024.

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Approved units: Tata Electronics-PSMC fab in Dholera ($11 billion, 28 nm), Tata OSAT in Jagiroad, Micron OSAT in Sanand ($2.75 billion), Kaynes ATMP, CG Power-Renesas ATMP; (ii) Strategic logic: friend-shoring under US CHIPS Act 2022 dynamics, JIST trilateral with US and Japan, Quad Semiconductor Supply Chain Initiative; (iii) Limits: most approvals are packaging-assembly-test (OSAT) rather than leading-edge fabrication; talent gap of 250,000-300,000 engineers per the India Electronics and Semiconductor Association; capital-intensive long gestation.

Way forward / Conclusion: Move from 28 nm to 14 nm via Tata-PSMC roadmap, scale design-linked incentives for fabless start-ups under DLI scheme, and use iCET technology agreement for advanced lithography access.

Introduction: India imports about 88-89 percent of its crude oil, burning about 5.5 million b/d (2026). The Strait of Hormuz, only 33 km wide at its narrowest, carries about 20 million b/d (20 percent of world's petroleum-liquids trade).

Body: Three dimensions — (i) Hormuz exposure: India took 30-40 percent of crude via Hormuz in Feb-March 2026; by March 2026 about 70 percent of crude was arriving outside Hormuz from 40 countries, up from 55 percent a year earlier; (ii) Diversification levers: Russia top supplier (about 30-35 percent), US imports up 31 percent YoY (December 2025), West African and Latin American expansion; (iii) Strategic reserves and infrastructure: 5.33 MMT Strategic Petroleum Reserve at Visakhapatnam, Mangalore and Padur (Phase I); Phase II at Chandikhol and Padur expansion; LNG import terminals; PM Surya Ghar (rooftop solar) and 500 GW non-fossil 2030 target.

Way forward / Conclusion: Expand SPR to 90-day IEA cover, accelerate biofuels (E20 by 2025), operationalise National Green Hydrogen Mission, and treat critical-mineral access as energy-security adjacency.